

JPRS 77073

29 December 1980

West Europe Report

No. 1675



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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CONTENTS

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

NORWAY

Steen's Inclusion of Kola in Nuclear Free Zone Discussed (Olav Trygve Storvik; AFTENPOSTEN, 29 Nov 80)	1
USSR's Palin: Kola Will Not Be Included in Nuclear Free Zone (AFTENPOSTEN, 29 Nov 80)	3
Authors Opposed To Advance Storage Discuss Storting Defense Panel Role (Per-Arne Bjerke; ARBEIDERBLADET, 13 Nov 80)	5
Norwegian Forces Commander Huitfeldt Backs Stockpiling (AFTENPOSTEN, 25 Nov 80)	8
Briefs Young Liberals Oppose Stockpiling	10

ENERGY ECONOMICS

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Saving of Residential Heating Costs Through Heat Pumps Examined (DER SPIEGEL, 20 Oct 80)	11
Lessening of Dependence on OPEC Energy, Capital Vital (Hans Baumann; DIE WELT, WELT DER WIRTSCHAFT, 20 Oct 80)....	18

FRANCE

Nation's Energy Supply Seen Remaining 'Precarious' (Pierre Pean; LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE, 10 Nov 80)	20
Economist Michel Develle Interviewed on Oil Supply (Michel Develle Interview; L'USINE NOUVELLE, 10 Nov 80).....	23

Price, Supply 'Unknown' Factors in Oil Supply (Marie Sellier; L'USINE NOUVELLE, 10 Nov 80)	25
GREECE	
Illegal Use of Propane Gas by Taxicabs Reported (G. Papanikolaou; O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS, 16 Oct 80).....	28
ITALY	
Coal Mining in Sardinia To Be Developed (RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA, 10 Oct 80; L'UNIONE SARDA, 24 Oct 80)..	32
CARBOSULCIS' Plan Revealed Funds for CARBOSULCIS	
NORWAY	
Energy Minister Johanson Comments on Oil Reserves (AFTENPOSTEN, 21 Nov 80)	34
Statoil, Norsk Hydro, Saga Offer Gold Block Plans (Hans Christian Erlandsen; AFTENPOSTEN, 21 Nov 80).....	36
SWEDEN	
Mexico To Deliver First Oil in 1981 as Pact Signed (SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 11 Nov 80)	38
Volvo's Future Energy Efforts To Concentrate on North Sea (Lars Hellberg; AFTENPOSTEN, 27 Nov 80)	40
TURKEY	
'TERCUMAN' Examines Oil Crisis (Nazli Ilıcak; TERCUMAN, 18 Nov 80)	41
Half of Oil To Come From Saudi Arabia (TERCUMAN, 18 Nov 80)	45
COUNTRY SECTION	
CYPRUS	
Similarities Between Cypriot, Palestinian Questions Analyzed (Spyros Kyprianou Interview; AL-QABAS, 30 Oct 80).....	47
Interview Conducted With Raif Denktas (Erten Kasimoglu; HALKIN SESI, 16, 17 Oct 80)	55
Socialist Leaders Condemns, Flays American Policies (Khalil al-Taqi; AL-QABAS, 4 Nov 80)	62
Economy: Worst Is Yet To Come (THE CYPRUS MAIL, 28 Nov-4 Dec 80)	67

Grim Warning by Employers' Chief (THE CYPRUS MAIL, 28 Nov-4 Dec 80)	68
------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

Direct Air Link to Yugoslavia (THE CYPRUS WEEKLY, 28 Nov-4 Dec 80)	69
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

FINLAND

Official: Soviet Defector's Return Consistent With UN Pact (Staffan Bruun; HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 16 Oct 80)	70
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

Holkeri Denies Interest in Presidential Candidacy (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 9 Nov 80)	72
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

Labor Ministry Personnel Hit CP Boss' Appointments (Editorial; HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 16 Oct 80)	74
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

Briefs	
Central Bank Curtailing Credit	77
Electronics Industry Advances	77

FRANCE

Rocard Speaks on 1981 Election, Political Situation, Giscard (Jean-Marie Colombani; LE MONDE, 26 Nov 80).....	78
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

Delays Announcing Candidacy Show Troubled Election Climate (Noel-Jean Bergeroux; LE MONDE, 29 Oct 80) ...	82
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

Recent Military Actions in Africa Reviewed (Jacques Servranckx; DEFENSE NATIONALE, Nov 80)	86
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

GREECE

Pending Issues Exploited by Political Parties (Panos Loukakos; TO VIMA, 16 Nov 80)	92
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

PASOK Party Support Analyzed (Mikhail Dimitriou; TO VIMA, 16 Nov 80)	96
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

Status on Restoration of Order Units Reported (Spyros Karatzaferis; ELEVTHEROITYPIA, 14, 15 Oct 80).....	103
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

New Units
Incentives for Recruits

Budget Is Balanced Without Imposing New Taxes (ATHENS NEWS, 28 Nov 80)	106
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

Government Supports Palestinians (ATHENS NEWS, 29 Nov 80)	109
--------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

Olympic Group Likes Kaiafa as Games Site (ATHENS NEWS, 29 Nov 80)	110
Chemicals in Food Processing Deplored by Government Official (AKROPOLIS, 22 Oct 80)	111
Briefs Five Day Week	115
NORWAY	
Conservative Party MP Langslet Attacks Security Affairs Panel (Morten Fyhn; AFTENPOSTEN, 28 Nov 80)	116
Storting Votes Foreign Aid Law, Increases Afghans' Aid (AFTENPOSTEN, 19 Nov 80)	118
Conservatives' Benkow Urges Increased Svalbard Development (Einar Solvoll; AFTENPOSTEN, 17 Nov 80)	121
Labor Party's Sudden Loss of Support Worries Leaders (Kjell Harberg; AFTENPOSTEN, 29 Nov 80)	123
Briefs Liberals' Rossbach on Prestockage	125
PORTUGAL	
Church-State, Military, Economic Factors in Political Change (Jose Rebelo; LE MONDE, various dates)	126
SPAIN	
Constitutional Bases for Catalanian Autonomy, Generalitat Powers (Gerard Camilleri; REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, Oct 80)	137
SWEDEN	
Paper Backs Ullstens' Criticism of USSR at Madrid (Editorial; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 14 Nov 80)	156
Wallenberg: IMF Will Control Nation in 4 Years (Hasse Olsson; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 8 Nov 80)	157
Bohman Discusses Economy, Wage Negotiations, Party (Ola Gummesson Interview; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 9 Nov 80).....	159
Industry Council Urges Increased Cooperation With EC (Anders Nilsson; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 8 Nov 80)	166

TURKEY

Karakas Wanted as Erbakan Defense Witness (DUNYA, 12 Nov 80)	168
TWPP, NAP Members Sought by Authorities (HURRIYET, 13 Nov 80)	169
Passport Law Changes Submitted (TERCUMAN, 16 Nov 80)	173
Religious Education To Be Revamped (MILLI GAZETE, 15 Nov 80) ..	179
Changes Occur in Top-Level Personnel (DUNYA, 16 Nov 80) ..	181
IMF Wants Private Bank Credit for Turkey (MILLIYET, 16 Nov 80)	183
SPO Authority Has Been Broadened (MILLI GAZETE, 4 Dec 80)	185
Realities of Economic Policy Explored (Editorial; Teoman Erel; MILLIYET, 4 Dec 80) ...	187

STEEN'S INCLUSION OF KOLA IN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE DISCUSSED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Nov 80 p 4

[Article by Olav Trygve Storvik]

[Excerpts] Reiulf Steen has said that the Labor Party will include in its program the party's intention to back a zone free of nuclear weapons "in the Nordic region" as part of the work for nuclear-free zones in a larger European context. With this political move the idea of a nuclear-free zone in our part of the world will probably remain a central part of the security policy debate in the time ahead. We will take a brief look here at which nuclear weapons such discussions would involve if the idea gains support.

The "Nordic area" has not been more precisely defined but Steen has said that he is thinking of Scandinavia, the Kola Peninsula and the Baltic region. Although the Nordic countries have not made internationally binding commitments not to station nuclear weapons on their soil, Scandinavia is really a nuclear-free zone anyway. Thus the discussions would have to concern the Soviet nuclear weapons that are a threat to Scandinavia. The Soviet strategic weapons systems that make up part of the central balance between the United States and the Soviet Union would be left out here even if they are stationed in the proposed zone area. This primarily concerns the strategic Soviet nuclear submarines at the Kola North Fleet bases.

The Soviet nuclear weapons that might be used against Norway and the rest of Scandinavia can be divided into two groups. One consists of nuclear weapons so situated in the Soviet Union as to appear intended solely for use against Scandinavia and Finland. These include nuclear artillery shells that can be fired from heavy cannons and ballistic nuclear missiles with a short to medium range. The second group consists of weapons which due to their mobility and long range can be used against Scandinavia as well as other parts of the world. These weapons will probably be the most difficult obstacle to the idea of a nuclear-free zone. They include pursuit planes and bombers, certain types of ships and Eurostrategic nuclear missiles.

The weapons in the first group, the ones intended solely for use against Scandinavia, are primarily stationed on Kola where they are a normal part of the equipment for the support troops for the two Soviet infantry divisions assigned

to the area. These divisions are supported by an artillery brigade equipped with 122-mm and 152-mm cannons and a missile brigade equipped with nuclear missiles for shorter distances. In addition, in the area south of Murmansk there are two bases for medium-range missiles with a total of 10 launching ramps for the SS-5, a missile with a range of 600 km.

AFTENPOSTEN was told by the Defense Ministry that the Soviet land forces on Kola have tactical nuclear weapons as an organic part of their permanent installations, with the range being such that Scandinavia is the only possible operations area. The weapons involved are nuclear missiles named "Scud," "Frog" and "Scaleboard" by NATO. They are all older types and are now being replaced by SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 missiles which are more accurate and have ranges of 230, 700 and 2000 km respectively. It is not known how far the Soviet modernization program on Kola has come to date.

In 1976 the Soviet Union stationed six older Golf-II class submarines equipped with nuclear missiles in the Baltic Sea, the first time ballistic missiles were permanently stationed in this ocean area. After that time it has been discussed whether these submarines should be regarded as a threat to the Nordic region or if the primary operations area for the missiles is West Europe. No simple answer can be given to the question but all of southern Norway can be reached by the missiles which are of the SS-N-5 type and have a range of 1100 km. The explosive force is 1-2 megatons.

There are also a number of fighter bombers stationed at Kola Peninsula air bases which can carry air-to-ground missiles with nuclear charges.

There are similar problems with regard to several types of vessels included in the North Fleet which are equipped with nuclear weapons. Most of these vessels presumably have primary duties outside Scandinavia but the point is that they can also be used against Norwegian territory if a decision is made to do so.

A special problem that could be taken up in any discussion of a nuclear-free zone is the increasing traffic of nuclear-powered Soviet vessels along the Norwegian coast and in adjacent ocean areas. This traffic also creates a mounting danger of collisions, other accidents and pollution of the ocean with possible consequences for marine life. Not long ago a Soviet nuclear-powered submarine was wrecked off Japan, officially due to a fire onboard. Things went well that time but the event illustrates the problems that can suddenly confront us. It is not known what safety precautions Soviet vessels have against pollution or if the Soviet Union has any emergency plans for avoiding sea accidents in the vicinity of Norway. Geographically both Norway and Japan have ocean areas containing increasing activity on the part of Soviet nuclear-powered vessels.

6578
CSO: 3108

USSR'S FALIN: KOLA WILL NOT BE INCLUDED IN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Nov 80 p 11

[Text] The Soviet Union would be pleased to have a nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia. "We are ready to make guarantees that are binding under international law not to use nuclear weapons against countries that promise not to have such weapons on their own territory." Valentin Falin said this in an interview with the communist newspaper FRIHETEN. Falin is the Number 2 man in the central committee's international information section and a prominent spokesman and diplomat. For many years he has served as an ambassador to Bonn.

But at the same time Falin clearly rejected the idea of including the Soviet missiles on the Kola Peninsula in a nuclear-free zone.

"All military forces stationed in northern areas of the Soviet Union are totally irrelevant to relations between Norway and the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund's attempt to involve Kola is analogous to demanding that if something happens in northern Europe something must also be done on the east coast of the United States.

"What is stationed on the Kola Peninsula must be seen in the context of what has been developed and stationed in corresponding areas of the United States. This has nothing to do with our relations with Norway. One does not build intercontinental missiles and the like to shoot down border barricades," Falin said.

Of relations with Norway he said among other things that American planning leads to problems. Without these problems neighbors like the Soviet Union and Norway could live very well together, he maintained.

In response to a question from FRIHETEN about how the Soviet Union evaluates American strategy and nuclear-free zones in Europe, Falin replied:

"The Soviet Union's position in regard to that question is quite concrete and very clear. We are prepared to resolve this question totally and internationally.

"In the first place we are awaiting a reply from the other side to our proposal that all nations signing the final Helsinki agreement--in practice this means

all the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations--pledge not to be the first to use arms, whether conventional or nuclear. That would serve as a guarantee for all nations, including those in northern Europe.

"If we all promise that, that no country will be the first to resort to armed force, this would in practice rule out all warfare in Europe. That would be a pledge to resolve all questions with peaceful and political means.

"In the second place we are prepared to give guarantees to all states that do not currently have nuclear weapons and do not intend to station such weapons on their territory that we will not use nuclear weapons against them if war should come. We are willing to give such guarantees and if necessary to solidify these guarantees in a binding form under international law," Valentin Falin said to **PRIMETEN**.

6578

CSO: 3108

AUTHORS OPPOSED TO ADVANCE STORAGE DISCUSS STORTING DEFENSE PANEL ROLE

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET is Norwegian 13 Nov 80 p 6

[Article by Per-Arne Bjerke]

[Text] "There is much more openness in Storting today on foreign and security policy issues than there used to be. The system used to be considerably more closed. This was also true of relations between Storting and the government. In my experience there have been obvious improvements. It is not as hard for an ordinary representative to obtain information on discussions of defense and security policy."

Storting president Guttorm Hansen made these remarks to ARBEIDERBLADET. The background is the debate on the influence of Storting representatives on security policy. In the book "Nuclear Weapons and Insecurity Policy" four Labor Party representatives, Kirsti Grondahl, Inger-Lise Gjørsv, Anne-Lise Bakken and Ingrid Eide wrote a chapter in which they said that most Storting representatives have to play a spectator role.

We asked Guttorm Hansen and Gro Harlem Brundtland if they agreed with the views expressed in the book. Is it hard for a Storting representative to find out what is happening in security policy?

Various Channels

"Everyone in Storting has open access to information on security policy issues through various channels," said Gro Harlem Brundtland.

"We have the budget debate and the foreign minister's reports. And the regular issues taken up by the Foreign Affairs Committee are also presented to Storting as a whole.

"But as in other areas it isn't easy to get a complete picture the minute one enters Storting. Therefore it might be a good idea to make it clear in bills and reports when fundamental issues were being brought up," said Harlem Brundtland who in addition to being deputy leader of the Labor Party group in Storting is also chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Is there no basis for the criticisms made by the four Labor representatives?

"Some representatives have experienced the situation described in the book and that is a fact. Therefore it is important that the opportunities for acquiring information are utilized. But it is quite clear that there is no cloud of secrecy in Storting surrounding everything involving defense and security policy. These words have been used and this creates an incorrect picture of what goes on. Aside from the limitations imposed by the need to keep some of the issues in the expanded Foreign Affairs Committee secret there are good opportunities to get information on security policy.

Greater Openness

"There is a trend underway toward even greater openness in this area. I think there is a deliberate government attitude that anything that can be open should be handled that way. My experience from working in the government is that they realize the need for greater openness and are trying to meet it," said Gro Harlem Brundtland.

Expanded Foreign Affairs Committee

"The expanded Foreign Affairs Committee is not that important," said Guttorm Hansen.

In the book, "Nuclear Weapons and Insecurity Policy," the role played by the expanded Foreign Affairs Committee in security policy decisions was pointed out. The committee has 25 members and its meetings are secret.

Guttorm Hansen said that the government consults the expanded committee on important foreign policy, security policy and trade policy issues. If four of the members of the committee insist the issues must also be presented to Storting. Committee discussions are often advisory for the government. The government is fully responsible for its own decisions and the consultations with the expanded committee are not binding on either side.

"The claim that only established people sit on the committee is often true with large modifications. People who are quite new in Storting have often become members. But here as elsewhere it is true that experience plays a certain role when the parties appoint their representatives. It is the parties that select their members for both the regular and the expanded foreign affairs committees.

"And it is not true, as has been charged, that only representatives with certain definite views sit on the committee. In the last session SV [Socialist-Left Party] had three representatives on the expanded committee and during the EC conflict there were representatives from both sides."

Negotiations

"I have been part of the expanded committee since 1965," said Guttorm Hansen. "Most of the meetings have been used to discuss the situation during important

negotiations in which Norway has been involved. This was true of the question of fishing limits and of relations with EC. In recent years, ocean rights issues have been discussed frequently.

"I think it must be quite obvious that a country cannot discuss its negotiation position with other nations openly. This can't be done in closed Storting meetings either. We must have a body where it is possible to talk confidentially.

"There are some things one has to discuss in secret meetings. But we are not talking about the most controversial issues. They come up more often in other ways," said the president of Storting.

6578

CSO: 3108

NORWEGIAN FORCES COMMANDER HUITFELDT BACKS STOCKPILING

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 25 Nov 80 p 3

[Text] "I was surprised by the agreement between the Norwegian and American governments on stockpiling allied materiel in Trondelag. This will greatly improve our ability to ward off attacks against our territory," said the supreme commander in North Norway, Lieutenant General Tonne Huitfeldt, at a seminar in Oslo yesterday. The general found nothing lacking in the agreement but added that it remains to be seen what we Norwegians can do in North Norway.

Storting president Guttorm Hansen assumed that the matter will be presented to Storting for ratification under the constitution as an agreement of special importance to the nation.

It is understood that the matter will be put through after it has been discussed by the national committee of the Labor Party next week.

The Storting president, General Huitfeldt and research director Ragnvald Solstrand of the Defense Research Institute spoke yesterday at a seminar in Oslo under the auspices of the Norwegian Atlantic Ocean Committee of which Guttorm Hansen (Labor) is chairman. He maintained that the recent Storting debate on the defense budget went more easily than expected in anticipation of the stockpiling agreement. "The arguments from skeptics followed an interesting and coordinated plan," the Storting president said. "They more or less said the same thing, namely that they would oppose any budget increase to cover the cost of another Norwegian brigade in North Norway."

General Huitfeldt took up the same theme when he pointed out that there is already stockpiling of supplies for a Norwegian brigade in the north. "What is involved here is guaranteeing similar supplies for another one."

The supreme commander in North Norway discussed stockpiling in a new publication issued by the Atlantic Ocean Committee. The general emphasized among other things: "From a purely military evaluation equipment for allied reinforcements should be stockpiled in advance where current estimates judge there is the greatest need for reinforcements and where it is most likely they will be put in. More precisely this means Troms and Nordland county north of Vestfjord."

The general pointed out further that it is not the size of the reinforcements that counts but the fact that an allied contribution is involved. In reality allied support in the form of land combat forces would make up only a very small part of the effort compared with the Norwegian forces. Their contribution lies in the multinational element, they mean that an attacker cannot go into our area without directly involving other and larger western nations. If the reinforcements are to give our armed forces a stronger deterrent effect we must have a credible ability to bring them in at a sufficiently early point of time.

The government's plan to stockpile supplies for an American marine amphibious brigade in Trondelag indicates that Norwegian authorities also want to strengthen our own defense in North Norway. "On that basis," said Lieutenant General Huitfeldt, "the solution is completely acceptable also from a military point of view."

General Huitfeldt also discussed some of the arguments used against stockpiling and said among other things that reinforcement in the form of American marine amphibious forces is not a way to "sneak atomic weapons in." He pointed out further that any decision within the allied command apparatus affecting Norwegian values or interests can be stopped by a Norwegian veto in the NATO council.

Huitfeldt stressed: "I do not see any possibility of the allied reinforcements being used for anything except what we are planning to use them for, defending Norwegian territory and there is no way 'American plans' can be implemented within the alliance.

What about the possibility of arms control and a possible reduction of military force levels in our vicinity? The general also brought that up and stated that in order to influence developments in that direction at all direct cooperation is needed and the solid backing of NATO and the United States.

Research director Solstrand pointed out that price increases for several types of weapons have been much more rapid than the regular inflation rate. He said that our political authorities in the years ahead would have to impose strict limits on what defense funds are used for and examine the effects achieved with the investments that are made.

6578

CSO: 3108

BRIEFS

YOUNG LIBERALS OPPOSE STOCKPILING--The Young Liberals have interpreted the mother party's national committee resolution on stockpiling. It means the Liberals oppose stockpiling according to a speech made by Young Liberal leader Oystein Heggen. "With its resolution the Liberal Party has shown its determination to defend the intentions behind our base policy and to link stockpiling with a clear demand that nuclear weapons not be used on Norwegian soil. The party has also stated that Norwegian territory must not be used as the springboard for offensive operations against other lands. That is a very important point," Heggen pointed out. "This eliminates long-range aircraft and hangar ships which have been mentioned in combination with stockpiling. It is essential that Norway not be bound more directly to the global strategy of the United States." [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Nov 80 p 3] 6578

CSO: 3108

SAVING OF RESIDENTIAL HEATING COSTS THROUGH HEAT PUMPS EXAMINED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 20 Oct 80 pp 110-122

[Article: "Heat Would Be Extracted From Water, Air and the Ground"]

[Text] In the fall of 1979 half a year after the Ayatollah Khomeini had driven up the price of oil by 75 percent, all 518 members of the German Parliament received the same piece of mail.

53,720,000,000 liters of heating oil, so it was stated in one of the pamphlets "Information for Members of Parliament" distributed by the Happel Heating Company based in Herne, is burned in homes, shops, churches and hospitals just to maintain the winter temperature at 20 degrees. "And," read the Parliamentarians further, "the fact that the people have, so to speak, to stick next year's vacation money in the oil tank is a cause of dissatisfaction."

On page 6 of the slick brochure, however, the representatives--themselves already long since distressed by oil--found out how to get out of it all. An electric heat pump would make it possible for each household to save about 70 percent of the heating oil presently burned. By extracting heat from ground water, the ground or just the air "the national heating oil reserve could be multiplied several fold" and "economic growth without an energy increase could be achieved."

So that the pamphlet would not look like electric company propaganda, Esso board member Peter Schillmeier was pictured circled in red along with a statement supporting the heat pump. And, so as not to stir up the tediously orchestrated strife about atomic energy, there it was in black and white: Those who support the heat pump as a supplement to conventional heating "are not pushing additional nuclear power plants."

The politicians reacted. The finance ministers have since included the installation of an electric heat pump in the list--also including insulation, storm windows and modern heat controls--of energy saving measures supported by a tax rebate. And a couple of high-level government figures took the message quite personally.

"But that installation," Apel told the bidders after some quick calculations, "will never pay for itself." Just for the interest--about DM 2,000 per year--on the invested amount he could continue to heat his house with oil. The minister turned to other companies and finally got a heat pump for about DM 16,000, about DM 12,000 list price plus DM 4,000 for installation, which is the going price on the heat pump market.

Like Apel, others from the upper levels of West German society are also eyeing the new wonder technology. Similarly, Wolfgang Dotzenrath of the Electrical Industry Information Center in Essen bought a heat pump for DM 30,000; however, among friends, he condemns its terrible cost-utility ratio.

Also the Baden-Wuerttemberg SPD Land Chairman and energy-conservation buff Erhard Eppler had one installed in his Dornstetten home. Lufthansa board member Reinhardt Abraham, responsible for the state-run airline's engineering department, is planning a similar purchase in 1981.

Additions to the Nobel Hotel Heedt in Gummersbach are among the industry's show-case installations. Starting with 3 overnight plans following the second world war, owner Guenther Hollaender has made a large operation with 240 beds out of the 150 year old resort hotel. The newest add-on was planned by the hotelier to take advantage of the latest knowledge from energy-conservation technology--thick insulation on the exterior and interior walls and an energy roof on top.

From this absorber roof which absorbs solar and atmospheric heat, a heat pump extracts so much energy that hotelier Hollaender has to pay out only DM 1,000 per month for all of the operational energy required for the 4,000-square-meter addition. Since the electric company RWE participated in the investment and heat-pump manufacturer Happel looks upon the Gummersbach House as a pilot project, there is naturally little said about the investment cost.

Of course, RWE and Happel are the driving force behind the rapidly expanding heat-pump business in the FRG. Early and before the technology of diesel and gas heat pumps matures, the financially-strong Essen Electric Power Company (RWE) would like to proliferate electric pumps. And because large electrical equipment companies get aboard in a big way, H. G. KG, a Herne family business, would like to secure a permanent place in the new alternate technology.

Only a single 2-hour meeting sufficed for the firm's heir, 32-year-old Otto Happel, and his business manager Helmut Schmiegel to make the decision to expand the business, which had grown large in conventional heating and air conditioning, to a capacity of 20,000 heat pumps per year. Five months after the investment decision, production started in the new factory.

The quick decision catapulted Happel far out front in the West German heat pump business. Of the 40,000 new heating heat pumps which will be produced in 1980, 15,000 to 18,000 will come from the Herne firm. The remainder will be spread over 100 other producers, of which--according to Happel manager Franz Schulenberg--not many more than 10 will survive.

The main competitor for the Herne firm is Stiebel Eltron, an equipment manufacturer in Holminden, which likewise is a family business. It was founded 56 years ago by engineer Dr. Theodore Stiebel and has become known primarily through its immersion and electric flow-through heaters.

The company, situated on the upper Weser, made a delayed start in the heat-pump business because business manager Kurt Schoen, second husband of Stiebel's widow Margret, first wanted to secure the top position in another alternative technology. With an investment of DM 20 million (Schoen: "Without a single penny of public money"), Schoen brought the provincial business to first place among the European manufacturers of solar collectors. His solar-collector plant with an output of 220 collectors per day located in Spittal, Austria is in fact the largest of its kind in the world.

Collector manufacturing conceals risks and incurred start-up losses, whereas the pump business, with a profit margin said to be about 30 percent, carries little risk for companies having traditional ties with plumbing and installation shops. Even more so, according to Schoen, since "RWE is pushing a particular technology." For these reasons the Stiebel Eltron managers also decided to rapidly expand their pump capacity and will compete vigorously in 1981.

The sooner the two front runners, both with strong connections with small-shop operations in and outside the cities, get their manufacturing going the more securely entrenched they will become in competition against the large electrical-equipment and machine-building companies which are not particularly favored by small shops. Before the giants with their concentrated financial power arrive on the scene, important sales bastions will already be occupied by the agile family businesses.

To wit according to a projection made by the Central Association of the Electrotechnical Industry, Inc., at the Hannover Fair at the end of April, 1980, 500,000 heating heat pumps will be in operation in the FRG by 1985. At the same time, figures Association functionary Albert Specht, 700,000 hot water pumps can be installed which take over supplying hot water during the summer; and, at least in well insulated houses, the oil-fired water heater can be turned off for months at a time.

Presently sales are doubling each year. Up to the turn of the century, according to a study of the Union of German Electric Power Plants (VDEW), about 3.2 million heating heat pumps will be installed in dwellings which had been heated exclusively with oil. Including the heat pumps in new constructions, 5.6 million units of the fabulous--touted as oil conservation machines by Happel--would be purring along. That corresponds to almost half the present inventory of oil heating units.

In contrast to the market leaders, the three large electrical concerns meanwhile are only slowly starting up. Robert Bosch GmbH of Stuttgart is pushing the heat pump business in its subsidiary Junkers in nearby Wernau. There they have been experimenting for several years with oil-independent technologies in what they call their tritherm house. Under new management, custom made heat pumps are however being gradually put on the market.

Subsidiary Kueppersbusch manufactures electric heat pumps for the ailing electrical equipment manufacturer AEG. The Munich electrotechnical firm Siemens is jumping into the pump market in a manner befitting a multi: It bought an established manufacturer, the Kulmbacher Air Conditioning Company.

The automobile companies are entering from a different direction. VW chief Toni Schmueker threatens to confront the producers in the electrical industry with a gas- or diesel-powered pump with a yearly output of at least 50,000 units. The propagandists for the diesel/gas principle have some convincing arguments: The pump combined with the internal combustion engine utilizes the diesel-oil or natural-gas energy via ground, air or water heat to 160 percent. The electric pumps come out a little over 100 percent due to the large energy loss in generating the electricity.

However, internal combustion engines are noisier than electric motors and do not last so long. They experience greater wear due to the many rubbing parts. Electric motors are actuated by magnetic impulses and have few rubbing parts. Carefully built electrical systems work without problems for over 15 years; conventional diesel engines for perhaps 2 years in continuous operation.

Additionally, according to the electric-power industry, the specific commodity to be conserved, namely oil, must be provided for internal combustion engines. Electric pumps on the other hand, emphasizes the pamphlet presented to the members of parliament, use domestic energy except perchance when using energy from nuclear power plants operated with imported uranium.

But it matters not--gas, diesel or electric--the concept "heat pump" is deceptive. What is casually called a pump is actually a compressor driven by an ordinary electric motor. For, heat extraction from air, water or the ground proceeds only by way of compression.

Presently the manufacturers offer a confusing assortment of pumps which are by no means standardized. There are pumps for

- supplying all heating and hot water (monovalent pumps),
- partial supply in combination with other heating systems (bivalent pumps),
- for hot water only.

The pumps can extract heat from

- ground water which requires two deep wells,

- the ground which requires laying a coil of water pipe about 1.8 meters deep in the yard,
- surface and stream water,
- an energy roof,
- the air.

Heat pumps operate on the basis of a technology which has been known for a very long time. As early as 1852, the British physicist William Thomson--later Lord Kelvin--applied for a patent on the refrigerator concept. In the heat pump case this principle is simply reversed. Whereas in the refrigerator mode the heat in the stored food is transported to the outside via a refrigerant, the heat pump cools the outside air, water, or ground and transports the extracted heat to the inside.

Usually nontoxic freon, which has a low boiling point, is used for this purpose. The ambient heat energy encounters this medium and causes it to boil. The vapor is then compressed causing a large and rapid increase in its temperature. The temperature generated from expansion and compression is finally transferred to the heating water. The refrigerant is again liquified and the cycle starts over.

All heat pumps consume initial energy because the motor and compressor have to be driven; this heat of operation is, of course, also utilized. In any case, the smaller the difference between the temperature desired in the house and the outside temperature the more economical the pump and the higher its performance coefficient.

The performance coefficient tells us how much more heat energy the pump gathers in than it consumes in the form of driving energy. A performance coefficient of 3 is considered satisfactory; For every kilowatt hour applied, about 3 kilowatt hours are gathered from the surroundings. In this process the electric heat pump just about recovers the primary energy lost in generating and transmitting the electric energy.

The performance coefficient is constant only in the case of a constant heat source in the environment. This is possible only in the case of ground water which lies between 10 and 100 meters underground and which experiences little change in temperature. Of course, ground heat pumps deal with varying temperatures. In the winter when much heating must be done the ground is also colder.

The air heat pump is subject to even greater variations. When the outside temperature is 12 degrees and the inside temperature 20 degrees, the pump achieves a performance coefficient of over 4. When going from minus 20 degrees outside to 20 degrees inside, the coefficient is about 1. Then direct electric heating can be used; the indirect route via environmental energy does not make sense.

Variations are similarly large when heat is to be obtained from an energy roof heated by the sun and other outside energy. Therefore the electric

companies and pump manufacturers recommend only ground-water and ground pumps as monovalent heat sources. In the opinion of the industry, the absorber roof and air heat pump pay only in combination with other heating systems.

Conversion from oil heating to a monovalent heat pump may, however, soon cause vexation. In the case of oil heating a system operating temperature of 80 degrees is common, but the heat pump brings the system up to only 50 or 60 degrees. Therefore, in the latter case the installed radiation surfaces in the house must be larger than for oil heating equipment.

In many houses the radiators are already too large. To avoid installing new radiators, the Technical Surveillance Association (TUV) and private energy advisers, such as the former president of the German Society for Solar Energy Ulf Bossel, recommend first extensive heat insulation and offer computer programs for the task.

With a 12-cm insulation layer and air-tight window frames, according to computed values, half of the heat energy can be saved in most German houses. Bossel: "Which, would you believe, is what it amounts to when the heat comes on at 10 rather than 15 degrees outside temperature."

The TUV has verified that with reasonable insulation and control measures 1650 liters of heating oil per year can be saved in each single-family dwelling--40 percent of consumption. Insulation shortens the heating period significantly. For this reason recommends, for instance, Bosch Director Werner Buttgereit that initially only a cheap hot-water pump be installed in well insulated houses. Buttgereit: "From April till October the boiler does not need to be turned on."

Hot water pumps with installation cost about DM 5,500. The electric companies favor, however, the bivalent electric air heat pumps which are about 3 times as expensive. In order to promote their proliferation, RWE has put through a new electric rate effective 1 April 1980 which gives the buyers of such equipment big advantages over other users. For, the bivalent pumps are considered in the halls of RWE to be a profitable deal--for the electric companies, the pump manufacturers and the consumers.

To the buyer of a bivalent pump the electric companies guarantee full supply to the household down to an outside temperature of 3 degrees; and, according to industry figures, this covers 90 percent of the year. Only below 3 degrees will the conventional heating system come on to augment or displace the pump. The purchaser then saves 70 percent of his heating oil which means that a full tank holds a 3-year supply. Since, of course, the electric bill climbs sharply only 40 percent (figured on a heating oil price of 60 pfennig) is saved in energy costs.

Since the bivalent pump with installation costs upwards of DM 16,000 for available single-family dwellings, the purchaser saves almost nothing because he could bank DM 1,200 interest on the DM 16,000 investment and could

easily finance oil saved. For the pump buyer, who still has to maintain his conventional heating system, the heat pump can be regarded as a hedge against rapidly escalating oil prices.

Even the tax saving--either a 1-time 25 percent write off of the purchase up to DM 12,000 or complete depreciation of the investment over 10 years--does not completely cover the capital outlay in old houses according to trade figures, especially since pump systems can be worn out after 15 years.

Moreover, the power companies require provisions for turning down a bivalent heat pump 3 times per day for up to 2 hours when the system is heavily loaded. The large manufacturers have already built into their equipment the control elements required for such cycling.

Thus, the heat pump is advantageous for the German trade balance which is seriously impacted by high oil import costs and for the manufacturers. The pump manufacturers view as the only uncalculable factor in the great boom the still unstandardized installation work associated with the new technology. Stiebel Eltron chief Schoen: "50 percent is established by design and materials--only 20 percent is subject to individual initiative."

That pump sales could come to a standstill because of a possible shortage of electricity is dismissed by the electric companies who on other occasions are glad to relate horror stories about their stoneage operations. With present capacities, they tell the pump manufacturers in writing and by the spoken word, the additional electric demand of 5 million heat pumps can be covered.

That, however, extends out to the year 2000. SPD energy expert Ulrich Steger from Dorsten near Recklinghausen: "The Powerplant over capacity in Nordrhein-Westphal is enormous."

RWE uses the heat pump strategy to earn additional revenue with present capacity. The environmentalists meanwhile have misgivings. They suspect a fourth cut, a deal between the electric companies and the oil mults regarding control of future future heat supply. In summer the business will go to the electric companies, in the winter, as always, to the oil companies. Both branches of control would be due a definite rate of return of its own.

The pump industry agilely evades the hostilities of nuclear power plant opponents who suspect a trick behind the heat pump propaganda to create the basis for the construction of additional nuclear power plants. Bivalent heat pumps, assures the Happel brochure, require "no electricity from continuous-operation base-load power plants like, for example, nuclear power plants. Rather, electricity from existing medium-load power plants, primarily coal-fired power plants."

LESSENING OF DEPENDENCE ON OPEC ENERGY, CAPITAL VITAL

Bonn DIE WELT, WELT DER WIRTSCHAFT (Supplement) in German 20 Oct 80 p 13

[Article by Hans Baumann: "We Ourselves Are Creating the Situation for OPEC To Keep Us in Its Claws"]

[Text] Essen--"The capitulation of industrial countries to a small group of oil-exporting countries seems perfect. They are dependent on them not only with regard to energy raw materials; in view of their balance-of-payments deficits caused by oil-price increases, in the future they will also have to import capital from the oil-producing countries and, beyond that, they will be forced to demonstrate political benevolence." Those were the words of Franz Joseph Spalthoff, member of the board of directors of the Rheinisch-Westfaelisches Elektrizitaetswerk [RWE--Rhine-Westphalia Electric Company] in Essen during a conversation with DIE WELT.

In his opinion, this condition will continue as long as we are unable to free ourselves from the claws of the oil-exporting countries. And how can we escape this dilemma? "The problem cannot be solved with strategy models and more lip service," Spalthoff says. Nevertheless, it appears that this simple realization is beginning to get through to the politicians of the industrial countries.

The spokesman for the largest German electric power enterprise is calling attention to the fact that the seven heads of government of the most important Western industrial nations determined during the last economic summit in Venice that "without a solution to energy questions no satisfactory solution to all the other problems is possible." The FRG had played a significant role with regard to the format and the procedures of this economic summit, during which the "highest priority" was given to the expansion of nuclear energy.

Nevertheless, realizations of this kind did not correspond to the reality in the FRG. And it is exactly this discrepancy which "lends to the OPEC countries a feeling of security to the effect that during the next few years they will retain their key position," Spalthoff says.

The chairman of the RWE board can prove that the OPEC countries do not believe that Europe will succeed in lowering the part which petroleum plays in the consumption of primary energy. Until 1990 its share is to be reduced from its current

level of 55 percent to 40 percent. An OPEC strategy paper indicates that "the industrial countries cannot or will not choose the way out from dependency on oil—in other words, a drastic reduction in energy consumption—because of its effect on prices, employment and economic growth." Furthermore, this OPEC paper points to the fact that the FRG, for instance, has itself obstructed the other alternative for a quick development of new energy sources, particularly nuclear energy.

"The situation has almost taken on tragic traits," Spalthoff says. Simultaneously with the oil crisis a growing resistance can be felt to the only alternative energy that presently is in a position to contribute an amount which would be decisive in meeting the energy needs.

"For years," Kalthoff says, those politicians who are responsible have not come up with a single clear decision in energy policies. The main cause has been the controversial and heated discussion of many years concerning "alternative" energy models. "Such discussions of problems are necessary and useful," Kalthoff says, "they must prepare decisions, but they cannot take their place. The time has come for politicians "to make clear decisions on energy policies even if they may be momentarily unpopular and will not produce a positive reaction among voters for several electoral periods."

Do the statements of the commission of inquiry contain any positive aspects concerning the question of nuclear energy policies? Spalthoff thinks so. In the opinion of the commission additional light water reactors should be built until a fundamental decision can be arrived at. Furthermore, as a solution to the storage problem, it has been recommended that a recycling plant be built. And what is the practical consequence? In Spalthoff's opinion, "The lull in licensing light water reactors, which in the meantime has spanned a number of years, must finally come to an end."

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NATION'S ENERGY SUPPLY SEEN REMAINING 'PRECARIOUS'

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 10 Nov 80 pp 38-39

[Article by Pierre Pean: "Oil: Mr Giraud's Long Quest"]

[Text] In spite of the agreement signed by Mr Giraud in Algeria, in spite of new contracts with producing countries, the French energy supply situation remains precarious. And the minister of industry advises oil companies to increase their stocks.

On 1 November, a tanker of the Total group, the "Hermione" loaded with 101,000 tons of crude from Iraq, stopped in the outer harbor of Le Havre. This was the last ship. It will be a long time before oil from Mesopotamia is again received here. The war which President Saddam Hussein started on the shores of the Chott-Al-Arab on 22 September is now affecting France. It is creating a 25 million tons deficit in our oil supplies.

Three days before the "Hermione" arrived, Mr Andre Giraud took a hurried and highly secret trip in a GLAM [expansion unknown] plane. Destination: Algiers. For the first time, the minister of industry was to meet his Algerian counterpart, Mr Belkacem Nabi. Officially, the French minister had come to discuss "matters of common interest, especially problems concerning France's oil and gas supply." Routine work. Actually, this great haste betrayed some anxiety due to the deterioration of the relations between SONATRACH [National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons] and the French Gas Company. The present French energy supply situation no longer allows for any gambling.

Mr Nabi who, in fact, had been attempting since last February to obtain from the French a revaluation of the price of Saharian natural gas, now intended to link this question to another negotiation in progress: the renewal of the cooperation agreement between the Total group and SONATRACH which expires at the end of this year.

This was a smart maneuver which enabled the Algerian minister to come out of the gas deadlock with his head held high. The lobbies of the various Algerian ministers had been filled with murmurs of disapproval for the

successor of Mr Delaid Abdeslam who, since the beginning of the year, had lost a lot of money for Algeria without managing to bend Gaz de France to his will. In this respect, therefore, Mr Nabi was the petitioner.

Since the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war, CFP [the French Oil Company] and the French Government have obviously been trying to consolidate their crude supply lines. Especially from Algeria. In 1979, Total bought 11.45 million tons from the other side of the Mediterranean, almost one third of which was shipped to France. In this respect, therefore, Paris was the petitioner.

As a result, a negotiation between Messrs Nabi and Giraud had become possible. From the outset, each agreed to let the other save face. Upon his return from Algiers, the French minister explained clearly how this unexpected meeting had progressed. "Each of us acquired a better understanding of the other's interest... I have a feeling that extreme ideas have become somewhat obsolete. We could accept an improvement of the indexing formula." In plain language, this means that Mr Giraud has accepted the principle of a more accurate indexing of the price of gas on the price of oil, in exchange for Algeria's giving up its demand for absolute parity between its gas and its oil, one of the most costly in the world, and for a compromise in the oil negotiation. On 4 November, this double agreement was ready to be signed. Only President Chadli Bendjedid's agreement was still needed.

Certain observers are already speculating on the consequences of the blitz meeting between Messrs Giraud and Nabi:

- . The price of Algerian gas would progressively increase from 3.20 dollars per million BTU (its present price) to a price still much lower than the 6 dollars originally demanded by the Algerian (between 4 and 5 dollars?). With time, this increase would of course result in an increase in the tariffs of the French Gas Company.

- . France would be given an "oil guarantee" at financial conditions less favorable than those of the previous contract with CFP.

The two ministers are pleased with the compromise arrived at because it includes positive elements for both of them. France's efforts are not limited to consolidating its access to Algerian crude. CFP has put in concrete form the offer made by Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi to President Giscard d'Estaing: it will receive an additional 50,000 barrels of oil per day from Abu Dhabi.

On 30 October, SOFRACOP [expansion unknown] (a joint subsidiary of Elf-Aquitaine and CFP) signed a contract for 120,000 barrels of Saudi crude per day with Mobil, one of the four members of ARAMCO. It will pay two dollars above the official price. CFP will get 10,000 additional barrels per day from Qatar. These contracts amount to 9 million tons per year, i.e. about 9 percent of the French supplies.

Until now, French oil companies have refused a Kuwaiti offer linking the sale of 30,000 barrels per day to that of large quantities of propane and butane. This would amount to a price surcharge of about 5 dollars per barrel.

Finally, with two more contracts coming into effect, one with Mexico (100,000 barrels per day) and one with Venezuela (70,000 barrels per day), plus tanker loads bought here and there (in the North Sea, in Libya, in Nigeria...), French authorities contemplate the coming months with some optimism. Mr Giraud does not "consider yet that the situation has been restored"; he estimates that about three fifths of the Iraqi deficit have been covered. For its part, CFP, the company most hardly hit by the closing of the Iraqi supply lines, has made up for about 60 percent of its crude deficit. Nonetheless, it had to reduce its sales to "third parties," outside the group.

Mr Giraud is still not satisfied with the signature of these new supply contracts. He has requested French-based oil companies to increase their (already high) stocks to 4 million tons. Some of these companies are far from enthusiastic at this prospect which, they say, is going to cost them a lot, puts them in an uncomfortable position with their parent companies, and would tend to harden market prices.

In fact, all the actors in the oil game have become used to the idea of another price increase. It is estimated at 2 dollars for official tariffs between now and the beginning of next year; it will be much higher for the heavy fuel and crude sold on the free market. French refineries have increased their tariffs for heavy fuel for the third time since 23 September. This amounts to a 30 percent increase in less than 6 weeks! Prices on the spot market are getting close to 40 dollars for North Sea and Libyan crudes.

The operators are remaining cool despite the low level of the surplus production granted by Saudi Arabia to the West: 500,000 barrels per day instead of the million which had been announced. But all agree that the situation is precarious. All the more so that the Iraq-Iran war might flare up again if the American embargo on military equipment is lifted as expected after the release of the hostages. Riyadh has already announced that oil production would be reduced as soon as American spare parts are being shipped.

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ECONOMIST MICHEL DEVELLE INTERVIEWED ON OIL SUPPLY

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 10 Nov 80 p 93

[Interview with Michel Develle, president of the French Association of Business Economists and an oil economy expert; time and location of interview and name of interviewer not given]

[Question] What impact do you think the Near East conflict will have on the price of oil?

[Answer] I can't say we are optimistic on that subject. Deliveries from Iran and Iraq were interrupted 7 weeks ago, but the Western economies are just now beginning to feel the effects, because of the time it takes the oil tankers to make the round trip. Of course we have significant stockpiles at our disposal, but it is imperative to see that they can only be used if it is certain they can be restored to interesting conditions. On the other hand, despite the precautions taken and government orders to limit purchases on the free markets, prices have increased by \$10 per barrel on the average in Rotterdam. This situation is tied in with the structure of the Iraqi clientele, which unlike that of the other Gulf countries was made up of some privileged customers (France, Japan, India, Brazil, Thailand). Today these customers are confronted with supply problems that are important in an oil market characterized by its lack of fluidity.

[Question] But some OPEC countries have nevertheless decided to compensate for the stopping of Iraqi and Iranian exports by increasing production by 1,500,000 barrels per day.

[Answer] So they say. In reality, the compensatory production promised by the OPEC countries is running into technical, and above all political problems. The production increases are being badly done. Certain movements orchestrated by Iran are hindering the operations. The moderate countries are being called traitors to the Arab cause.

Moreover, we have to expect the election of Reagan in the United States to have repercussions. His election was not warmly received by the OPEC countries. The Israeli-Arab differences are going to be exacerbated. And it is still true that at present in the matter of compensation only have the course has been run. There remains a shortage of about 1,000,000 barrels per day.

On the other hand, on the periphery of OPEC there are countries that are making a significant effort to increase their production. I am thinking of Egypt, which has reached 800,000 barrels per day, which nevertheless represents one third of French consumption. In Mexico, which has passed 2,000,000 barrels per day and will reach 2,700,000 at the end of the year. In the black African countries, in the Ivory Coast, in Peru and Bolivia. Increased production outside of OPEC constitutes an appreciable braking force on the price rise.

[Question] Are you afraid there is going to be a third oil shock, and what price increase do you predict between now and the end of the year?

[Answer] The probability of a third shock is far from nil. The mounting anxiety about the political dangers in the Middle East strengthens that probability. How far will prices go, and at what level are they going to be fixed? I don't know anything about that, since it is a question of a political, not an economic price. However, what is practically certain is that, by means of an alignment effect on the spot market price, the price of oil is heading toward \$40. It could even get there by Christmas.

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PRICE, SUPPLY 'UNKNOWN' FACTORS IN OIL SUPPLY

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 10 Nov 80 pp 92-94

[Article by Marie Sellier: "Oil: An Equation With Two Unknowns"]

[Text] Two sizable unknowns in the oil equation: supply and price. Despite a serene front, the situation is not very good. There is still a deficit in worldwide deliveries. As for the prices, they will go up sooner than we think.

Above all, the situation should be dedramatized so as not to create "needless" panic. Those orders are being carefully obeyed. And while the Iraq-Iran conflict is beginning its ninth week, while the danger of the war expanding is not removed (the weakness of the Saudi Arabian regime leaves observers nothing to worry about), while, finally, for some countries (Japan, the developing countries), the stopping of Iranian and Iraqi crude (about 4,000,000 barrels per day in all) is already assuming a dramatic character, international authorities like the French Government persist in displaying a worthy serenity--or an assumed serenity.

Andre Giraud, the minister of Industry, after appeasing the spirits with a great deal of arithmetic by guaranteeing France 15 months of tranquillity, today asserts that we have succeeded in locating three fifths of the barrels of which Iraq has deprived us. Ulf Lantzke, the director of the International Energy Agency, says for his part that the oil situation of the Western countries is "satisfactory," on the supply level as well as where prices are concerned. Arguable statements, but understandable considering that the Western economies are still staggering under the blow of 100-percent increases in oil prices that followed the 1979 Iranian revolution. Did not Raymond Barre say last week to the Economic and Social Council, "Today our country is facing a second oil shock." In those circumstances, a new oil shock--it really must be called that--would almost place France in the same situation as a groggy boxer who has been picked up from the floor only to be sent right back into the fight. Moreover, when the oil market's sensitivity to psychological factors is considered, the good words do not seem needless.

However, the oil companies, which have every interest themselves in appeasing spirits, are swearing vigilance, and Andre Giraud's hurried trip last week to discuss gas and oil in Algeria muddies somewhat the pastel color of the official photography.

So where exactly are we in the matter of supply and price, the two unknowns of the oil equation?

Supply. Let's take a count. The stopping of Iranian and Iraqi exports deprived the oil market of about 4,000,000 barrels per day. However, at the time the hostilities began that same market had a surplus of 2,000,000 barrels per day, more or less. A situation, remember, that had led the producing countries--except for Saudi Arabia--to decide on a 10-percent reduction in their production. That reduction did not take place--quite the contrary--since four moderate Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) decided on 10 October in Taif to increase their production by 1,500,000 barrels per day, the major part to be supplied by Saudi Arabia, which thus reaches a daily production of 10,000,000 barrels. A gap of 500,000 barrels per day, more or less, remains, depending on whether the glut on the market was below or above 2,000,000 barrels per day.

Therefore the situation is not dramatic, whereas in other respects the worldwide stockpiles are still very significant (enough for over 100 days of consumption) and are even reaching record highs in the United States, where according to the latest report of the American Petroleum Institute they have risen to around 395,000,000 barrels.

A Situation More Satisfactory for France

Let's say the Western economies have not yet physically felt the effects of the stopping of crude exports by the belligerents, since the last tankers from those countries are just arriving on our coasts (it takes 45 days on the average to transport Gulf oil to the reception terminals).

As for France, which was dependent, we recall, for nearly one quarter of its oil supply on Iraqi oil, the situation is better, it is true, than it was when the hostilities began. In fact, after many negotiations and bilateral agreements accompanied by a mobilization of the national companies to serve governmental policy, France has succeeded in gleaning several thousand additional barrels here and there. By virtue of the Taif agreement Saudi Arabia pledged, through one of the ARAMCO companies [Arab-American Oil Company], to furnish 130,000 barrels per day to SOFRACOP [expansion unknown], a joint subsidiary of the French Oil Company (CFP) and Elf-Aquitaine, over a three-month period. An agreement that will be renewable, it is hoped. To that figure should be added a supplement of 50,000 barrels per day granted by the Arab Emirates to France after Giscard's stop in Abu Dhabi on his way to China. This bonus is probably feeding the tanks of Total, which is known to have interests in that country. Just as the 10,000 barrels per day conceded by Qatar for a one-year period and the supplement that Kuwait had already granted--according to rumors--were destined for Total.

Contracts That Arrive in Time

Moreover, the contract that has been in gestation for several months between the CFP and Mexico is reaching maturity just at the right moment: 5,000,000 tons a year for ten years, that is so much to the good, especially when it is "stable oil."

And at the same time in Venezuela, Elf was reaping the fruits of a negotiation initiated in February 1979 by Albin Chalandon, obtaining 2,100,000 tons per year of heavy crude for five years. This agreement is interesting on two accounts: first of all, Venezuelan crude being relatively cheap, our currency expenditures are reduced; then, it will be expressed in significant investment by the Elf-Aquitaine group in the national territory (heavy crude processing units at Donges) and will thus make possible improved geographic diversification of supplies.

Several thousand barrels remain to be picked up wherever possible: in Nigeria, in Gabon or Libya, where a French economic mission is staying right now. A simple coincidence? One could doubt it, when Col Qadhafi has just expressed the wish to see cooperation between France and Libya increased, especially where oil is concerned.

Finally, one last rather encouraging touch to the French supply picture: France's domestic consumption continuously decreased during the first nine months of the year, which is illustrated by a 12-percent decline in crude oil imports in relation to the corresponding period of 1979.

Let us go on now to the second unknown in the equation.

Price. In this area optimism is not reasonable. We probably will have oil (at the worst, Saudi Arabia can increase its production to 12,000,000 barrels per day), but we will have to pay dearly for it. This is the inevitable other side of the coin in a situation that places the producing countries out of plumb with their oft-repeated desire to administer their resources over the long term, and which also works toward an inevitable oil price increase. Already in France the average price of a ton of imported oil, according to the BULLETIN D'INFORMATIONS PETROLIERES, increased by 31 percent between January and September 1980, bringing the oil bill to 95,000,000,000 francs. And it will not remain there. The recent price rises on the free markets, as well as the increases--or rumors of increases--by certain producing countries, augur nothing good for the future. On the Rotterdam spot market, which is of course marginal, but is nonetheless a barometer of the international oil market, the prices of crude have similarly gone from \$30 to \$40 a barrel, while the prices of heavy fuel oil were increasing by 40 percent (see UN, No 45, page 88).

As for the producing countries, in addition to the \$2-per-barrel increase decided upon by Abu Dhabi and the extreme rise that Venezuela has applied to the price of its heavy crude, it is said that Saudi Arabia will charge a premium of \$2 per additional barrel produced. And there is a good chance the same thing will happen in Kuwait. According to some observers, this premium, which is applicable to limited quantities, could be merely the prelude to a general raising of the price for Saudi Arabia's entire production, the price of which is still the lowest (\$30 per barrel).

France, which imports 34 percent of its oil from that country, can thus expect to see its oil bill increased soon. However, there is a respite in the price climb: Qatar is maintaining its official price of \$33 for the supplement of 10,000 barrels delivered to Total.

1981 Promises to be a Difficult Year

For now, everyone seems to be in a state of uncertainty. The Japanese, who won renown shortly after the Iranian revolution by buying oil at a high price, up until now have shown exemplary discipline, whereas they are among those most affected by the stopping of Iraqi exports. Negotiations are making good progress, but discretion is customary.

In France, however, no one in either governmental or oil circles has any illusions about the situation after the beginning of next year: 1981 promises to be a hard year where oil supply, and especially prices, are concerned.

ILLEGAL USE OF PROPANE GAS BY TAXICABS REPORTED

Athens O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 16 Oct 80 p 11

[Article by G. Papanikolaou]

[Text] About 30 percent of the 12,000 taxicabs in Athens are running on propane gas. This is evident from exclusive information given to us by the Athens Traffic Police. Of the checks which were made by its agents on about 150-200 taxicabs in the interval from June-August 1980, it was found that 55 of these had a propane-combustion device. If it is considered that of the totality of taxicabs which were checked, many were not charged with a violation because they had disconnected the coupling of the engine to the propane-gas system, or because their drivers "complained" (1), then this percentage is even larger.

In any case, it is a fact that a large number of taxicabs recognized long ago the advantages which propane gas offers, seeing that without a person having to pay any special tax, he can make trips at a much smaller cost.

The Safety of the Passengers

But what is especially important is the issue of safety. Because nobody can guarantee that we will not have some accident perhaps, given the (unknown) way in which the installation of these devices in the taxicabs is being done today (possibly by unskilled mechanics), and given that the taxi drivers do not have any obligation (aside from the safety of their own lives) to make a frequent and careful inspection of their vehicles. In any case, the authorities have this obligation--that is, the protection of the public which uses taxicabs. Because it is one thing to have the use of propane gas permitted, together with the corresponding provisos and safeguards, but it is another matter for the passenger to think that he has entered into a taxi whereas in reality he is riding in a moving bomb, in which the misleading notice is written: "Smoking is forbidden for reasons of health"!

It is good that the taxi drivers are concerned about their health, but it is better for the authorities to look to the health of the rest of the people too.

The Charges

As was natural, the complaints about the situation which prevails in the sector of propane gas have begun, the most recent being that of the Greek Federation of Gasoline Dealers (TO VIMA, 23 September 1980), which states that the taxicabs

and private automobiles which are burning propane "are using old propane cylinders which were thrown away by the Italians because their 5-year period of use had elapsed."

The gasoline dealers charge that these cylinders are being imported into Greece on a regular basis, ostensibly for the purpose of melting them down, but in reality they are sold to the owners of taxicabs and private automobiles as new cylinders!

"Although by way of an extrajudicial summons, the Greek Federation of Gasoline Dealers advised the Athens, Piraeus, and Salonica police headquarters about the taking of decisive measures," continues the announcement, "these illegal acts are continuing right under the noses of the police authorities. Millions of people in the cities of Athens, Piraeus, and Salonica are being exposed on all sides to a mortal danger."

But even if the charge made by the gasoline federation mobilizes the authorities and the police agents, is it possible to ensure that the law will be observed and the public will be protected?

From our small-scale investigation, it is evident that the answer to this question is negative.

Because the State is powerless to enforce a substantive prohibition on the use of propane gas in taxicabs and private cars, owing to a perceptible vacuum with respect to legislation in this area. As was found during the investigation by OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDRONOS, but also as the officials of the Athens Traffic Police stated to us, of those drivers who have been charged and referred to the public prosecutor's office because they were using propane gas in their vehicles, almost all have been acquitted!

According to the traffic police, the procedure which is followed in these cases is as follows:

1. If in the checking of the vehicle it is found that propane is being used, then the traffic policeman takes the driver with his vehicle to the traffic-police headquarters, where after an entry is made of the particulars on the driver and vehicle, the vehicle is impounded and the driver is released.

The next day, escorted by a traffic policeman, the driver brings the vehicle to the inspection service of the Ministry of Communications at Kholargos. There, on the basis of articles 88 and 89 of the Traffic Code (KOK) and Decree ST/A 832/19 January 1978 of the Ministry of Communications, after the violation is confirmed the car license and the driving permit are revoked and the driver is sent to some repair shop in order to have the propane-combustion equipment removed. Next, following a new inspection a certain fine is imposed on the driver and he is freed (perhaps only to reinstall the propane device).

Following this, the same service of the Ministry of Communications draws up a report which it sends to the Athens Traffic Police, which in turn lodges a charge against the driver.

Articles 88 and 89 of the KOK on which the entire action is based refer to the alteration of the particulars on the vehicle license. Aside from other things, also recorded on the license is the type of fuel which the vehicle uses, and according to these articles: "In a change of owner of the road vehicle, as well as in an alteration of the principal particulars recorded on the vehicle license, when this is permitted, the issuing of a new license is required following a verification of the new particulars by the services which are responsible, depending on the case, for the issuing of such vehicle licenses."

2. If it is found by an appropriate agency that the provisions of the preceding paragraph have not been observed within the time limit set in the ruling provided for by Article 88, Paragraph 3, the license and the license plates of the vehicle are revoked, but these are returned following the issuing of a license in accordance with the above stipulations.

3. Whoever violates the provisions of the article under consideration is to be punished by imprisonment for 1 to 3 months and by a monetary fine of at least 3,000 drachmas.

What is significant here is the fact that the deadline for going before an inspection, as fixed by the decree of the Ministry of Communications, for a certain vehicle in which some particulars have been altered is 15 days from the day when the alteration has taken place. Thus it is naturally true that any repair shop will be able to assert that the change took place just the previous day, or the driver can maintain to the traffic policeman that at the very moment of his arrest he was on the way to have his vehicle inspected!

It is worth noting also that the use of propane does not necessitate a change of fuel in the vehicle, since the gasoline-combustion system continues to be there in parallel with the other system. The choice of one of the two systems is a matter left up to the driver.

Since these loopholes exist and since the granting of permission to use propane in the Athens and Salonica taxicabs is impending, the judges' verdicts are to acquit those drivers whom the traffic police are bringing before the courts for prosecution.

As the officials of the Athens Traffic Police state, the present penalties which are provided in case of a conviction of some driver for altering the particulars as stated on the license for a vehicle are insignificant in comparison to the benefit which the driver will have from burning propane gas, which is more economical than gasoline.

The maximum penalties are 3 months in prison and a fine of 3,000 drachmas, while the likelihood of somebody being arrested is about 1 in 500,000. If we consider that ultimately the penalty can be reduced significantly or that there may not even be a sentence, then the risk is seen to be not so very great, and moreover it leaves a margin of profit for the driver. In short, within 1 month at most the loss from any imposition of a fine on the driver from using propane is more than made up for by the benefit from the use of this fuel, which is more economical than gasoline (by 60 percent).

In the bill which is being drawn up by the Ministry of Communications, which will regulate the optional use of gasoline or propane for Athens-Salonica taxicabs beginning in January 1981, if severe punishments are not provided for violators and if all the loopholes are not closed of that sector from which comes today the importing of these devices and the fueling of the vehicles by propane-bottling outfits in the early-morning hours, then following the granting of permission for its use by taxicabs we will see all these vehicles running around Athens and Salonica with propane gas. It is clear that any granting of a permit to use propane gas in taxicabs must be accompanied by the enactment of strict regulations for the protection of the passenger public, if we want to avoid any more tragedies on the Greek roads from this factor.

12114

CSO: 4908

COAL MINING IN SARDINIA TO BE DEVELOPED

CARBOSULCIS' Plan Revealed

Rome RASSEGNA PETROLIFERA in Italian 10 Oct 80 p 800

[Text] The problems of CARBOSULCIS (an ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency] component and the Sardinian Mine Agency) were discussed during the visit by Undersecretary for State Holdings Tocco to the Serucci mine, the company's operations center. The government representative was accompanied by CARBOSULCIS' deputy Enzo Pruna. During the meeting, it was made known that by 1987, 3,550,000 tons of coal, will be produced. This will include a financial commitment of about 200 billion lire and employ over 2,000.

The level of production will be achieved only gradually due to the training needs of the labor force, which will make use of the appropriate training structure (for school and coal yard pilots). This will require an investment of about 12 billion lire. The first phase for the activation of this plan calls for the completion of an underground infrastructural framework, above ground plants and construction to meet social needs connected to the basin's mines. The mines in question, Nuraxi, Figus and Seruci, have presently fallen into a state of inactivity.

General engineering coordination during the investment phase will be directed by SNAM [National Gas Pipeline Company] Progetti. The plan, which involves the northern sector of the basin, has already been approved by ENI's executive offices. For the southern sector, prospecting activities are already underway. The results will be used in a feasibility study for this area. The reserves here appear to be larger than in the northern zone where 57 million tons have already been confirmed.

The caloric output of the average market product is of 5,200-5,300 kilocalories per kilogram, compared to 5,700-6,000 for imported coal.

Undersecretary Tocco expressed satisfaction in noting the advanced stage of the project, now entering the executive phase. He also mentioned however, the economic difficulties faced by the company due to the "decretone's" not being enacted, a decree which would have set aside 60 billion lire and would have allowed the project's prompt startup.

With regard to the use of SULCIS coal, Undersecretary Tocco stated that there should be no undue worries because: be it its use "in loco," through EUROALLUMINA and ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] or be it its use via gas or chemical alteration techniques, the utilization of the mineral end-product should not engender any excessive preoccupations.

Funds for CARBOSULCIS

Cagliari L'UNIONE SARDA in Italian 24 Oct 80 p 6

[Text] Carbonia, 23 Oct--It will be the ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency] that will provide CARBOSULCIS with the funds necessary for resuming of coal excavation at the Sulcis coal mines. The National Hydrocarbons Agency, through SOFID, its financial branch, has decided to make 20 billion lire available to CARBOSULCIS in order to allow the mining company to commence operation. The project ran the risk of being halted following the blocking of federal aid which was to be included in the notorious "decretone," which the recent government failed to approve.

Because of this financial windfall, CARBOSULCIS will be able to begin work on a series of initiatives included in the program for the reactivation of the mines. The initiatives were outlined this morning at Seruci by the company's deputy to the plant council as well as to the regional and provincial FULC representatives during a feasibility study meeting.

ENI's prefinancing package through SOFID does not, however, solve the long-range problem of another 200 billion lire needed for the completion of the project. The original text of the agreement signed at the end of this morning's meeting stipulates that "the fulfillment of the plan's objectives is predicated on the complete availability of necessary financial resources." The main objective will be to have CARBOSULCIS overcome the stalling point in which it ran the danger of becoming mired following the nonpassage of the "decretone." This would have allowed the completion of the project while waiting for the crisis to pass coupled with the government's decision to finance the undertaking.

Responsibilities taken on by CARBOSULCIS vis a vis organized labor involve mainly the full employment of the present work force. The mining company has pledged to hire, by 1 December, 47 apprentice miners who are presently undergoing professional training. Furthermore, the company will hire an additional 30 workers drawn from specialist and professional lists at various levels.

In addition, in the memo of accord signed today, CARBOSULCIS has agreed to set up professional training courses for 100 unemployed workers beginning in January 1981, in order to meet personnel needs during the second half of 1981. Other courses for about 40 apprentice miners will begin in July of next year.

Naturally, funds still have to be made available from the enormous reserves tied in with the project as a whole. These reserves can be used only by the new government's initiating a financial plan for the exclusive benefit of the coal sector. Until CARBOSULCIS has been assured the certainty of being able to dispose of 200 billion lire needed to complete the exploitation of the Sulcis coal basin, the whole matter will remain in doubt.

9209
CSO: 3104

ENERGY MINISTER JOHANSON COMMENTS ON OIL RESERVES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Nov 80 p 24

[Text] "The Norwegian oil age will last a hundred years. It is not just an interlude in the Norwegian economy. It is a permanent factor. We estimate that we have petroleum reserves south of the 62d parallel corresponding to 4 or 5 billion tons of oil units, although what has been found so far is considerably smaller in size. But if the estimate is approximately correct there will be enough for a hundred years of operation if we stick to the current production level," said Oil and Energy Minister Arvid Johanson in a speech last night at the Ostlandet Shipping Forum.

"We should not be upset about the wealth lying off our coast," said Johanson, pointing to what oil and gas mean to our total economy. He said there was no way we would reach the goal of 90 million tons a year, defined as a moderate tempo, before the turn of the century.

This year production will be around 50 million tons. Some people ask what has happened to the oil money. "The only answer one can give is that the money has gone into all sectors of our economy, sparing us from the problems we have seen in other countries.

"But our oil money has also led us into unrealistic dreams. We have had a crisis of expectations. However it will require substantial resources just to maintain supplies to the Norwegian economy at the present level.

"I believe it is necessary to follow the course we have drawn up," said Johanson who said he did not feel it was right to reduce the already moderate goal down to 50 million tons a year, for example.

In 1981 it is estimated that oil and gas production in the North Sea will give the state over 28 billion kroner in taxes and fees. A third of all export kroner will come from this sector in 1981. The value of our oil and gas production this year will be around 47 billion kroner or roughly 10,000 kroner for each Norwegian.

Norwegian petroleum production accounts for 5-6 percent of the total petroleum consumption of western Europe. This may seem like a modest amount but it is still quite substantial in the total picture.

Johanson also mentioned oil activity and said that although Statoil, Hydro and Saga have been chosen to perform important tasks on the Norwegian shelf this does not mean that foreign oil companies will have no place in the Norwegian oil activity. "They will and therefore industrial cooperation linked to block distribution is still relevant. The tempo we have chosen on the Norwegian shelf seems to be fully accepted in international circles. The same is true of our goal of full Norwegian control of this activity," said Johanson.

The oil and energy minister also spoke of the difficulties created by the war between Iran and Iraq and said that Norway is prepared to take the steps needed to help create peace on the international oil market.

Johanson said that Norway cannot give itself special privileges just because we have found petroleum on the Norwegian shelf. We must also pursue a price and sales policy that contributes to energy economizing. The rising prices give us an advantage but there is also a limit where oil prices can hinder growth in the countries we trade with. This would have negative effects on other sectors of our economy, said Johanson who concluded by saying that he could not join the prophets of doom. On the contrary he maintained that the oil was a good thing for Norway.

6578

CSO: 3108

STATOIL, NORSK HYDRO, SAGA OFFER GOLD BLOCK PLANS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Nov 80 p 25

[Article by Hans Christian Erlandsen]

[Excerpts] Bergen, 20 Nov--The three companies, Statoil, Norsk Hydro and Saga, propose to start out by investing 18.5 billion kroner in developing the "Gold Block," Block 34/10. The idea is to build a cement platform of the Condeep type and a steel platform. If Storting gives its approval in the spring, production of oil could begin by the end of 1987. Statoil and Hydro have asked the authorities for permission to expand the Mongstad refinery at a cost of 5 billion kroner.

"This is a little piece of oil history we are making today," said Arve Johansen, administrative director of Statoil at a press conference on Thursday. "For the first time a group of Norwegian operators will be developing a field on the Norwegian shelf."

On Thursday the three companies informed Oil and Energy Minister Arvid Johanson and the Storting Industrial Committee of the plans they hope the authorities will approve. On Wednesday the companies agreed that the field was worth operating and worked out how to develop what they call the first phase.

What is called an integrated cement platform will be built, meaning that on a substructure of the Condeep type a deck is placed containing equipment for drilling production wells, processing facilities for oil and gas and housing quarters.

Two years after this has started production a separate drilling platform will be put into operation. This will have a steel substructure and will transfer its production to the cement platform's processing facilities. Together the two platforms will have a capacity of 245,000 barrels of oil a day at peak production in 1991.

Already now preliminary plans are being made for further development but they are awaiting the Storting discussion before going further with the project.

In phase 2 100 million tons of oil and 10-15 billion cubic meters of gas could be produced. In addition there are more substantial reserves in the block.

Statoll and Norsk Hydro have asked the authorities to expand the capacity at Mongstad refinery from 4 to 10 million tons annually.

Preliminary planning will begin right away and they hope to be ready for production in 1987. The Statoll director pointed out that it would be an advantage if they could at the same time begin production in the "Gold Block" but that this is not a prerequisite for meeting the new refinery's crude oil needs. A larger oil terminal is also planned. The construction will provide 350 new jobs in addition to those created in connection with petrochemical activities based on oil.

6578

CSO: 3108

MEXICO TO DELIVER FIRST OIL IN 1981 AS PACT SIGNED

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 11 Nov 80 p 31

[Article: "Mexico: Oil Contract Finalized With Sweden"]

[Text] In January Sweden will receive the first deliveries of crude oil from Mexico. On Friday, the cooperative oil company OK and the state operated Svenska Petroleum (SP) signed the first contract with Mexico about deliveries of totaling 2.5 million tons of crude oil per year.

The Mexican state run oil company, Pemex, will sell 1.5 million tons of crude oil per year to OK and 1 million tons to SP.

These deliveries mean that Sweden will receive 15 percent of its crude oil from Mexico.

Sulphur Rich Oil

The Mexicans demand that 50-60 percent of the delivered oil will consist of heavy and sulphur rich oil, the so-called maya-oil, says Lennart Anderson, import director for OK.

It is singularly difficult to refine the maya-oil in Swedish refineries.

It is sulphur rich and far too heavy--that is, yields mostly thick industrial oil by refining instead of gasoline and heating oil.

Reider Fauli, deputy director of Scanraff, Sweden's largest refinery, says:

--When the maya-oil is mixed with the lighter isthmus-oil, which we receive at the same time from Mexico, we hope to be able to manage pumping the mixture in the refinery.

The deliveries from Mexico contain approximately 60 percent maya and 40 percent isthmus.

Over 34 Dollar Per Barrel

OK and SP pay official price for the Mexican oil--at today's price 29 dollars per barrel for maya-oil and 34.50 dollars for the lighter isthmus.

The greatest problem, however, with the Mexican oil is its high sulphur content. The Swedish sulphur regulations--which forbid too high a sulphur discharge--are the reason that the expensive oil from Africa and the North Sea are much better suited for Sweden.

--We must mix the Mexican oil with oils with lower sulphur content in order to get products that are suited for Sweden, says Pauli.

Scanraff is the only one of the four Swedish refineries that has a desulphurizing plant that can convert crude oil containing a high level of sulphur into thick oil containing a low level of sulphur.

The Mexican oil deliveries to Sweden were discussed with Mexican President Portillo during his visit to Sweden in May this year.

At that time the president promised that Sweden could buy 70,000 barrels of crude oil per day. That was to correspond to 3.5 million tons per year.

Silence After The Visit

After the president's visit there was a silence regarding the oil deliveries to Sweden.

According to the well-informed newspaper PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, Mexico had difficulties in bringing up the production--the deliveries to Sweden suddenly became very uncertain.

But the Swedish oil company finally got its contract--only 2.5 million tons per year, however, instead of 3.5 million tons as the president had promised.

Nynas--which also belongs to the ONS-group OK, Nynas and SP--attended the negotiations in Mexico but did not want to sign the contract. The Mexican oil is probably too heavy for the Nynas refinery in Nynashamn.

9583

CSO: 3109

VOLVO'S FUTURE ENERGY EFFORTS TO CONCENTRATE ON NORTH SEA

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Nov 80 p 34

[Article by Lars Hellberg]

[Text] Eskilstuna, 26 Nov--Volvo's future oil involvement will not be limited to the Norwegian continental shelf. Partly directly through Volvo Energy and partly indirectly through International Energy Development Corporation (IEDC) in which Volvo has a 25 percent involvement, the firm is concentrating on the North Sea as well as projects in the United States, Australia and Africa.

IEDC has obtained concessions for oil exploration in such places as Sudan and Angola, firm leader Pehr G. Gyllenhammar said at a press conference in Eskilstuna on Wednesday at which the concern's report on activity in the third quarter of the year was presented.

With regard to the current study of cooperation among Volvo, Svenska Petroleum and Statoil on future distribution of Norwegian oil products on the Swedish market Gyllenhammar said it was not primarily a question of building up a chain of gas stations even though he felt they might go into an existing chain. But the starting point is the need for involvement over the entire spectrum in a broad emphasis on energy.

With regard to Statoil's interest in this project, Gyllenhammar "guessed" that the Norwegians view an expanded domestic market for Norwegian products as an advantage as more oil becomes available. The Swedish state "should be interested in finding a market for Norwegian petroleum products in Sweden," especially in light of guaranteed deliveries.

In the shadow of the bigger projects the energy sector is thriving. Volvo Energy which is in the establishment phase has started cooperation with Saga Petroleum not only on the Norwegian shelf but also involving other concessions in the United States among other places (see page 35 [not included]). IEDC is also interested in extracting oil and gas in Australia. In addition, through the Saga cooperation Volvo Energy has sought concessions for extracting oil on the British continental shelf.

The Volvo leader could not say at present what might happen further with IEDC's offshore concessions in Africa. Volvo Energy has an opportunity to enter into utilization of IEDC's concessions with a larger share than the quarter participation provided for in its charter. But it is also possible that utilizing the concessions will be left to others. IEDC is an important part in Volvo's international involvement aimed at combining energy and industrial investments.

'TERCUMAN' EXAMINES OIL CRISIS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 18 Nov 80 pp 1, 12

[Article by Nazlı Ilıcak]

[TEXT] Turkey produces 2 million 300 thousand tons of petroleum per year. In contrast, it is being estimated that consumption will stand at 14 million 800 thousand tons in 1980. This is the equivalent of 3 billion 100 million dollars. Each year, we pay more in foreign currency for petroleum than we receive for the sum of our exports. Turkish administrators must find at least 250 million dollars a month, or between 8 and 9 million dollars each day, for petroleum. While the petroleum needs of our country as well as the cost of this burden have been increasing with each passing year, it is unfortunate that domestic production has dropped. The following table indicates developments during the past 10 years:

PETROLEUM PRODUCTION IN TURKEY

<u>Year</u>	<u>Million Tons</u>
1969	3.6
1970	3.5
1971	3.5
1972	3.4
1973	3.5
1974	3.3
1975	3.1
1976	2.6
1977	2.7
1978	2.7
1979	2.8
1980 (Predicted)	2.3

Last Saturday, the Conference of Economic and Social Studies organized a seminar focusing on the production of petroleum in Turkey. A number of speakers including Nezi̇h Neyzi, Fikret Gurel, Aydin Bolak, Kafesçioğlu

and Kavrakoglu discussed this important topic. We wish to present to our readers in the form of an outline some of the knowledge and ideas that were presented at this seminar:

- Petroleum was first discovered in Turkey in 1940 within the Raman region. The great expectations that were brought about by this discovery eventually turned into disappointment.
- While petroleum exists in Turkey, production will never reach the levels attained by our Arab neighbors. This is caused by differences in our geologic structure. Petroleum fields classified as "Super Giants" do not exist in Turkey.
- There are 28 super-giant fields in the world. Of these, 24 are in the Middle East, 2 in the United States of America (Alaska and Texas) with the remaining 2 in Mexico and in Venezuela. Super-giant fields are those that can produce more than 725 million tons of petroleum.
- There are four petroleum basins in Turkey. These are the Southeast Anatolian Thracian, Adana and Tuz Lake basins. We have conducted searches in only a very small portion of these fields. At the current rate, it will take us 120 years to search every field.
- Only a very small portion of existing reserves is being converted into production. Of the 440 million tons of reserves at the hands of TPAO only 25 million tons can be converted into production. Of this amount, 18 million tons have already been produced and 7 million tons remain. If the reserves of other petroleum companies are also taken into account, Turkey currently possesses 16 million tons of extractable petroleum. Yields from existing fields could be increased through the use of new methods involving water pressure, gas pressure and steam pressure. The reserves of West Raman for instance stand at 281 million tons. With the 1 to 1.5 percent yield achievable through current methods, only 4 million tons can be produced from these reserves. According to the stipulations of an agreement with the World Bank, new methods are to be introduced that will create the opportunity to increase production to 57 million tons as represented by a yield of 15 to 20 percent. This would allow us to produce 100 million tons of petroleum from fields such as Çamurlu and Raman as well as other sources of which we know but are unable to exploit. If we assume that 5 million tons would be added to our yearly production through such measures, this would amount to an opportunity of 1 billion 250 million dollars for the Turkish economy.
- As indicated above, Turkey could develop existing sources or increase production through exploration and the discovery of new fields. Very little, however, has been set aside for exploration by the budget.

The amount this year is 13 billion liras or 150 million dollars. Only half of this sum, 75 million dollars, is to be spent in foreign currencies. While we spend 8, 9, 10 million dollars per day on imported petroleum, we set aside for research only the equivalent of 10 to 15 days of imports.

- Petroleum engineers have very low incomes. While those with 15 to 20 years experience make 15 thousand liras (a month) in our country, they make 4000 dollars (a month) in foreign countries. A significant brain drain towards foreign countries is currently underway. Qualified and talented people must be brought into TPAO. General directors must be rescued from the tutelage of the Ministry of Energy and must be given broad powers. This institution should no longer remain as a repository for old members of parliament and generals.
- Money spent for petroleum research does provide a fair return. A yearly investment of 200 million dollars ultimately replaces 600 million dollars worth of imports. In other words, if Turkey were not to make this investment and produce petroleum, it would have to pay an additional 600 million dollars to meet its needs from foreign countries.
- Foreign capital and technology must be taken advantage of. All countries including Russia and China, have opened themselves to foreign capital and technology. Following the invasion of Afghanistan, America placed an embargo on the sale of drilling equipment to the Soviet Union. The Japanese are building a pipeline in Siberia. On the Chinese continental shelf, westerners are conducting geophysical studies.
- An important reason for the drop in Turkish production and for the reluctance of foreign capital to come to Turkey is the wellhead price that has been charged for many years. While OPEC prices have been on the rise, until 1980, petroleum producers in our country were made to sell petroleum to refineries at lower rates. Within the framework of decisions adopted on January 25, 1980, a directive was promulgated to bring wellhead prices to the levels of those paid by TPAO for imports. Also, the producing company has been given the right of exporting 35 percent of its production while setting aside 65 percent to meet the needs of the country. The company may use the foreign currency (obtained through these exports) for its petroleum related activities. The new directive has aroused interest and in 1980 a total of 70 licenses have been granted. Of these, 47 were obtained by private companies such as the Koç Group, the Eczaşasi Group, Comag and World Wide Exploration, Inc. TPAO has secured 23 licenses and has been contacted by 12 foreign companies. Because a mere directive cannot provide the necessary security and guarantee, a law that will provide regulation in this area is needed.

- In Turkey, all petroleum related activity is in the monopoly of TPAO. Foreign companies are not being given the opportunity to work within an integrated system that would include production, processing at the refinery and marketing. Profits from refining and marketing can provide incentives to foreign companies. The Government of Egypt, for instance, has succeeded in increasing petroleum production by working on a 50 per-cent basis with foreign corporations.

Aydin Bolak attracted attention during the seminar with his witty and lively speech. He said: "A spring provides energy by recoiling, a wind-mill by turning and the water in a dam by flowing. It is in the destiny of petroleum to provide energy by burning." Petroleum burns, and at the same time can "burn" nations. The Middle East conflict is an example of this. The Iran-Iraq conflict shows a potential for expansion at a point where giant interests collide. And for years, Turkey must go through an ordeal brought about by a lack of petroleum.

9491

CSO: 4907

HALF OF OIL TO COME FROM SAUDI ARABIA

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 18 Nov 80 p 9

[TEXT] Saudi Arabia has expressed its willingness for the signing of a bilateral agreement with Turkey. The agreement stipulates that this year's oil shortage resulting from the Iran-Irak war as well as half of Turkey's raw petroleum needs for next year will be met through the importation of Saudi oil.

The understanding reached during Foreign Minister Iler Türkmen's visit to Saudi Arabia involved proposals that would make Saudi Arabia the first and foremost supplier of oil to meet Turkey's needs. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were also mentioned as prospective suppliers. It is expected that efforts will be initiated vis-a-vis Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates while the process of translating Saudi agreement into a formal treaty is still underway.

Foreign Minister Iler Turkmen carried a message from Head of State Kenan Evren to Khaled Ben Abdulazez, King of Saudi Arabia. It has been learned that Iler Turkmen was told during his contacts that following the September 12 operation, Turkey is being viewed with full confidence. He was also told the significance of Turkey's place in the Middle-East.

According to the understanding reached, Saudi Arabia is to meet the demand for oil that has arisen in Turkey as a consequence of the Iran-Iraq conflict and will supply half of Turkey's needs for 1981. It is expected that a technical delegation will leave Turkey for Saudi Arabia in the days to come for the purpose of signing the agreement in question. Also it has been decided that Turkey's perpetually problematic oil links will be strengthened and its oil importation shifted to the Gulf Region with the help of Saudi Arabia.

Significant steps at the political level are also being taken in the context of the relations between the two countries. It is expected that Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Ben Feisal will officially visit Turkey next month. A visit by King Khaled Ben Abdulazez is expected to take place at a later date. It has also been learned that Huseyin Celen who is

Director General for Bilateral and Political Affairs is being discussed as a replacement for Fikret Bereket, the Ambassador to Jeddah who has been recalled. Otherwise, it has been learned that Turkey is to have high level participation at the Islamic Summit to be held at At-Taif in early January.

9491

CSO: 4907

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN CYPRIOT, PALESTINIAN QUESTIONS ANALYZED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 30 Oct 80 p 17

[Report on Interview with President Spyros Kyprianou of Cyprus by Khalil al-Taqi; in Nicosia; Date of Interview not Given: "We Reject Any Solution That Lends Authority to the Turkish Occupation of Half of Cyprus; Justice Is Indivisible; a Victory for Palestine Is a Victory for Our Country and Our People; We Condemn the Partitioning of Lebanon and the Acts of Israeli Piracy; We Will Not Permit the United States To Use Our Land To Occupy the Oil Wells"]

[Text] President Spyros Kyprianou of Cyprus told AL-QABAS that Cyprus was going through the most difficult stage of its history and that the existence of Cyprus as an independent state was in danger as a result of the Turkish invasion and occupation of a section of Cypriot territory. One third of the residents of Cyprus have become refugees after being forcibly expelled from their homes. In addition, the country's condition has deteriorated. Because of the invasion we still do not know what became of 2,000 of our citizens who have been missing as a result of this invasion.

In a detailed interview with AL-QABAS President Kyprianou added, "We are searching for a peaceful solution to the question of Cyprus in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations. Unfortunately, 6 years have gone by, and the solution that we want has not come about. This is because of the Turkish position and because Turkey wants us to accept its preconditions. We are trying to break the deadlock through negotiations but to no avail because Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leaders want us to accept the preconditions that they set. If we were to agree to these conditions, we would be consenting to the partitioning of our country, and we do not consent to that. We are prepared to talk, and we did agree on Cyprus being a federal state with two cantons. The dialogue must be based on the 10-point agreement that took place between me and Mr Rauf Denktash on 19 May 1979 in the presence of UN Secretary General Dr Kurt Waldheim because this agreement comprises the basic elements of a fair, peaceful and lasting solution to the question of Cyprus. This agreement stipulated the following points:

"1. An agreement to resume sectarian negotiations on 15 June 1979. This was not implemented at the time.

"2. The negotiations were to be based on the February 1977 Makarios-Denktaş agreement and on the UN resolutions regarding the question of Cyprus.

"3. The human rights and basic freedoms of all the citizens of the republic had to be respected.

"4. Negotiations were to deal with all regional and constitutional considerations.

"5. Priority was to be given to [the effort] to reach an agreement about the repatriation of Varosha under the protection of the United Nations. This is to take place at the same time negotiators begin discussing the constitutional and regional considerations for a comprehensive settlement. After an agreement on Varosha is reached, it is to be put into effect without waiting for the outcome of the negotiations on the other considerations of the Cyprus problem.

"6. An agreement to refrain from any action that may threaten the outcome of the negotiations. Special attention is to be given to the practical preliminary measures both sides are to take to strengthen good intentions, mutual trust and a return to normal conditions.

"7. Consideration of disarmament in the Republic of Cyprus. Matters pertaining to this subject will be investigated.

"8. The independence, sovereignty, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus must be guaranteed against any total or partial union with another country and against any form of partitioning or secession as well.

"9. Negotiations between the two parties are to be pursued continuously and steadfastly. Any delays are to be avoided.

"10. Negotiations between the two parties are to be conducted in Nicosia.

President Spyros Kyprianou of Cyprus added and told AL-QABAS: "We want the solution [we are seeking] to preserve the unity of Cyprus because the happiness of the people of Cyprus can only be achieved with the unity of the state; it cannot be achieved by partitioning it. If Cyprus were to be partitioned, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots will be destroyed. I believe that finding a just and lasting solution to the question is in everybody's interests. Therefore, we hope that all the countries will influence Turkey and induce it [to solve] the question of Cyprus.

"I also believe that the countries which have special relations with Turkey can persuade Turkey to abandon its expansionist policy because

this question must be settled in the interests of the world in general and in the interests of Cyprus in particular.

"The problem of Cyprus is now entering into a sensitive stage. During the next few weeks it will be possible for us to determine how we can develop those efforts that seek to achieve progress in the negotiations between the Greek and Turkish communities on the basis of the 19 May agreement.

"Naturally, we reject any attempt whose purpose is to change this agreement because any change will mean that the other party does not want a solution. It will also mean that that party wants to set conditions. Therefore, we cannot accept any changes in the agreement, nor can we accept any conditions that pertain to resuming the negotiations.

"We are rejecting any solution that would mean or lead to partitioning Cyprus because the happiness, prosperity and peace of Cyprus and its people lie in the unity of the state and of its citizens. Dividing the people and partitioning the country will mean the gradual destruction of Cyprus. The dangers of that prospect will not stop with the people of Cyprus, but they will go beyond Cyprus and sooner or later will spill over into the area.

"It is known that despite the fact that the 19 May agreement is quite clear, the two parties have achieved no progress in the negotiations on the basic subject or on the course that must be followed. The Greek Cypriot side is not responsible for this lack of progress. The foot-dragging that we are noticing now is forcing us to put up with a useless and endless dialogue. We want to resume the negotiations on the basis of the 19 May agreement, and we are adamant about this. If negotiations are not resumed or if the objective of the other party is to conduct negotiations only for the sake of negotiating, this will not prevent us from continuing and intensifying our efforts on the international scene."

An International Problem

President Kyprianou continued his interview with AL-QABAS and said, "We have always emphasized that the problem of Cyprus was an international problem with numerous ramifications. The interest of the Non-aligned movement in this problem stems from that fact. This movement does not have military power, but it has wielded considerable moral power from the outset, and it can influence developments in the world. The principles upon which this movement is based constitute the best means for solving international problems in a manner that is consistent with the charter of the United Nations. I believe that at this stage we need the Non-aligned movement even more and more. The movement has contributed solutions to several aspects of problems that humanity has faced. Ever since the Sixth Conference for Non-aligned Countries, the movement has conducted itself constructively in several directions. I believe that its existence and its activities will be extremely important in the future."

The president added, "Six years after the invasion of our small, peaceful island, which is incapable of opposing a military power that is much greater than itself, we [find ourselves] still waiting for a series of UN resolutions to be put into effect. These resolutions called clearly, openly and unambiguously for the withdrawal of the Turkish army of occupation as quickly as possible and for the removal of injustice from Cyprus.

"This is another similarity between the problems of Palestine and Cyprus. This means that in both cases there is an endless series of UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of the invading troops and respect for human rights and condemning the colonialist, expansionist policy as well as the colonization policy that is being practiced by the occupation forces. Unfortunately, these resolutions have not yet been put into effect for an obvious reason. This is primarily due to the reluctance of the superpowers, which are supporting Turkey and Israel, to put pressure on Turkey so that the aforementioned resolutions can be effected.

"Despite the fact that the United Nations and the bloc of Non-aligned countries condemned the Turkish invasion, Turkey and the leaders of the Turkish community in Cyprus made extensive efforts recently to portray the question of Cyprus as a sectarian question between the Christian Greek Cypriot majority and the Moslem Turkish Cypriot minority. This was done to win the sympathy and support of the Islamic world even though the problem is purely political and stems from Turkey's expansionist policy and its intent to partition the island. Turkey's objective became officially evident for the first time more than 25 years ago, that is, during the fifties. There was no religious friction in Cyprus even during the Turkish occupation before Cyprus became a British colony; nor was there religious friction in Cyprus at the outbreak of the revolution which achieved independence later."

Sanjak of Iskenderun

President Kyprianou told AL-QARAS, "We must make note of the fact that in Cyprus Turkey is using the same methods it used in Sanjak of Iskenderun which was shaved off from Syria in 1939 and annexed to Turkey after its demography was altered by the flow of Turkish settlers. It is not unknown that scores of thousands of Turkish settlers were brought to Cyprus where they were housed in the homes of Greek Cypriot refugees who were forcibly expelled from the part of the island that Turkey occupies. This was a clear attempt, and it is still continuing, to change the demographic situation in Cyprus.

"Turkish Cypriot leaders have tried to stir up disputes between the two communities in order to divide the island. The Greeks and Turks have been living happily and peacefully; they've mixed and cooperated with each other all over the island for hundreds of years. I am quite confident that they will easily go back to their former state if the Turkish army stops its policy of forcing partition and separation on the people.

"Greek Cypriot leaders are quite prepared to sit with the Turkish Cypriots at the negotiations table and look into the establishment of a bi-zonal federation on the basis of the points that the late President Makarios and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş had agreed about in February 1977 and on the basis of the agreement that Mr Denktaş and I concluded in May 1979. This agreement is known as the 10-point agreement.

"The peace talks are deadlocked because of Turkish intransigence. The Turks are obstinately insisting on having the Greek side accept beforehand the conditions of the Turkish position with regard to the bi-zonal federation, instead of leaving this constitutional matter for detailed investigation during the negotiations."

Two Separate States

"Turkey is insisting on a settlement that is based on the existing division in Cyprus that took place as a result of invasion and occupation. But it wants to conceal this under the rubric of a bi-zonal federation. In fact, this will be no more than two completely separate states. We will not, however, sign any agreement in advance that would legitimize the forcible occupation of 40 percent of Cyprus and deprive our 200,000 refugees of the right to return to their homes. This is an internationally recognized human right.

"Although at present there are no possibilities for reaching a settlement soon, I am confident that sooner or later we will reach a lasting and a just solution. Like our Palestinian brothers, we are relying on our efforts, on the solidarity and the support of the international community, and especially on the solidarity and support of our Arab brothers."

"President Kyprianou of Cyprus went on to tell AL-QABAS, "We have always subscribed to the view which proclaimed that a commitment to the preservation of human rights was an international commitment and that deviation from that course, regardless of the justifications therefor, were not permissible. A mere glance at the international scene is sufficient to persuade us that there is an unsatisfactory situation in this regard concerning the preservation of basic rights. What is even more objectionable is the fact that numerous resolutions that were adopted by various organizations, such as the Human Rights Committee, the Committee for the Liquidation of All Forms of Racism and others, have not been put into effect, and increasingly desperate appeals for putting an end to such violations have gone unheeded and unenforced.

"This is especially true with regard to the existing situation in Cyprus where Turkey has been trampling down international law for 6 years. It is shamefully violating every basis for the human rights of the people of Cyprus.

"The entire world has learned of the decision adopted by the European

Human Rights Committee which was proclaimed on 31 August 1979. The decision found Turkey guilty of committing innumerable crimes against the people of Cyprus. These crimes were carried out by Turkey's invading forces of occupation."

The Question of Jerusalem

The president of Cyprus spoke about his country's position on the question of Jerusalem and said, "We condemn without reservations the decision that was made in the Israeli Knesset to annex the Arab section of Jerusalem. Not only is this action a violation of the principles of justice and of the charter of the United Nations, but it is also a violation of UN resolutions on the matter. Furthermore, it complicates the problems of the Middle East question further; it is an action that threatens peace and security in the world.

"The position of the Cypriot government remains firm and unaltered. [We] support the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the occupied territories in accordance with UN resolutions, and we support the full application of these resolutions.

"With regard to the Palestinian question, which is an inseparable part of the Middle East question, the government of Cyprus supports the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to establish a sovereign, independent state.

"Cyprus has strongly and firmly supported the Palestinian question and the right of Palestinians to return to their homes and to live in their own homeland a long time before the island itself was subjected to invasion and forced partitioning by Turkey in 1974. Now that Cyprus has been suffering the same painful destiny of Palestine, with one third of its population--200,000 persons on the side of the island which is under Turkish occupation--forcibly expelled from their homes and prevented from returning to them by the Turkish army of occupation, our support for the Palestinian question is greater than it has ever been before. We believe that justice is indivisible and that any victory for Palestine and for the Palestinians will signify a victory for Cyprus and for Cypriot refugees because Palestinians and Cypriots are partners in suffering. The wheel of life has tragically stopped turning for them because of the shameful injustice that befell them just as it befell our Palestinian brothers."

The Question of the Middle East

President Kyprianou spoke to AL-QARAS about the Middle East question and said, "We are very saddened by the development of events on the road of finding a just solution to the question of peace in the Middle East. We firmly believe that a comprehensive settlement is essential and that that settlement must guarantee the Palestinian Arab people their inalienable rights. In this context we do not believe in piecemeal

agreements. The Palestinian people are the essence of the question. There will be no real solution unless all parties who are related to the question participate in finding a solution, and especially the PLO in its capacity as the legitimate and the sole representative of the Arab people of Palestine.

"Such a comprehensive, just solution, which will not be achieved in the absence of the PLO, must be based on UN resolutions and must include the total withdrawal of the usurping, aggressive Israeli forces from all occupied Arab lands. It must [also] include the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to establish their independent state on their native soil.

"Our Arab brothers are well aware of the fact that we have always been on their side, defending the just Arab cause even long before the events of July 1974 that swept our country and produced the same injustice and tyranny that had befallen them. The fact is that, in addition to their geographic proximity, the Middle East and Cyprus do suffer from questions that have several similarities. There was aggression and occupation in both cases; in both cases the question of refugees and that of the shameful violation of human rights were raised. In both cases there were similar attempts to create artificial borders and to change the geographic nature of the areas by bringing in large groups of people and making an alien people settle there after forcibly expelling the native residents of the area. In both cases too there was an attempt to establish the status quo that was created by the aggression and the violation of human rights."

The Events of Lebanon

Concerning the events of Lebanon and their outcome, President Kyprianou told AL-QABAS, "It is with deep sorrow that we follow the developments in Lebanon. We condemn the proclamation of a separate state in South Lebanon called Free Lebanon, and we also strongly condemn the Israeli acts of aggression and piracy against South Lebanon. These actions are dangerous to the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon on its territories. They are also a shameful violation of human rights. We are therefore urging the United Nations to take firmer action to help the Lebanese government regain its sovereignty over all its territories and preserve the unity of the country."

The president of Cyprus added, "There are many schools of thought: one of them states that the crisis of Cyprus is independent of the Middle East crisis; and the other states that the former crisis is related to the latter. There are numerous similarities between the crisis of Cyprus and that of Lebanon: both are in the same area, within the Middle East in general. The attempt to partition Lebanon, which we strongly condemn, resembles the attempt to partition Cyprus, which we strongly condemn too. The two crises have other similarities, but one does not know whether or not these similarities are part of a general plan. Nevertheless, the crisis in the Middle East and in Cyprus peaked almost at the same time.

"One cannot say that the crisis of Cyprus and that of Lebanon are not related to the Middle East problem. We are, however, dealing with the problem of Cyprus independently. In our opinion this is the proper course."

The president of Cyprus denied that U.S. influence in Cyprus was growing. He told AL-QABAS, "No, it is not true at all that U.S. influence in Cyprus is getting stronger and is growing. What some agencies are saying about the possibility that the United States may use Cyprus as a base from which it would launch its occupation of the oil wells in the Arabian Gulf is not true. We have secured assurances from the British that British bases will be used for British purposes only."

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INTERVIEW CONDUCTED WITH RAIF DENKTAS

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 16, 17 Oct 80

[Article by Erten Kasimoglu]

[16 Oct 80, pp 5, 7]

[Text] One of the important questions which is frequently brought up for the debate is that the Federal Assembly is not working.

The Assembly is unable to carry out its functions of making laws and overseeing their implementation. As a consequence various problems remain unresolved, and our people are worried.

Why isn't the Assembly working? Or why is there not more of an effort to make it work?

From time to time the press or various organizations bring up the issue and debate it, make their pronouncements and try to direct attention to the just anxiety of the people.

This time we intended to present a number of questions which we put to certain parliamentary deputies so that their views on this issue could be heard from their own lips. Of the seven interviews with parliamentarians which we have conducted in this series we are publishing today that with Raif Denktas, Deputy from Lefkosa.

Question: As the first period of the Federal Assembly enters its last legislative year how would you evaluate its performance to date? The general opinion of the public is that it is not working. What are your views on this question?

Answer: The four year performance of the Federal Assembly is far from satisfying the expectations of our society and quite inadequate.

The main reason for this are the parliamentary rules which were adopted at the outset of this four year term to regulate how the Assembly was to operate. These rules were directed far more at determining whether or not its operations were conducted democratically than at assuring its functional effectiveness. For this reason the Assembly has frequently presented a picture of anarchy, of extreme immoderation without any limits. Assembly operations have been conducted in an atmosphere of random chaos rather than harmony and order. Consequently its four years' work has been inadequate and in a sense a wasted four years. It is true that there are many reasons for this, but the principal one has to be the Assembly rules, because they

do not contain provisions for expediting the legislative process. Whereas in all democratic parliaments such provisions are present. This shortcoming in our rules has been apparent for the entire four year period, and in my work during these years I have continually restated the necessity for changing these rules. However there have not been many who paid any heed to this. Only in the last year has the National Unity Party gotten around to preparing a draft amendment, but this has been bottled up in committee and the Assembly is still operating under the 1976 rules, if you can call that operating.

Question: Mr Denktas, do you have personally or as a party member a concrete proposal for making the Assembly operable through a change in the rules?

Answer: Our party's concrete proposal was accepted on a group basis last year and sent to committee. One should say this about this proposal: If we consider the Assembly's operational structure the essential work is carried on in committees. The Assembly consists of 40 persons, and it is important to remember that part of these 40 are engaged in executive functions. Consequently bills and motions pile up and the committees can never get out from under this back-log.

Quite a lot of work can be done in the 40 member general establishment which is supposed to be done in the committees. The committees might be allowed a short period to complete their work. If they do not make good use of this period, and even if the bill or motion has not been reported out of committee, it would be brought before the plenary session. The whole Assembly might work on it for a longer time, but the work would be more productive, and the bill or motion might be more quickly enacted into legislation. That is to say, in some cases, to limit the time in committee and to have the bill or motion come under consideration by the entire Assembly might mean that a lot less would escape the attention of the deputies, the public and the press. With respect to the general Assembly procedures it will be necessary to change some other provisions of the parliamentary rules which have led to endless speeches in support of or opposition to various bills and motions so as to place a definite limit upon them. All parliaments throughout the world put time limits upon speeches. In Turkey the speeches of a prime minister or a principal opposition leader are subject to a limit, whereas our parliamentary rules do not place any such limit. This immoderate degree of freedom has resulted in chaos in our Assembly. Speeches in our Assembly go on for hours, but the same words are repeated over and over. It would be far more productive to have these speeches confined to what would contribute to the substance of the bill or motion under consideration.

In summary, the transfer of committee operations to the plenary Assembly, together with certain practical revisions in the way the Assembly operates, would have a positive effect and the imposition of a time limit upon Assembly speeches would to a great measure eliminate the problems which have hindered the operation of the Assembly.

Question: What might some other proposals be for resolving the problems of the Federal Assembly and facilitating the legislative process?

For example some deputies have proposed that the job of a parliamentarian be made a full time one. What do you say to this?

Answer: I have not gotten involved in the debate over whether the Assembly deputies should be incorporated into the civil service. I have not stated any opinion on this question yet. This might or might not be a good idea, but the basic issue is not whether to make the job a full time one or not, because it would be incorrect to consider it a part time one. The parliamentarian's main job anyway, is to legislate. Aside from that he has the duty to keep the public informed and involved in public issues. Consequently the question of whether it is a full time job or not is irrelevant. One issue is to increase the number of laws which are passed. But it must not be forgotten that the laws which are passed must not just remain on the pages of the RESMI GAZETE. They must be brought to life, and this must be perceived by our citizens. Up to now this is being perceived only in the most superficial manner and then only if the question is one which puts money into the citizen's pocket or takes it out, that is in the case of tax legislation, or for example laws affecting public servants or retirement. But the Social Housing Bill was passed, a bill which is to change the structure of society to a major degree and resolve a very important problem, although its practicability is still in dispute. Even though there has been some progress the major effort required by the bill has not been made. So it is not enough just to have a bill passed by the Assembly. What is needed to have it properly implemented is for it to be fully perceived by society.

We must think how to make the work of the Assembly more productive, and this within the framework of the Constitution.

It is not a question of deputies absenting themselves from the Assembly or not participating in the work of the Assembly. First of all the deputies must be convinced that their work in the Assembly is beneficial and useful to society, because frequently they themselves believe that the work they have done has been fruitless or has not achieved the hoped for results.

Personnel Problems of Deputies

Question: Does the fact that the deputies are also managing their own private professions throughout their 5 year terms of office adversely affect their legislation duties?

Answer: If the Assembly worked every day this would be true. As it is the deputies adapt their private professions to the Assembly schedule. At present the Assembly meets in plenary session once a week and so the deputies are able to continue their private professions. If the Assembly were to meet more often the deputies would have to adjust their private schedules accordingly. Those who failed to adjust would be subject to exposure by the press.

Question: Would this be sufficient?

Answer: In my opinion it would be. It would show that there is a tendency to neglect Assembly work to allocate time to private affairs. The reverse of this is always possible too. We have to accept the fact that the deputies are people that like politics, or else that they have a sense of duty. If they have a sense of doing something useful for society while they are serving as deputies I am convinced that they will all tend to give the greater weight to their Assembly duties than

to their private businesses. Of course exceptions might be found. However there is this to consider. Measures could be introduced into the Assembly rules to prevent neglect of Assembly duties. The current rules are deficient in this regard. That is to say neglect of Assembly duties in favor of private interests could be prevented by Assembly rules. I believe that the absence of such a rule is adversely affecting the work of the Assembly. However it is absolutely necessary to say in this connection that disorganized committee work, retraction by the government of bills already submitted to committee, changes in the government's views regarding motions under consideration, and the lack of authority on the part of committee chairmen to cut off debate and bring matters to a vote are leading to bills and motions being buried in the committees. As a consequence there are few bills being issued from committee in prepared form for debate in plenary session and therefore the full Assembly is not meeting frequently enough. If the committees were to transfer the important aspect of their function to the full Assembly, that is, if the committees were to be transformed in their role to that of a sieve and leave the actual work on the bills to the full Assembly then the Assembly could get down to the business of debate on the agenda items far more quickly.

Question: Do you believe that there might be some benefit in opening the work of the committees to the press?

Answer: In one sense it could be beneficial, but looked at from another standpoint, for example the opposition parties would feel themselves obliged to oppose certain matters if they were confronting the public, whereas in the committee they might take a more flexible attitude and could cooperate better with the members of the party in office. This situation exists in all democracies. In the full view of the public a party could perhaps feel itself absolutely bound to a certain point of view and could not abandon it to defend another view. However that absolute stand does not properly reflect what went into it. One should not forget that there are also rivalries among the opposition parties. Therefore if the press were to be admitted to committee activities the deputies on the one hand would be compelled to be more careful and alert but on the other hand this would eliminate the hoped-for flexibility of approach.

It is important whether or not the committees discuss bills and motions within a limited period of time. In the period the committee would perform its duty, would amend certain articles, and then would say to the Assembly, "We have examined, or have not been able to examine this bill." The full Assembly would then do what was left to be done. Because no one knows what bills there are on the committee agenda, the public is in the dark, because the press has not been admitted to committee sessions. But once the bill comes before the full Assembly, all the more so if it is an important motion or bill, the public immediately displays its interest. Under these conditions the work of the Assembly gains the necessary weight and importance in society. After the aforementioned motion or bill has been passed the full Assembly Parliament again becomes an indistinguishable institution.

However, if the fundamental deliberation on the bill is performed by the General Assembly it will be necessary for us to meet at a minimum three or four times a week. If these meetings are properly regulated and if the periods of debate are limited the passage or rejection of the bill will be followed by the public with interest.

I believe the important thing, for the opposition especially, is not to talk for a long time but to be able to state their objection to a given bill if they have one. And they can do this in a limited period quite as well. Consequently the opposition ought not to be afraid of placing limits on speaking time. I'm not saying the opposition is always guided by a desire to obstruct the passage of bills--just some bills are treated in this fashion. This could be said about any parliament in the world. However in the countries in which there is a libertarian democracy there are certain rules to counteract attempts to block the passage of laws. We don't have rules like this in ours. If there were an opposition in the TFSC which was one hundred percent ill-willed and determined to prevent the parliament from operating we wouldn't be able to get a single law passed.

Question: Is the parliamentary arithmetic an important factor in the shortcomings in its operation? How do you view the relative responsibilities of the government and opposition parties in this regard?

Answer: In my view the mistake in approach which the opposition parties make is as follows: the opposition parties maintain that the majority group ought to run things in the parliament and make it operate and they have maintained this from the very beginning.

To say "let the majority run the parliament" is a fundamentally mistaken attitude. Because such a way of thinking announces to the world that as opposition parties they feel themselves unnecessary. That is to say if the majority wishes to run the parliament what need is there for a minority. We ought to look at the issue from this standpoint. But unfortunately the attitude of the opposition both in committee deliberations and in the General Assembly is sometimes stiff and unbending and sometimes wishy washy.

[17 Oct 80, p 5]

[Text] R Denktas: The fact that the ruling party today has fallen to 23 seats must not make one forget that they came to Parliament with 30 deputies and that they therefore received a mandate of 30 seats from the people...

There have been days when the ruling party has fallen as low as 20 seats. It isn't possible for a Parliament to function with 20 deputies. If only these 20 deputies were to enter the Parliament, they could not constitute a majority. The control of a majority (21 seats) by the government is a fundamental consideration in forming a government. Whoever has the majority in Parliament is the governing party, and that party forms the government. However to put this to a test at every session of the Parliament, further, to test it in the committees and to continually maneuver the government into a corner by questioning whether or not it is in the majority is not a tactic that reason can accept. This is because the question of whether or not the government has a majority in Parliament can be tested from time to time in other ways in democracies. If it is thought that there is doubt in the matter, the opposition demands a vote of no confidence, and in this manner the government's control of a majority is put to the test...

Whether or not the position of a deputy is linked to any given party, the responsibilities of this office must be carried out without regard to partisan views...

It is a different matter altogether to defend this or that party's views as these responsibilities are being carried out. However it is a condition that the fact of belonging to one party or another does not give rise to the right of not carrying out these responsibilities... The Parliament belongs to the people. Just because the NUP [National Unity Party] is in the majority, this does not mean that the Parliament belongs to the NUP... Therefore, the question of whether or not the Parliament is to function is not a responsibility falling on the shoulders of the NUP alone. The Parliament belongs to the people, and the office of deputy is a responsibility bestowed by the people. All deputies, regardless of differences, must carry out this responsibility... It follows that the belief that the Parliament is to be run by the government does not conform to democracy in its essence... If something like a "government's parliament" comes about, then a dictatorship of the majority comes into being... It brings about the understanding that he who has the majority can operate the Parliament when and if he wishes... If opportunity is given for such an understanding to become established, this opens the road to a dictatorship of the majority which is opposed to the essence of democracy... The majority will form the government, but that party must not establish a dictatorship... The parties must be in a position where they cannot place impediments in the path of their deputies' performance of their responsibilities...

Question: Mr Denktas, can one say that political maneuvers for personal aims have had a negative influence on the functioning of Parliament, in particular in connection with the passage of legislation with a social content? How do such negative influences come about in Parliament... For example, whenever a proposed piece of legislation dealing with housing or rent problems comes up for debate in Parliament, public opinion appears to approach the conclusion that those deputies who own houses or apartment buildings will be able to block a piece of legislation that might be inimical to their own interests... In a parliamentary panorama spanning four years has this or other examples like this been acted out?

Answer: Fundamentally this is a most interesting question and one that we could debate for a long time...

If the majority in Parliament belongs to one particular class in society, then the interests of that class can be protected by that Parliament, no matter which party is in power, and it is possible that the interests of other classes will not be protected... This is a very important point... It is a very complicated subject of debate whether in a Parliament that ought to be the mirror of society, or of which it is expected that it reflect society, the class of peasants and workers who form the majority in society should be represented by individuals with roots in the peasant and worker class, and whether individuals belonging to other classes, such as independent businessmen, who appear to defend the interests of those classes or honestly defend them, should even be in Parliament...

If one is talking about a piece of legislation that is contrary to the private interests of individuals who have the right to vote in Parliament, and the question is whether this proposed piece of legislation can become law, then one has to ask this question separately for each individual... The reason is that there are individuals who are of a mentality that lets them perform their duties irrespective of their own private interests, but there may also be individuals who might use their elected positions solely to promote their own private interest... What is

important is that the community should be able to draw this distinction and to cast its votes accordingly... A two-sided example cannot be shown in any way... Given the fact that in Cyprus we are living as a small community, it would be a shame the moment that social struggle took the place of social coalescence.

Thus it is up to the parties to prevent class differences from being reflected in Parliament. How is this to be accomplished? If a party in power is under threat from individuals within its own group in Parliament, and it is leery of the individuals who are directing that threat or who have the potential to direct that threat, it may show a tendency to shelve certain pieces of legislation in order to remove from consideration items which might touch on the private interests of those individuals who are potential threats, with the aim of carrying out other items in the party's program... To a certain degree this has to be accepted as normal... This is because in Cyprus everything happens in full view of the community and it is right that it should be thus... If the ruling party has a concrete program, and if it has undertaken to apply this program in order of priorities and in a detailed fashion, it will do whatever is required by the program... However it is a possibility that when one starts out with a complicated program imposed solely by principles one may not achieve any results...

Returning to the matter of whether or not personal interests have affected the functioning of our Parliament... At this point I do not wish to say anything further... What is important is that individuals who must not bring their personal interests to the Parliament be present in this community's Parliament...

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SOCIALIST LEADERS CONDEMNS, FLAYS AMERICAN POLICIES

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 4 Nov 80 p 17

/Article by Khalil al-Taqi: "Dr Vassos Lyssaridis, Leader of the Cypriot Socialist Party, to AL-QABAS: America Is Trying To Impose a New Camp David on the People of Cyprus"/

/Text/ In a conversation with AL-QABAS Dr Vassos Lyssaridis, leader of the Cypriot Socialist Party (EDEK), stated that the forces which are trying to impose the Camp David agreements on the Palestinian people and the Arabs are trying to impose similar agreements on the Cypriot people, with the goal of keeping Cyprus as a military and political base to protect their interests and the interests of their friends and agents in the Middle East.

He went on to say "Unfortunately, the secretary general of the United Nations is trying to avoid facing the fact that the issue of Cyprus is an issue of occupation and invasion, and he ignores the resolutions which have been issued by the international body demanding the withdrawal of foreign forces from Cyprus and the return of the refugees to their homes.

"The Cyprus issue can be resolved in accordance with United Nations resolutions and on the basis of internationally recognized principles, meaning that Cyprus will be demilitarized, nonaligned united republic with sovereignty over its territory, with the rights of all its citizens guaranteed and inviolate."

He went on to say, "If we address ourselves to the practical aspects, taking into consideration the developments which have occurred recently, I can say that we would accept a solution based on a federal foundation, but with full guarantees of rights of residence and ownership and freedom to move. It is obvious that we cannot have boundaries on a small island 9,000 square kilometers in area, whose population does not exceed three quarters of a million. Even to have security agencies dealing with the movements of citizens and residence problems is something I do not accept, because the island has been faced with an invasion and the Turkish army has taken over the homes of civilians and offered them to other citizens.

"In the Middle East as a precedent there is the example of Israeli policy toward Palestine. We have passed through the same experience. The Israeli army expelled the Palestinians from their homes and their territory and today Israel is claiming that these homes and this property belong to Israel and that the Palestinians have

no right to return and have no right to their property. We have faced the same thing in Cyprus, and this is unacceptable. At the same time it conflicts with the interests of the Cypriot Greek and Turkish communities."

Dr Lyssaridis went on to tell AL-QABAS, "The Cyprus issue is not a struggle between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The Cypriot crisis was created because the United States of America wanted to use Cyprus as a base for launching an aggression against the Arab nation, which is trying to become a people in command of their destiny, and because the United States wanted to use the island to dominate Arab oil and oppose the triumphant Palestinian revolution.

"Mr Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriot faction, says and always reiterates 'If we agree to discuss the issue of residence, then there will probably be a demographic (population) and geographic change in the structure of the sector, as this agreement will result in the return of numerous numbers of Greek Cypriots to live in their old homes in the north of the island.' However, we consider that this problem Mr Denktash is raising can be solved by constitutional measures.

"As far as the American plans go, we reject those, because we are sure that they are aimed at splitting up the island and creating two semi-colonies on it, one in the north and the other in the south, enabling the Americans to use both against our noble Arab brothers and combatants who want to be the masters of their destinies. For this reason we reject the American plans, which are aimed at strengthening imperialist interests in the Middle East."

The Solutions Put forth

Dr Lyssaridis, the leader of the opposition Socialist Party in Cyprus, talked about the solutions put forth by the secretary general of the United Nations, Dr Kurt Waldheim, which would result in the establishment of a federal state on the island, and said "The movements of the secretary general of the United Nations are based on an old British-American-Canadian plan which those countries presented in December 1978, aimed at imposing a solution on our people in the manner of the 'Camp David' solution. These attempts failed at their time, and here they are now trying through the secretary general of the United Nations, demanding that our people offer further concessions, demanding that they give up uniting the island, and we realize that offering any new concessions will lead them to demand that we offer further concessions. Therefore we are determined to continue fighting for the independence of a united Cyprus devoid of foreign armies.

"The United States wants Cyprus to be a base to supervise the Suez Canal and Arab oil, and above all to plot against the Palestine liberation movement because it is the main, basic vanguard force against colonialist imperialist American schemes in the region."

Armed Struggle

In response to AL-QABAS' question on his conviction that armed struggle has become the only means for solving the Cypriot issue, Dr Lissaridis said,

"Before answering that question, it is necessary to raise an important question: why did Turkey invade Cyprus? Is it true that it raided it to protect the rights

of the Turkish Cypriots? It is well known to all that the Turkish people in Turkey are suffering from more than the Turkish community in Cyprus is, and proof of that is the fact that the Turkish Cypriots are living in a state of discontent and restlessness under the fire of Turkish occupation.

I can assert to you that the Turkish invasion of Cyprus took place in accordance with orders from the American Pentagon. Therefore what concerns America now is to preserve this occupation so that it may be a cover for implementing its schemes, which would face many difficulties in the event the Turkish armies withdrew and the island returned to its previous state of unity and independence. Here it is necessary to state an important matter, which is that the United States has been faced with two options in the face of the latest developments in the Middle East, to consolidate the occupation of Cyprus and give the Turkish occupation of part of it international legitimacy, or to resort to occupying all of it directly.

"Since the United States considers that it would be more feasible and easy for it to strive to impose the first option, it is now doing the same thing it did in Lebanon, clothing its conspiracy in factional garb in order to preserve the presence of puppet forces which can facilitate what it wants and enable it to dispense with involvement in a direct occupation.

"We say that Turkey must know that whatever foreign support it finds it will never be able to impose on our people the solution that it wants and Washington wants, and it must know that the only solution is to come to the negotiating table to discuss a real solution and not to impose an unjust one. In spite of our reservations about the negotiations going on now in Nicosia, we are trying to be optimistic, because they will be a favorable opportunity if we succeed, in view of the problems Turkey is suffering from as a result of the military coup on the one hand, and the possibility of implementing what can be agreed to without the temporizing of Turkish politicians and parties the coup forces removed. However, that in no way means that we support the idea of military coups and the probable adventures of Turkish generals following the latest coup.

"In this context, I can say that any people have the right to choose the means they consider appropriate to obtain their freedom and as far as our people in Cyprus go I can stress that they are ready to sacrifice and give their lives to defend their dignity and nation."

The Palestine Cause

Dr Lissaridis talked about the Palestinian cause, saying "The balance of forces is rapidly shifting in favor of peoples' struggles, and a large group of Arab citizens is being organized under the banner of the struggle against imperialism and Zionism in the Arab world. If natural resources are placed in the balance at the service of the struggle, the balance would change at once. Even inside Israel Jewish young people and workers have started to realize the erroneous, serious policy of the Israeli military clique, and the same thing applies to Cyprus. The final thwarting of the occupation of Cyprus, or America's use of the occupied areas for its strategic goals, will turn the 'Turkish victory' into an adventure.

"I will give you the example of our Palestinian brothers. Fifteen or 20 years ago, the whole world thought that the Palestinian cause had fallen into oblivion, today

the Palestinian cause has become the most important and serious one in the world. Aside from the difficulties which Palestinian fighting men might be facing at the current time, I believe that in the end they will acquire their national rights.

"I believe that the overwhelming majority of the Cypriot people are standing on the side of the triumphant Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian Arab people, and I also believe that the Cypriot government is taking a proper position regarding the Palestinian cause. It considers the Palestine Liberation Organization to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people, and the Palestine Liberation Organization office in Cyprus has all the diplomatic privileges foreign embassies in Cyprus enjoy."

Concerning the existing relations between Cyprus and Israel, Dr Lyssaridis said "What adds to my happiness is that the Cypriot government is proceeding to expel the Israeli embassy from Cyprus. Here I would like to point out that diplomatic relations with Israel were imposed on us by force; when the Cypriot state was established after the national revolution which triumphed in 1960, Turkey, Greece and America imposed the condition on us that we accept the presence of an Israeli embassy in our country's capital, on the excuse that it was necessary that we recognize all member countries of the United Nations in order to be considered a member of the international organization.

"I have said more than once in the Cypriot parliament that the Israeli embassy in Cyprus has turned into a den of criminals disrupting the security of the Cypriot people and infringing on their dignity before directing their fire at the hearts of the fraternal Palestinian Arab people. The Israelis know full well that the Cypriot people love and respect the Palestinian Arab people and hold the Palestinian cause and the Palestine Liberation Organization sacred. Therefore when they send their intelligence personnel to defame the Liberation Organization they are in fact defaming the Cypriot people.

"Our late leader Archbishop Makarios is the one who firmly implanted our people's relations with the Palestinian Arab people. He was joined by firm solid bonds of friendship with the leader of the Palestinian people, the fighter Yasir'Arafat, and therefore in no case can one retreat from this friendship. In fact, it is to be noted that it is growing and developing constantly. As regards our party's relations with the Palestinian revolution, and the FATH movement in particular, I am divulging no secret in telling you that the bylaws of the EDEK party permit its members to belong to the ranks of the Palestinian revolution, especially the FATH movement.

The Socialist Party and the Palestinian resistance are one body, our enemy is one, our goal is one, and the future of our country is one. In our party's indoctrination sessions I always say that either we and the Palestinian revolution will die or we will triumph together, and we are confident that we will triumph.

The Middle East Problem

Dr Vassos Lyssaridis talked to AL-QABAS about the Middle East problem and the possibility of solving it through negotiation, and said, "The issue is not one of

negotiation. I believe that no one is opposed to holding negotiations, if they are honorable and chaste and take into consideration the interests of the people which is the interested party.

"Ending the problem of the Middle East means eliminating the dominance of imperialism, defeating Zionism, strengthening progressive regimes and doing away with agents and bridgeheads in the area.

"Proceeding from this premise, I believe that the initiative the head of the Egyptian regime, President Anwar al-Sadat, has made under the guise of what he called 'the historic peace initiative' is unacceptable and utterly to be rejected. The 'Camp David' agreements totally ignore the rights of the Arabs and almost ignore the fact that there are occupied Arab territories. These agreements accept the fact that Israel's power creates right, they accept the fait accompli, and they also accept the elimination of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people."

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CSO: 4902

ECONOMY: WORST IS YET TO COME

Sicosis THE CYPRUS MAIL in English 28 Nov-4 Dec 80 p 8

[Text]

Most Cypriots believe that the economy is generally in a worse state now than it was a year ago, and what is more important, they feel things will get even worse in the next six months.

These are the findings of the opinion poll on the economic situation conducted earlier this month by the Middle East Marketing and Research Bureau.

The poll found the average Cypriot worried about both inflation and the energy crisis.

Problems such as the marketing of agricultural produce, the crisis in the building industry, unemployment of young graduates and the problems facing the Co-op movement also featured as causes for concern.

Prospects

People were asked whether in their opinion, the Cyprus economy now was in a better or worse shape than a year ago.

Only 7% thought it was in a better shape, 85% believed it was worse, while 7% said there was no change.

Replying to a question about prospects for the next

six months, the great majority (77%) were pessimistic about the economic outlook, and said things were bound to get worse. Only 6% were hopeful while 11% believed there would be no change in the situation.

The government was given a rather low rating for its handling of economic problems. It received less than three points (out of a maximum 7) showing that most people, especially the younger population, were dissatisfied with the government's economic policies.

The government fared somewhat better on its energy policy, where it got an average rating of 3.54 out of 7.

On the question of energy, the poll showed the people in their entirety were fully aware of the seriousness of the problem while 88% said they were ready to accept sacrifices in order to solve the problem.

Asked about ways of tackling the problem, 85% opted for restrictions in car imports, and 71% for the introduction of rationing by coupons. They were generally against higher prices for petrol and diesel.

The only measures which seemed to have a degree of acceptance were the introduction of a special road tax and a surcharge on consumption of electricity over a certain number of kilowatts.

GRIM WARNING BY EMPLOYERS' CHIEF

Nicosia THE CYPRUS MAIL in English 28 Nov-4 Dec 80 p 8

[Text]

The Cyprus Employers Federation celebrated its 20th anniversary this week by announcing a change in its name. From now on it will be called Cyprus Employers and Industrialists Federation.

When originally set up in 1960, the group (then consisting of only 19 members) was known as the Employers Consultative Association. Now it has a membership of 1,300.

Speaking at an anniversary gathering at the Hilton Hotel, the Federation's chairman, Mr Renos Solomides, said the Federation was non-political and had no political ambitions.

Crusade

Referring to the economic situation, Mr Solomides, a former Finance Minister, spoke of an "oncoming inflation storm" and called for a "national crusade" to combat it.

He pointed out that if no effective steps were taken to curb inflation, people would enjoy "astronomical" wages and salaries which however would be "void of any real purchasing power."

Mr Solomides declared: "If we do not come down to earth and adapt ourselves to the limitations and potentialities of our national economy

and annual productivity growth, the quick raising of the people's living standards being sought will prove an illusion. In actual fact it will be a Pyrrhic victory. When the crisis comes, the workers will suffer the heaviest blow in the form of unemployment while businessmen will go bankrupt."

Mr Solomides strongly called for a temporary suspension of the automatic adjustment of wages and salaries to the cost of living in-

dex. At times of high inflation, such direct linkage caused a "vicious circle" and further aggravated economic destabilisation, he said.

DIRECT AIR LINK TO YUGOSLAVIA

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 28 Nov-4 Dec 80 p 32

[Text] Yugoslavia has told Cyprus that there is now a "definite and distinct interest" on the part of Yugoslav airline companies in starting and maintaining a direct air link between the two countries.

Speaking at a press conference in Nicosia yesterday on the 17th anniversary of the proclamation of the Socialist Federal Republic in his country, the Yugoslav Ambassador to Cyprus Mr. Cvijeto Job said "President Kyprianou and our Prime Minister devoted a lot of time to this idea. It has been discussed for the past few years and now there is a distinct possibility that something may be done within the next two months or so.

Ambassador Job explained that the possibilities of either charter flights or regular scheduled connections were examined and that the more likely of the two would be weekly scheduled flights.

Such a link, he pointed out, would stimulate business and tourism between Cyprus and Yugoslavia and at the same time eliminate the necessity of making an overnight stop in Athens. In addition, there has been a great deal of interest on the part of Cypriot travel agents and tourism organisations.

That is why the matter was discussed here during the third meeting of the mixed Cyprus/Yugoslav commission for economic, scientific, technical and industrial cooperation held in Nicosia last week, he said.

During the two-day meeting five bi-lateral agreements were signed on cooperation in the fields of education, culture and science for 1980-82, a new and more far-reaching trade agreement, and agreements on cooperation in tourism, road transport and health.

OFFICIAL: SOVIET DEFECTOR'S RETURN CONSISTENT WITH UN PACT

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 16 Oct 80 p 11

[Article by Staffan Bruun]

[Text] The Soviet defector's identity still is not clear. Secretary of the Interior Eino Uusitalo who made the decision to return the man to the Soviet Union has still not been available for comment.

Last week police captured a Russian outside Sotkamo, 90 km from the Soviet border. Because the man had no pieces of identification and no residence permit for Finland, officials at the Ministry of the Interior decided to send him back to the Soviet Union.

All parties involved have refused to say whether the man was a political refugee seeking asylum. Both the head of the aliens division Eila Kanno and the local sheriff Matti Valinen of Sotkamo explain their silence by referring to orders from higher officials.

Kari Saksela, public relations official of the border patrol, says that all aliens who are captured by the border patrol are turned over to the police automatically.

"Officials at the Ministry of the Interior are the ones who decide what happens to these aliens. Then we carry out their decision. In this particular case we had to take care of the Russian and bring him to the border where the Soviet officials took over."

Kari Saksela stresses that the border patrol never makes a decision about the return of a defector.

UN Pact

Eero Kekomäki, assistant department head at the State Department says that the UN Pact concerning refugees, drawn up in 1951, is a binding agreement for Finland.

"According to this pact we are not allowed to return a refugee to a country where he might be persecuted. But this applies only to persecution because of belief, race, religion etc. Refugees who are persecuted because they have committed a crime in their homeland are not covered by this pact."

Eero Kekomaki informs us that in 1970 Finland instituted a law that said that persons who are guilty of crimes in their homeland must be returned to Finland.

"But this law does not apply to political crimes. The crimes must be considered serious crimes in Finland also in order for this law to be applicable. Interpretation of the law is done by the Justice Department."

Same Position

Basically, a refugee from the Soviet Union is in exactly the same position as a refugee from Latin America, Eero Kekomaki says.

"But Finland has made two special pacts with the Soviet Union regarding specific situations," he adds.

One pact stipulates that high-jackers are to be exchanged between the two countries. And the other pact concerns persons who have crossed the border by mistake.

"According to the special pacts these persons are to be returned home after a minimal amount of formalities."

Eero Kekomaki emphasizes that as soon as a person willfully crosses the border with Finland the UN Pact goes into effect.

8901

CSO: 3109

HOLKERI DENIES INTEREST IN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 9 Nov 80 p 11

[Article: "Sorsa Restrains Discussion About a Successor to Urho Kekkonen"]

[Text] Discussion regarding the presidential question has begun too early in the opinion of Kalevi Sorsa, chairman of the Social Democratic Party. In an interview he gave to ETELA-SUOMEN SANOMAT last Saturday, Sorsa took special care to place the incumbent president, Urho Kekkonen, and his challenger, Mauno Koivisto, opposite one another. In Sorsa's opinion it is not wise, even as an election tactic, for the Social Democrats to set one of the candidates up as an official target.

If the SDP [Social Democratic Party] were to choose an official candidate at this time, it would be Koivisto overwhelmingly, Sorsa said in his interview. He denied that he himself would be available or attempt to become a candidate. He mentioned in addition that he supports normal elections.

Sorsa also considered the possibility of cooperation with the Coalition. In his opinion, cooperation by the SDP with the Coalition could even be more fruitful than cooperation with the Center Party.

According to Sorsa, this is because of the fact that the Coalition and the SDP represent modern society and are wrestling with its problem. On the other hand, Sorsa sees in the Center Party much "natural old-fashionedness, which is perhaps necessary in fact for the agricultural population."

Holkeri Declines

Bank director Harri Holkeri, who was considered the most probable Coalition candidate for president, declined the honor. In the third edition of Saturday's UUSI SUOMI, Holkeri said that he was not interested in the candidacy.

In answer to a further question, Holkeri said that he would not be available as a presidential candidate. "I have come here to the Bank of Finland, and it is useless for the Coalition to come here looking for a candidate. We have strong enough watchmen here to throw those kinds of beggars out."

Ele Alenius (KD), a director of the Bank of Finland, is ready to support Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto as a joint presidential candidate of the left.

In an interview yesterday with ILTA-SANOMAT, Alenius took a different position from that of Aarne Saarinen, chairman of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party], who has had a negative attitude toward Koivisto's presidential candidacy, citing foreign-policy reasons.

Member of Parliament Pertti Salonen (KOK [Coalition]) is encouraging the Center Party and the Coalition to cooperate on the presidential question. In an interview with UUTISKESKUS, which is close to the Center Party, Salolainen said that the parties must guarantee to the country a nonsocialist president in the future.

9611

CSO: 3107

LABOR MINISTRY PERSONNEL HIT CP BOSS' APPOINTMENTS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 16 Oct 80 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] Labor Minister Arvo Aalto has come under fire from two different directions, according to Jan-Magnus Jansson. On the one hand Aalto has made a remark which must be interpreted as supportive of wildcat strikes and other protest actions in places of employment; and, on the other hand, he has also come under fire for his appointment policy. The editorial observes that generally Aalto had been considered a constructive politician, but recent events show that the assimilation of communism by the Finnish society is no painless process.

If we believe Kalevi Sorsa's words, the state of disorder in the Communist Party resembles the "disorder in the busy lover's closet." This expression is not part of Swedish common usage, but, certainly, nobody has any difficulty understanding its meaning. The leader of the Social Democrats mentioned three reasons for the disorder, among them the impending loss in the upcoming election, the recent events in Poland, and the approaching party congress.

A number of Gallup polls support the fact that the Communist Party is likely to lose the coming election. On the basis of polls taken last September, Finnish Gallup pollsters reported last Sunday, for example, that the Communist Party will have the support of 16.8 per cent of the voters in the local election. This means that the party's support has decreased by 1.7 percentage points since the local election in 1976 and by 1.1 percentage points since the last general election in 1979. The most recent poll, done by the magazine APU, arrives at practically the same result. It shows 16.7 per cent for the communist-people's democrats.

In other words, the decline in voter support is evident as far as the polls go. Then one can obviously speculate about the reasons for this. The split within the party is always a plausible explanation, and this is a split which certainly has not decreased in the last months. Some observers point to international incidents, not only in Poland but also in Afghanistan. One might also ask whether their long term in power is causing displeasure. Finally, one ought to remember that the communists have been sliding for a long time due to social, regional and ideological changes within the electorate.

It is quite natural for these unanimously negative reports to cause a certain amount of nervousness within the party. And to these must be added the fact that the party's strong man and foremost representative in the government, Labor Minister Arvo Aalto has come under heavy fire both because of his statements and because of his--actual or alleged actions.

In the middle of last week Aalto made a statement, which can only be interpreted as supportive of wildcat strikes in the eyes of management. Among other things, he said that it is good that protest actions have increased in places of employment lately. Aalto got instant rebuttals from a number of leading social democrats, such as Ulf Sundqvist, Sulo Penttila and finally Prime Minister Koivisto, who, without mentioning names, regretted that people were "deliberately undercutting the credibility of already existing agreements." Criticism from the non-socialist block was not mild, of course.

This, certainly, makes us wonder what has got into the usually very careful Labor Minister. Local wildcat strikes are not unusual, that is true, but up until now it has been the privilege of the taistoits to encourage them. It is impossible to refrain from drawing the conclusion that the internal strife within the party has brought Aalto to these exaggerations. The paper put out by the communist minority group has been filled with daily reports about different kinds of protests at places of employment before the election.

According to another hypothesis, Aalto has had to 'clean up his act' in an ongoing battle between Aalto's supporters and the supporters of labor union boss Olavi Hanninen. The battle has intensified because of the coming party congress. Aarne Saarinen's influence is also part of the picture. This is an explanation offered by Sorsa in his speech quoted previously.

The communist defense against these sharp attacks has been tailored to fit the attitude that if something unpleasant is introduced into the debate, it is better to lead it into other areas. Saarinen has defended Aalto by pointing out the fact that the same people who are attacking wildcat strikes now have cheered the wave of strikes in Poland. This is really not a very relevant point. Fighting for basic human rights is one thing, but encouraging employers to ignore already existing agreements is a totally different one.

Aalto himself has trivialized his statement by asking a rhetorical question, do people really believe that a single strike comes about because of what someone happens to say or not say. A thorough editorial in KANSAN UUTISET, published on 14 October strikes a defensive note. The editorial does not deal with Aalto's statements, but states directly that the non-socialist and social democrat members of the government evidently are satisfied with the latest developments in the area of wages and seem to support employers' efforts to allow companies to take all the profits while wage-earners are lagging behind. In future, the editorial declares, communists and the entire people's democratic movement still back the wage-earners' protest actions at their places of employment 'to ensure their piece of the profits in the economic upswing.' The editorial did not discuss the credibility of any agreements.

Aalto has come under fire from a totally different direction also. This has happened in the area of appointments within his own ministry. On 5 October

HELSINKI SAANOMAA7 published a sharp full-page-article, which examined the situation in the ministry in depth and argued that Aalto is doing everything he can to 'pack' the ministry full of communists. Among others some high, non-communist officials supposedly have stopped all in-put of their opinions about applicants there, since the minister does not pay any attention to them anyway. According to a news-item published yesterday, the employees union of the Labor Offices has drawn up a written protest in this matter and even threatened to take organized measures in order to see to it that the appointment process is changed.

The Labor Minister brushes away this criticism, saying that in his department there are fewer communists than representatives for any other large political party. It is difficult to tell how much this action is a reflection of government employees' general reaction against these appointments; a reaction coming from employees who are not affiliated with a particular party as well as from other segments of society. Or are they reacting against specific irregularities in Aalto's areas. Really, an informed set of party policies for the process of making appointments would not interfere with two basic ideas that govern the ideology of the majority communist group. First of all, it is believed that political gains are achieved through the influence of the state's political system, not through actions or protests outside of that system. Secondly, the administration of this system should be characterized by its political systems, that is it should represent the different parties according to a principle of proportion.

Arvo Aalto, along with the head of his party Saarinen, belong to the group of communist politicians who have earned a certain amount of confidence outside of his party because of his realistic stance and his tendency to accept the rules of Finnish society. Therefore, the fire that he has come under now is somewhat unexpected, but it just serves to remind us of the fact that assimilating communism into our society is a process that is not at all free of problems.

8901

CSO: 3109

BRIEFS

CENTRAL BANK CURTAILING CREDIT--The Bank of Finland, in its new credit guidelines on Monday, require that banks must now severely cut back on all loans. This is because repeated suggestions by the central bank to slow the giving of credit have not yet produced results. According to the Bank of Finland, loans granted by the banks have increased in recent months so much that they are aggravating the problems of balance in the national economy. "We will have to tighten the financial policy line even more, unless sufficient support for eliminating imbalances in the economy is received from other segments of the national economy," warned chief director Ahti Karjalainen. The Bank of Finland gives annually general guidelines for the main direction of credit policy for the coming year. This time, the circular letter sent to banks is exceptional. According to Rolf Kullberg, a member of the board of the Bank, the situation is so difficult that banks are being encouraged to cut back on all credit. Formerly, the banks have received a list in which various credit targets were classified into those favored and those toward which banks should have a restrained attitude. [Excerpts] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 11 Nov 80 p 22] 9611

ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY ADVANCES--The 1979 balance sheet of the Finnish electrical and electronics industry shows a 40-percent increase in the volume of exports, for a value of 2,098,000,000 Finnish marks, against 3,557,000,000 in imports. Imports increased 20 percent in value in 1979. The balance of trade in the sector 4 years ago was in deficit by two-thirds in volume; it is only in deficit by one-third in 1979. For the future, Finland will remain dependent with respect to subcontracting, microcomputer equipment and telecommunication. Half of the exported products--in value--were purchased by Sweden and the USSR, while the largest suppliers of electronics are Sweden, the FRG, the U.S. and England, with 1,880,000,000 marks realized in 1979. [Text] [Paris ELECTRONIQUE ACTUALITIES in French 7 Nov 80 p 3] 8946

ROCARD SPEAKS ON 1981 ELECTION, POLITICAL SITUATION, GISCARD

Paris LE MONDE in French 26 Nov 80 p 13

[Article by Jean-Marie Colombani: "Giscard's Reelection Would be a Catastrophe for the Country, Rocard Declares"]

[Excerpt] Michel Rocard's speech Monday evening 24 November during Channel 2's program "Cards on the Table" assures one thing: all the socialists are ready to fight to save the country from the reelection of Valery Giscard d'Estaing. The deputy from Yvelines emphasized eloquently: "It would be a disaster for the country," before being more explicit in his remarks. This desire to defeat the leader in office implied that Rocard promised Francois Mitterrand his loyal support: The matter is settled. The statements of the deputy from Yvelines seem to have been particularly welcomed by the friends of the PS [Socialist Party] first secretary. "One of the latter's close confidants suggested to us," he has created the conditions for Mitterrand's eventual victory. If Rocard did not hide his "gloom," if he even indicated his bitterness, through a certain noticeable puckering at the beginning of his report, he rapidly regained the upper hand, managing to avoid the traps which his two interviewers set for him--legitimately but systematically. The latter seemed to want to have him oppose Mitterrand by all means. Rocard repeatedly explained to them the "collective" nature of the socialist struggle and his own desire to contribute effectively to the candidate's campaign.

But he declared "I am myself, that is the bearer of a proposal for the renewal of democratic socialism, which is "maturing" and which confronts "a Left which is rigid in its traditions."

Taking advantage of his sacrifice in the name of party unity and effectiveness--starting a "primary" in the PS would have guaranteed "a sure defeat," he explained--and planning the future by making the most of his originality: such was Rocard's whole effort.

One of the factors in this originality consists, according to an expression which he used himself before the Metz Congress, in his

desire "to speak more truthfully, closer to the facts." He was very particular Monday evening about abiding by this principle expecting rightly that this image will help him in the future. To speak more truthfully: "I have kept my word," he repeated to explain his withdrawal since the announcement of the candidacy of the PS's first secretary. Rocard has no fear of taking credit for a monopoly of loyalty, suggesting thus that other socialists.

Being closer to the facts, even though it was at the cost of self-criticism: "We were mistaken" about Charles de Gaulle, he explained, for we were not convinced that a "maurassien [cannot identify] general was a great liberal." Even though it was at the cost of recognizing that social democracy is in retreat in Europe, because it was satisfied with attempting to correct capitalism's injustices.

Bringing up Coluche's candidacy--"It is not wise," according to Rocard--came in the nick of time: at a moment when "ridicule" is mentioned, at the moment when political life seems to suffer a certain disrepute, there is a program which was to effect a reconciliation with politics and its representatives, for it was of high quality. It was so, even if Rocard could not answer the main question which is asked the socialists: How to transform the hope which they represent into victory at the polls?

Questioned about whether he is "sad" like his supporters, Michel Rocard answers: "Yes I am, and I am not alone. But I do not dwell on this disappointment. For a politician who tries to be, who feels himself a fighter, disappointment is only for the moment. (...) There is no politics worthy of the name, if it is not ethical. And I am proud of having shown it (...). I withdrew because I promised to. Keeping your word is never a defeat or a surrender. Why did I give my word? For a simple reason: You cannot campaign all by yourself. A strong party is necessary. The PS was mine. (...) Everyone can understand that the candidate of half a party against the other, would have been beaten, in any case. For the question is to know: how to defeat Giscard d'Estaing. Starting with an internal conflict was a sure defeat. (...) I did not want to have my party and my candidate run that risk. It was the only thing to do.

After having emphasized his respect for party rules, he deplores that political parties in France are "so weak and so emaciated." He points out: "Parties are huge in Germany, Italy and Great Britain; their members are counted in millions; they are deeply rooted in the people, they express hopes more closely (...). But without a party, there is no democracy (...). The socialist candidate who would have broken his own and had it run the risk of a serious division was a losing candidate. I am involved in all these disappointments, I share them. But let us understand clearly that it was there that it happened and that it is necessary to join a political party to make democracy work."

Rocard then declares that the reelection of Giscard would be "a catastrophe for the country. "Supporting this statement, he brings up reasons of "public morality" ("when the same team is in power too long, it allows itself privileges, he asserts. We must change the team in power for reasons of national rehabilitation"), institutional stability ("security requires rotation") and economic and social reasons.

After having reaffirmed that he will fight for the socialist candidate, Rocard was asked to comment on the PCF's 131 proposals. He emphasizes the seriousness of the communists' step, then compares the proposals with the Manufrance catalogue. "When you get it, you rather want to buy everything, he points out, but you cannot; governing is to foresee and to choose. In all these proposals which are more trade unionist than political, the problem is that there is no choice. I see clearly there that the PCF is not a candidate to exercise power." Rocard also thinks that in the sections on health and education, for example, the communist proposals are "conservative." He adds: I would have hoped that our communist partners were more innovative. I regret it. It will be the task of we socialists to be bold, innovative and of the Left. (...) The PCF is probably seeking a good identification with a movement, which is mainly of revindication.

To Alain Duhamel's question, "what is it that prevents transforming hope into victory," Rocard answers that in the 4 or 5 years there has been an advance of the Right to some extent everywhere in Europe, "a certain setback of socialist hope." He points out that "the soviet party is collapsing before our eyes." As for the "pledge" of democratic socialism, he emphasizes that "it was no longer very inventive." He adds, "it was merely the pledge of keeping capitalism's production machine, but correcting its injustices; this pledge assumed that capitalism works well (...). The model of socialist development is collapsing at the same time as capitalism. The task of our generation is to restore in France the idea of democratic socialism, through a third way which respects freedom (...)." He points out that we must pursue "the maturing of this work (of renewal) with respect to a Left which is rigid in its traditions"; he declares: "The maturing is not yet such that I am the main representative of the socialist idea (...). We are in that movement and I would not want any of those who have followed me to give up."

He explains that "there is a chance" of seeing the PS win in 1981, then he points out that discussion is open in the PS "not on principles of nationalizations, but on the method of effecting them." He praises the public sector, which he says must be "the main instrument for adaptation to a world of tomorrow which will not be easy at all" and he wants to avoid "bureaucratic nationalizations" and grant privileges to "nationalizations which work." In answer to a question of

Alain Duhamel, he declares that Mitterrand does not bring up in his book the question of methods of nationalizations, "no doubt respecting the fact that the discussion is open."

He then points out that the struggle against unemployment must have priority, brings up the status of women and emphasizes that "time will be necessary" to correct the situation and we must "release energies," those of the entrepreneurs as well as those of the public organizations, especially "in creating substantial regional authorities."

Then he rejects the idea that he is "impatient." He asks: "What is this farce? I am a militant who has fought long for socialism." Rejecting the assumption of a Mitterrand defeat in 1981, he asserts that "a renewed socialism, which is adapted to the 20th century, is possible."

8490
CSO: 3100

DELAYS ANNOUNCING CANDIDACY SHOW TROUBLED ELECTION CLIMATE

Paris LE MONDE in French 29 Oct 80 pp 1, 9

[Article by Noel-Jean Bergeroux: "The Ever-Growing Number of Candidates Helps Giscard"]

[Excerpts] With 6 months remaining before the presidential election, the large number of candidates to the residential post reveals the confusion and perplexity in the political sphere. And yet, the list of 30 or so who have declared their candidacy includes neither Giscard d'Estaing, nor Mitterrand, nor Chirac. Of itself, this early profusion reflects poorly on the dignity of the office and supports under those circumstances the decision of the three major contenders to wait.

As for the unions, the recent unilateral demonstrations by the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] (24 October with the miners; Tuesday, 28 October in defense of Manufrance) illustrate the continuing differences between the CGT and the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor]—agreement on action remains at a deadlock. Each accuses the other of causing the break in the "fighting front," even if voices at the heart of the CFDT are heard criticizing the management.

Three Expectations

If Valéry Giscard d'Estaing ever considered Michel Rocard a more formidable adversary than Mitterrand, it would seem that he no longer holds that opinion.

The president's advisers have not always agreed upon the question: "Who is the greatest threat?", but the events of Sunday, 19 October, may have prompted some revisions of opinion and shaken some certainties. The performance by the deputy of Yvelines was considered clumsy, a technical "failure" and a great threat to socialist party unity. In addition, the reaction of Pierre Mauroy to the declaration of candidacy by the mayor of Conflans-Sainte-Honorine was interpreted as being difficult to comprehend.*

*This interpretation is based on the relative prudence which characterized the 20 October reaction of Pierre Mauroy. Doubtless, the obvious indifference of the mayor of Lille is explained by the fact that he was not too excited by the idea of his associate's ambitions on the national level, not just within the socialist party.

Moreover, the multitude of candidates quite obviously helps l'Elysee: Everything which gives an impression of agitation and disorder reinforces the image of he who waits to the last moment to declare his candidacy—if he is, indeed, running, since he still is not giving any clues. "The president is presiding," is all that is said. And the 6 remaining months before the election will be marked by as many closed councils and working meetings as necessary to back up this slogan. Here the wait and see policy is both tactic and strategy. It also dispenses with the need for speaking, which is no small advantage if, as the Elysee seems to admit, public opinion reproves this eagerness to ride the waves for greater visibility in a period of instability when more reserve is called for.

On Sunday, Jacques Chirac retreated into his waiting position which is also motivated by a desire for dignity and the refusal to take part in "debates which are not worth risking the presidency." Nevertheless, this policy disguises neither Chirac's decision to run nor the complexity of his situation with the leaders of the RPR [Rally for the Republic].

Publication of the first list of Debre supporters showed that the deputy of the Reunion is in no way a marginal, folksy candidate—26 gaullist deputies, two independents, and four senators, to name only the parliament members, have already taken his side. This is certainly not a majority, but it is far from negligible. As for the decision of Marie-France Garaud to run, she added to the confusion and reinforced the hopes of those betting on a burst of gaullism.

Chirac will thus wait until the beginning of January to make his decision known in a manner he wishes to be "faithful to the spirit of the establishment." That is, he alone will decide, not his party. But, in a parallel vein, the leaders of the rally are attempting to set up a policy of replacement—a policy seemingly based, on one hand, upon an affected optimism with claims of mobilization and, on the other hand, upon a smokescreen around a hit theme, unification.

Aggressive optimism inspired Chirac's stance of Sunday, 26 October, summarized as follows: "The RPR will have a candidate in the second round of the presidential election. Any other possibility is inconceivable." Such strategy prompted Robert Poujade, RPR deputy of the Cote d'Or and former general secretary of the UNR [Union for the New Republic], to remark, "I don't know who put this idea in his head, but it was not a well-known political scientist. That's pure fantasy." Actually, it is less a matter of "fantasizing" than of making do with what he has, attempting to get out the militant vote with the slogans available to him.

Smokescreens

Smokescreens tend to modify trademarks—talk of possible unification with the socialists leads one to think that Chirac's party is not just dividing the majority, but envisions positive action, even with nonGiscardian partners. To go them one better, allusions are made to the possibility of a "new majority," while prudently remarking that it will not happen as long as the PS [Socialist Party] will not officially renounce its union with the left.

Nevertheless, this attitude can also be interpreted as a sort of appeal for negotiation with the chief executive. When Chirac says, "If you want to change the

policy, you have to change the president," he adds, "or the president needs to make an effort to change himself." And when he makes the coming evolutions dependent upon "the steadfast will which will be demonstrated by the electorate," he lets it be understood that an RPR which has made a good showing in the 1981 ballot will be in a position to influence the policy of the president of the republic.

Sunday night at the Europe 1 Press Club, Bernard Pons also hinted, behind words highly critical of the administration and the chief executive, that perhaps his group's limited pre-election impact keeps it from looking beyond the polls.

All the same, for Chirac and his group, the problem rests in the fact that the present multitude of candidates from his own "family" hardly allows room to expect astoundingly high marks, much less second place in the first round.

Still, this reasoning invites a couple of comments which may clarify the situation. In the first place, it is not necessarily correct to view several candidates as subtracting from the gaullist score. Admittedly, gaullism in general would possibly garner more votes with several representatives rather than with a single representative. In other words, Jacques Chirac plus Michel Debre equals more than either Jacques Chirac alone or Michel Debre alone. This is significant so long as the two are not mutually exclusive and do not tear each other apart during the campaign. One way to reduce the risk of weakening the whole is to cease admitting that it is divided.

In the second place, it is also necessary to consider the thesis according to which the experiences of 1974 and 1978 established the futility of a strategy aimed at bearing upon a power while strengthening it with votes. In 1974, Jacques Chirac assured the election of Valery Giscard d'Estaing but was unable to significantly modify his policy. In 1978, the RPR contributed greatly to the success of the majority but despite the large number of deputies which it presently includes, it in no way changes the action of the administration. This is basically what Chirac has said: "The presidential election is the way to censure the executive."

"Face-washing"

Francois Mitterrand is the third person waiting--awaiting candidacy like the other two and, like them, careful to avoid the whirlwind.

First, since the chief of state is waiting, he who has so often desired to take him on single-handedly also waits. Then, 1965 and 1974 taught him to appreciate short campaigns. Finally, just as he is asking that the PS be given "time to wash its face after leftist quarrels," so too, he needs time to "wash his own face" after the PS disputes. The time will allow him to separately and successively treat the two problems before him--getting his party back on the track after the internal debate over candidacy, then launching the campaign proper. Then will come the moment for developing arguments aimed at convincing part of the discontented gaullist electorate that it can vote for the socialist candidate. There, too, it is a matter of "unification," but translated into an electoral contribution capable of compensating for votes lost to the communists.

Chirac and Mitterrand are counting on the results from the first round to justify their efforts as party leaders. For the president of the RPR, the figures of the first Sunday will be the measure of his influence in the coming septennate. For the chief of the PS, the results will determine his hold on the party as well as the possibility which may still be open to him to deepen the separation between the PS and PC [communist party]. In the immediate future, it is noted that the verbal reports at the heart of the left are increasingly unsound and create prejudice in the socialist party which, on Sunday, had to abandon the canton of Seurre (cote d'or) to the majority because of a lack of "republican discipline" and which lost, in addition, the canton of Boissy-Saint-Leger-Lucy-en-Brie (Val-de-Marne).

But for the present host of the Elysees, the figures from the first round of 1981 will constitute the basis of reflection on the type of government he will employ if reelected in the second--a splintered gaullism or not, a socialist party split in two or not--possibilities already considered at the Elysees.

9171

CSO: 3100

RECENT MILITARY ACTIONS IN AFRICA REVIEWED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Nov 80 pp 32-40

[Article by Div Gen Jacques Servranckx]

[Text] I have been asked to give you a quick rundown on recent French military actions in Africa.

I propose to successively discuss the rationale of our "foreign actions," the definition of such actions and a review of the most recent actions.

1. The Rationale

We find the rationale of our foreign actions in the first place a rather recent political document, the preamble to the law dated 19 June 1976, which deals with approval of the military program for 1977-1982, an important law for the armies which gave rise to a debate in Parliament in the middle of its application; i.e., at the end of 1979.

Among the essential missions assigned to the armed forces, it is stated that outside of Europe the forces must be capable of contributing to the security of countries to which France is linked by agreements or by a de facto economic or cultural solidarity.

In the paragraph "Role of the Armed Forces," it is stated: "Overseas, by their permanent presence and their capacity for intervention, our forces must first and foremost be capable of assuring the security of overseas departments and territories; they must also be capable of foreign actions of various kinds, whether this involve participation in missions of presence at the request of international organization or at the request of the states concerned, whether it be necessary to provide military and technical assistance to threatened states."

In the second place, we find the rationale for these actions in the General Instruction for the Employment of the Armed Forces (or the IGEFA) which was approved by the general chief of staff of the armies on 12 January 1979. "Outside the metropolitan territory and its immediate approaches, the armed forces must be capable of supporting and implementing the decisions of the government in the affirmation of its policy, defense of its national interests, prevention and settlement of crises or conflicts in which France may find itself directly or indirectly involved."

This document defines actions susceptible of being levied upon the armed forces and which specifically may involve:

- the Mediterranean basin;
- the overseas departments and territories;
- countries linked to France by defense or cooperation agreements or by de facto solidarity;
- the vital maritime communications lines or certain essential oceanic regions.

The envisioned actions are classified into three families. The first family consists of indirect support, in the form of technical military assistance, logistical cooperation or aid provided by the on-site assignment of cadres or specialist. The purpose of these actions is to permit beneficiary friendly states to get a hold on their responsibilities. As a general rule, assistance provided in a quick and dynamic manner is preferable to the permanent presence of advisers.

Next comes direct support, which is limited as regards the means committed for the duration of the action. An action of this kind most often corresponds to a situation of brutal crisis which call for reactions in the shortest possible time.

The next family of actions is engagement in force, a veritable air-land, amphibious or specifically sea operation, prepared with detachment.

The missions and capabilities of our armed forces, finally, are set forth in ministerial directives to each of the three armies.

2. Definition of Foreign Action

In our time, what is a French foreign military action? I propose a definition which is neither academic nor regulatory, but is specific and stresses well in that way these foreign actions differ fundamentally from our colonial interventions prior to 1939 and from our operations in Indochina or North Africa from 1945 to 1962.

A "Foreign Action"

is a:

- political-military;
- urgent (crisis);
- surprise (secret);
- "balanced" (sur measures);
- effective but limited;

reaction

whose success always involved the renown of France and its armies.

A foreign military action is first and foremost a reaction; i.e., a response, proof that France has decided neither to accept the affront nor to be disinterested in

the question, a gesture of solidarity with respect to a community in danger, with a government or international organization which requests our help.

This reaction is always political-military. Is it necessary to say that it would be as absurd to envisage a foreign action, without the permanent agreement of the political authority, as it would a political decision to act militarily without the prior advice of the military heads concerned?

Two observations derive from this observation. First, a foreign action is an operation conducted by three persons and to which each of them lends his style and acts without a useless intermediary. The president of the republic becomes informed then makes a decision; the chief of the general staff of the armies provides information, organizes and directs; the operational command conducts the action.

The second consequence is the need for mutual confidence.

Here we will take up one of the factors, which in my opinion are essential, in a foreign action and one aspect which touches us all deeply, as it is to be found at the outer limit of discipline and feeling. The observation which will serve as the point of departure for our thought is as follows: at the time of every foreign action, the quite legitimate desire for effectiveness on the part of our units of the three armies has been constantly subordinated to the need for the political effect to be produced. Therefore, it is important, at a more leisurely pace, to delve into the situation, such as it presents itself to the government authorities.

The general chief of staff of the armies is the meeting point of the political and military sectors. He is the highest military authority and the only one, with regard to the use of the armed forces, to be in direct contact with the president of the republic, the head of the armed forces. In this relationship, there is neither intermediary nor political hierarchy. The commitment orders of the president of the republic go directly to the chief of staff of the armies.

The latter must simultaneously take two actions:

--vis-a-vis the government first, he must have precise knowledge of the objective which the latter has established; however, he must also evaluate the risks incurred, propose the most appropriate courses of military action and specify the necessary time frames, to prevent them from being underestimated:

--vis-a-vis the armed forces, he must then define the mission and the means committed; however, he must also make them aware of the political and diplomatic aspects of the action, in a word, the parameters of this action. These forces must learn to successively receive orders which may to them appear contradictory, for they are lacking some of the elements of evaluation; the armed forces must place themselves entirely in the hands of the chief of staff of the armies to preserve their security and ensure their best possible use.

A few examples may illustrate this situation.

At the time of the operation in Kolwezi, in May 1978, the transport aircraft loaded with parachutists waited over an hour for authorization to take off from Kinshasa, because there were diplomatic problems to be settled before the action.

In Chad, at times units in contact with the adversary were forbidden to take a defensive position while at the same time were not permitted to take effective military action.

Reaction is urgent: it is the reaction of the fireman; it is better to have a cup of water in a second than a bucket of water in a minute or a tank in an hour. It is a question of taking back the initiative, before it is too late.

Reaction is surprise. Swiftmess and secrecy are combined to obtain freedom of action and economy of forces. Our obsessive fear: to write a new chapter to this endless work whose title might be: "The War of Lost Opportunities."

Reaction is balanced and must walk the line between sterile planning and dangerous improvisation. The objective having been established, and in the face of a situation that is none of those which one might have envisioned, one must not waste time when confronted by problems which it could have been possible to resolve at a more leisurely pace. To accomplish this, it is necessary to plan for what may be, without locking oneself into useless plans.

In this way, it is possible to plan the setting up of the means by defining the inventory of these means and the alert positions. It is also possible to plan their transport, whether by air or sea route, military or civilian channel. It was in this way, for example, that agreements were made with the big airline companies for their possible participation in the transport of troops. Finally, it is possible to plan the reinforcement of our overseas garrisons.

On the other hand, it is illusory and dangerous to wish to plan the action itself and its support. In these two sectors, one limits himself to guidelines developed during the interservice working sessions with the active participation of the command concerned.

If the first duty of the chief of staff of the armies is to be able to tell the president: "The Risk is acceptable"; his second duty is to determine the size of the military forces to engage.

Contrary to the custom of the very great powers which act in force at the beginning of the action, we act in homeopathic doses. For example, in Kolwezi there were four companies; in Gafsa, two airplances, two helicopters and a few combat vessels along the coast. Therefore, it is a matter of offsetting the small volume of our means with something else. That something else is first and foremost the level of training. The chief of staff of the armies would not have proposed to the president of the republic to take the risk of an airborne action over Kolwezi if he had not been sure of the very high level of training of the regiment involved.

Reaction must be effective but limited. The essential point is to win; but the more delicate achievement is not to get bogged down. In Vietnam, our command and, a few years later, the American command, discovered that the most difficult part of foreign action did not consist in getting there but leaving at the right time. Our means susceptible of participation in foreign actions are, of course, limited. Therefore, it is necessary to economize, to know when to withdraw them in time. At the launching of an action, one must think about winding it down [deflation] and, better yet, bringing it to an end. That is what we call "slipping away" [erquive].

How do we prolong our action without delaying the "slipping away"? That is the whole problem with technical military assistance; however, "that is another matter" which we will merely mention here.

Success always involves the renown of France and her armies.

I think I can convince you of this with these few examples.

The balance sheet of battles in Kolwezi was: 247 rebels hors de combat for every 5 of our troops. We can without difficulty imagine the effect of an adverse balance sheet.

The Israeli and West German armies understood perfectly well, at times with real nostalgia, that a handful of men at Entebbe and Mogadiscio covered themselves with more glory than the thousands of combatants standing at attention in the Golan Heights or behind the Iron Curtain. Recently, the United States attempted a power play to free its hostages detained in Tehran. For various reasons, this initiative failed; but who failed? A colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps or the Western World?

3. The Most Recent Actions

--Participation in the disengagement of the Suez Canal (1974-1975-1978).

--Djibouti (1976-1977)

--Mayotte (1977-1978).

--Zaire (1977-1978).

--Lebanon (under the auspices of the UN, since 1978).

--Chad (1978-1980).

--Mauritania (1977-1978-1980).

--Central African Republic (1979).

--Tunisia (1980).

To these actions, we must add a certain number of interventions which were humanitarian in nature:

--Cambodia (1979-1980).

--Uganda (1980).

4. Conclusion

It seems to me that the recent foreign actions engaged in by France are for our three armies excellent moments of truth for the capabilities of our forces, their level of training, the suitability of their equipment for military action and the functioning of our transport system [liaisons].

We have left the integrated organization of the Alliance's forces without the desire to return; however, in the military sector, we are allies who are perhaps difficult but loyal, faithful and effective.

I think that, in the recent foreign actions, too, France has been able to demonstrate that she is loyal with regard to her allies, faithful to those who called upon her and effective, judging by the military results obtained.

8143

CSO: 3100

PENDING ISSUES EXPLOITED BY POLITICAL PARTIES

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 16 Nov 80 p 7

[Article by Panos Loukakos]

[Text] Following NATO, economic measures. Following the economic measures (but also the 5-day week), the negotiations for the signing of the Greek-American agreement on the bases. Together with these, a clearly discernible "rapprochement" between the New Democracy [Party] and the royalist (but not pro-dictatorial) wing of the extreme Right. At the same time, the developments in the Center. And finally the obvious effort by the Panhellenic Socialist Movement [PASOK] to broaden the area of its appeal. What can all this be but a harbinger of coming elections? Elections which according to all indications--and in spite of all government denials--will take place before the end of the 4-year term.

PASOK Chairman A. Papandreou expects the elections to take place in March 1981 while the government representative, A. Tsaldaris, hastened to deny it, stating that the Chamber of Deputies will complete its term. But all the recent indicators imply that most likely the denial will not be borne out.

Already this past month a new political climate has emerged following a relatively long period of political inactivity. The events follow one another with a speed which allows no time for political analysis and interpretation. But these changes are substantial and will play a decisive role during the next year.

Re-welding in the Right

The opening of the developments and the change in the scenario was Greece's reinduction into the military wing of NATO. The reinduction not only settled the foreign policy questions but also restored the "ideological orthodoxy" in the New Democracy, opening the way for a variety of understandings and rapprochements in the wide area of the Right. The New Democracy abandoned for good the role of the one who is resisting "outside pressures"--a role it has played ever since 1974--and in this way pushed out of the political stage the theory of "national unity" which obligated the opposition to be especially careful with its own policies.

As a result, the [New Democracy] sought political alliances. It found them in the area of the extreme Right, more specifically in the pro-royalist but not pro-dictatorial wing. The speech of Spyros Theotokis, the parliamentary spokesman

of the National Array, in the Chamber of Deputies on the question of NATO is indicative of these converging tendencies within the Right. Equally characteristic was the intervention of Premier Rallis who defended Sp. Theotokis when he called the ex-king as "King Konstandinos" and naturally received the attacks of the PASOK deputies. As long as K. Karamanlis was the leader of the New Democracy such a rapprochement was impossible since today's president of the Republic was one of the main targets of the royalists who blamed him for the removal of King Konstandinos. By contrast, the differences with G. Rallis, who had publicly stated at the 1974 plebiscite that he voted for monarchy, are fewer.

The "less rightist" premier, compared to Averof, shows that he is succeeding slowly and without fanfare at what his intraparty opponent Averof promised, namely, the re-welding of the Right and the reversal of the defections toward Markizinis.

Averof's February

These maneuvers by G. Rallis strengthen his position to some extent within the New Democracy and remove many of the arguments of Averof's supporters. Some of his supporters insist that the matter is not closed and mysteriously refer to some unspecified developments that will take place in February. What will happen in February--if anything happens at all--nobody knows. The only event connected with February is the election in the New Democracy Party organisations. These organisations are largely controlled today by the Averof followers, but the assumption of the premiership by G. Rallis (who actually insists on holding those elections in February) may have reversed the existing correlation of forces. It would make sense if Averof, today's minister of defense, decided to let the New Democracy Party do so before the planned intraparty elections in order to have as many organisations as possible follow him. But the return to NATO together with the agreement on the bases and the quiet overtures by G. Rallis to the Right outside of the New Democracy make any move by Averof increasingly problematical.

Volunteers for PASOK

The New Democracy, by abandoning in essence its expansion toward the Center and starting its opening to the Right, leaves a certain area uncovered--how wide is presently unknown--which had been covered by Karamanlis in 1974 and 1977. The new realities which emerge out of these developments naturally change certain facts for PASOK which is making a systematic effort to expand its influence in its own political area. This effort is obviously carried out with certain interruptions and has its own problems, since PASOK does not wish to be accused of not being faithful to its policies. Thus, on one side it does not want to lose its "more leftist" and usually most active members, and on the other it will be able to attract progressive center masses without, however, having to "load itself" with a large number of old-line politicians who, though individually may be useful, together, however, will change PASOK's nature. PASOK Chairman A. Papandreu is trying to hold this delicate balance while, in view of the forthcoming elections, he faces an impressive number of "volunteers." Judging from certain early but reliable indications PASOK will not include on its ticket most of those who asked in the past to join the major opposition party.

Developments in the Center

The situation in the area of the Center continues to be extremely confused, as everybody talks about the coming together of the dispersed forces. Each side, however, calls the other to join its party framework as an "equal member." Democratic Center Union [EUK] and Democratic Socialist Party [ADISO] are getting ready for their congresses, calling on all the Center forces to participate in them, the Baltalis farmers' party is waiting for the situation to clear up so they can make their own decisions, while other Center personalities are waiting in the anterooms of PASOK.

The initiative of G. Mavros, who remains the leader for many traditional followers of the Center, may create a new situation in the area [of the Center] causing even greater problems in the existing (and vegetating) Center forces. The intense interest expressed by the New Democracy and PASOK in the reappearance of Mavros as the leader of the Center camp is indicative:

PASOK believes that it could possibly cooperate after the elections with the Mavros party. But exactly the same is the desire of the New Democracy which would prefer such a coalition compared to other possible solutions.

The question is--and this is also a precondition for any development along the above lines--what exactly does the Center represent today in Greece and what is its strength today after all its well-known vicissitudes?

It is certain, however, that more things separate Mavros from the New Democracy than those which separate him from PASOK as shown by his recent speeches in the Chamber of Deputies. Under these circumstances the political cost of a move by Mavros more likely will be paid by the New Democracy.

KKE appears to see these developments with some displeasure, as its leadership seems to recognize that its objective of participating in the second distribution [of votes] in the next election is unrealistic. On the other hand, the virtual rejection by PASOK of the KKE suggestions for cooperation has caused a series of comments and articles, signed and unsigned in RIZOSPASTIS, which accuse PASOK of "rightist leanings" and broadcast in every tone the well-known slogan that "there can be no change without KKE."

The KKE-Interior, after the painful experience of the "Alliance," is preparing to enter the electoral contest by itself, including only some "cooperating personalities" on its ticket. A first illustration of such a cooperation, which AVGI presented with great fanfare, was that of D. Tsatsos which is expected to be followed by others.

The government has already given a pre-electoral color to the current period. It is not only the handouts (which are termed even by government officials as pre-electoral and as especially burdensome for the already difficult economic situation) but also the intragovernment discussions which often reach the public concerning the electoral law. Theoretically, the government says that there will be no changes. Yet there may be some modifications which are being sought by members of the cabinet. It is certain that the "reinforced proportional system" will not be abandoned because this might lead to a breakup of the New Democracy. But in

the framework of the reinforced proportional, certain modifications are possible which may be also in the interest of the New Democracy, and which if eventually implemented may give a new color to the electoral campaign.

It seems that the government has already initiated the countdown toward the election. Everybody is talking about it and everybody is getting ready. Officials of the government have let it be understood that in addition to the recent handouts "there are some aces hidden up its sleeve which it will put on the table at the last moment." The question is whether those "aces" will be able to reverse processes which have been underway for some time.

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CSO:4908

PASOK PARTY SUPPORT ANALYZED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 16 Nov 80 p 5

[Article by Mikhail Dimitriou]

[Text] Headed by Andreas Papandreu, a leader of international caliber and charismatic radiance, with its policy centered around "the march to Change together with the people" and thanks to its social program, the Panhellenic Social Movement [PASOK] is knocking at the door of power.

Just 6 years from its founding, yesterday's "Protest Movement"--as its critics called it--has today every possibility to come to power through the parliamentary process. It will enter the next electoral contest alone with the objective of winning its own majority of seats in the legislature and forming its own government [without a coalition]. The program for the "first 100 days" being prepared now by a team of economists and other party cadres headed by Professor A. Lazaris, together with the hundreds of pages of PASOK's governing plan, reveals that side by side with the fighting man movement there is an unobtrusive responsible preparation.

PASOK, a unique phenomenon in Greek political history and especially in the area of socialism, thanks to its impressive structure with its hundreds of organisations, has achieved, among other things, something especially significant: decisively breaking up the system and the networks of traditional political "clientele." Even more:

"PASOK," according to A. Papandreu, "in its 6-year-long fighting course has given evidence, has shown in practice, that it is a genuinely socialist movement whose brilliance has begun to spread beyond the Greek frontiers and has started to influence the socialist thought and activity in other areas in Europe."

From this complex phenomenon called PASOK we will focus on the internal structure of its basic points in view of the spectacular rise of its appeal. The method we have chosen is to rely on the figures based on official documents, unknown data, and written papers which are made public for the first time. For this, the leadership of the Movement offered every assistance, sincerely and without vacillation or reservation. The picture [which emerges] is impressive in every respect. Problems do exist, especially since the language of sincerity is a principle of the leadership and the ambitious goals of this joint march of the people with its political party are growing.

The categorical admonition of Andreas Papandreu to the deputies of the Movement to inform the people "with sincerity which will rule out cheap pre-election promises" is still fresh.

Economic Resources

To put together an organization such as the one PASOK aspires [to create] ("with collective will and united action, democratically structured, effective, open to the people, fight-worthy and fighting") requires a popular infrastructure based on economic self-sufficiency. According to a recent party document, this is the first and definitive condition for the autonomy of organization, beyond any obligations or decisions by the capitalists or the various [power] "centers."

Until the pre-election period of 1977 the fixed expenses of the PASOK headquarters were around 600,000 drachmas per month. Today, they reach 1 million and cover a multitude of needs and activities. Just for the headquarters on Kh. Trikoupi Street and some adjacent offices the rent is 250,000 drachmas per month.

Nobody so far has questioned the fact that PASOK bases its economic autarchy on the people. This, as a political condition, derives [from] and is irrevocably tied to its very personality and strategy. Many "PASOK critics" in the last few years, in spite of their systematically orchestrated criticism, have been unable to question this basic truth.

A. Papandreu, first among the friends and cadres of PASOK, gives the example of economic contribution. He has not accepted even one drachma from his royalties from his scientific books. All the cadres are working for free and only 15 persons in clerical positions at the headquarters are paid. PASOK deputies give [to the party] 10 percent of their salary and the deputies-at-large 15 percent. This source accounts for 950,000 drachmas per month. The local and branch committees (we will see later which they are and how many) support their own headquarters financially and most of them send between 10 and 20 percent of their revenue to the central headquarters for its needs. The member dues are set at 150 drachmas per month but the revenues increase from various affairs, various economic "plans" and so forth.

In the 1977 election, the "plan" for the PASOK fund-raising campaign was set at 50 million drachmas collected from cadres, members, followers, and friends. Specifically, the projected revenues from the Attiki Basin were 22 million, 6 from Salonica, 2 from Thessaly, 2 from the Akhaia Nome, 3.5 million from Crete, and so on.

Fund-Raising "Plans"

It has been reported that PASOK is planning to launch an 80 million fund-raising campaign for the needs of the next election. Leading cadres of the Movement assured us that this is not the exact figure, "only tentative." The plan of the financial committee is flexible; it will be eventually formulated according to the needs and potentialities estimated by each nome committee. But if the exact figure cannot be established as of now, the conduct of the campaign has been carefully planned. This is the timing:

The campaign will start on 1 December 1980 and will continue for 2½ months until 15 February 1981. This period is divided into two phases, with 15 January 1981 as the obligatory mid-point. By that time 70 percent of the total should have been selected.

The mechanism of movement is of particular interest. The Financial Committee functions at the central point and promotes and controls the "plans" (personal and collective) in every nome or organisation abroad. At the level of the Executive Office the responsibility is assigned to medical doctor Paraskevas Avgerinos while the secretary of the Financial Committee is engineer Kostas Gaitonas. At the second level, the mechanism for the conduct of the fund-raising campaign for the election defines the composition of five-member committees in each nome. It is composed of the financial official of the nome committee, the two secretaries of the nome committee, and two other members with a specific qualification: to have social prestige in their area and proven abilities.

In addition to the collective "plans" of the fund-raising campaign there are also individual "plans." The central headquarters have already set their targets which vary depending on the area of residence (cities, townships, villages) and occupation. We are not going to write about these various scales but only as an illustration the lowest level for certain special cases is set at 1,000 to 2,000 drachmas.

Other "plans" apply to the nome committees and there is a distinction between individual and collective "plans." For instance, if a nome committee has proposed collecting 3 million drachmas, 75 percent will be covered by individual "plans" and only 25 percent by the collective "plans" (for each local, branch, and organisational cell of the nome).

This planning which was decided in a recent "closed meeting" of party cadres underlines the intention of PASOK to draw the necessary resources from the entire population and not only from the organised cadres and followers. "The fund-raising campaign," according to an internal memo, "is a political action and not merely an opportunist technico-economic process. Because it gives every citizen the opportunity to participate with his contribution to the construction of PASOK, translating his political sympathy into active involvement. Because it proves that the people are the only source of funds for PASOK, thus silencing once again the enemies and reminding the friends of their duty to contribute steadily."

In this way, through the fund-raising campaign which PASOK will start on 1 December, the members and the organs of the Movement constitute the connecting link between the organisation and its friends, followers and the country's democratic people.

The accounting by the thousands of volunteers, receipt-book in hand, will take place each week under "strict control" for each drachma offered for the objectives of the Movement. At the end of the campaign, special auditing committees will function at the nome and the national level.

Another special arrangement in the context of PASOK decentralization is the fact that 60 percent of the receipts will go to the Central Struggle Committee while

40 percent will remain with the nome committee. This sum cannot be used for other purposes or needs, only for the needs of the electoral campaign.

Special fund-raising "plans" exist for the Greeks abroad where PASOK has great political influence which is being constantly expanded. Generally speaking, the contributions from the Greeks abroad constitute a basic source of funds for the Movement especially those in Western Europe, Australia, and Canada. A characteristic illustration is the fund-raising campaign in West Germany in late 1975 and early 1976 which had the target of collecting the sum of 30 million drachmas. Recently the PASOK organisation in Sweden offered a computer to the Movement. Beginning in 1981 PASOK will start the classification of all members, according to special social categories, party activities, and so forth (at the Kh. Trikoupi Street headquarters).

Before we complete our discussion of PASOK's fund-raising campaign, which will show not only the extent of the Movement's influence on the masses but also the degree of the politicization of the citizens, we will outline its framework as described by a leading PASOK personality. It refers to the political and social situation in the following 2 1/2 months until 15 February, which in his opinion will be characterized on the part of PASOK by "high pre-electoral fever with mass public participation with repeated mobilisations."

Membership Number

PASOK had approximately 500 local committees on the eve of the November 1977 election with 30,000 members who constituted, together with the organization, the main and only electoral machinery. According to the statistical data made public at the Panhellenic Conference in July 1977, the number of PASOK members was 27,000. Today, the figures are impressive, around 70,000 members. Whatever other weaknesses there may be, a political-organizational unity is developing inside PASOK. These members are in existence and active in various degrees (according to the criteria of the Fifth Convention) and not merely a name with a date of registration, without specific placement, functioning and activity. No member can participate in more than one organization.

It is true that following the 1977 election in spite of the response, participation and mobilization in the electoral battle, there was a phase of "objective downturn" compared to the target set at the time. This continued until the October 1978 municipal elections ("mediocre and at times contradictory organizational pace") and led to the known results of the Fifth Convention of the Central Committee and the declarations of A. Papandreu for a broader expansion of the organization at the rank-and-file level.

The results were in many respects spectacular, beyond the doubling of the membership. For example, if one were to review the 32 nome conferences of last year, on the basis of the official documents, he would find the development of intraparty democracy, and also the renewal and enrichment of the leading organs with worthy new cadres. The renewal of the nome committees ranged from 40 to 60 percent. This applies to the nome committees of Arkadia, Lakonia, Korinthia, Argolis, Irakleion, Evvoia, Evritania, Larisa, Magnisia, Karditsa, Pieria, Imathia, the rest of Thessaloniki, Serrai, Xanthi, Grevena, Evros, Thesprotia, Ioannina, Arta,

Kerkyra, Kefalonia, Lesbos, Dodekanisos, areas of the Attiki Basin and also the organizations in Germany, Italy, and Sweden.

Nevertheless, certain problems for gaining a unified conception continued. In any event the successful main effort of the Central Committee and the Executive Committee and the decisive intervention of PASOK chairman Papandreu were in that direction.

This effort to deal sincerely and realistically /with problems/ is shown by the following excerpt from a special party report /issued/ some time ago:

"...In spite of the practical steps in everyday activities, the party is still affected by the political or social origins of its members or even cadres. Wherever these social developments appeared intense, the breakdown of the social fabric extended into the Movement with the appearance of conflicts in political practice. These phenomena were intense in the major cities (mainly Salonica, Athens, Patrai). In the provinces these phenomena weakened because the process of unity was assisted by the common and not simple converging class interests, but also by the radicalism and the faith in the vision of the farmers.

"The effort of organizational intervention was crowned with success to the degree that the cut wherever and whenever it was done took into consideration these characteristics, politicized the differences and shaped favorable terms for grasping the problems and the disengagement of cadres and members from sterile disagreements..."

Today, it is a fact--regardless of the particular problems which a descending review points out--that the turn of the PASOK organization in the mass movement proved to be a cut for strengthening the organization itself and the effectiveness of the mass movement. This was achieved with the development of broad social relationships with the steady objective that there must be the widest broadening of the political front of the party, cancelling in reality the personal networks of electoral clientele.

Today's 70,000 PASOK members are organized on a national scale covering the whole of Greece and all foreign countries where there are emigrants. Totally speaking, we have:

- a. 1,015 local organizations of which 150 are abroad.
- b. 600 organizational cells in the various areas (with 25 members).
- c. 500 party organizations and 100 organizational cells in the sector of blue collar workers, small businessmen, professionals, and students.

The mass expansion moved ahead primarily through the founding of new organizations and less through the expansion of those which existed at the beginning of the year. The target of PASOK until the beginning of 1981 is to double the number of 65,000 active cadres which existed at the convocation of the Sixth Conference of the Central Committee. This ambitious target is regarded as entirely realistic and is based on responsible measurements. More specifically, the friends and followers of PASOK, as identified by the local organizations and party cells, exceed the

number of active members by more than double. Sometimes they number three, four and five times more. These friends and followers who constitute the organization's broad political front will provide the source for the target of 130,000 members, the largest number any party has ever had in Greece.

For example, the Nomes Committee in Iraklion reported this summer 2,200 active members and 4,000 registered friends. The Local Organization of Kalandri had 115 members and 300 registered friends, while the Nomes Committee of Imathia reported 2,500 friends.

Background of Members

The social composition of the PASOK local organizations (with the exception of certain local organizations in urban centers) reflects their localities. The reflection of PASOK cadres' social composition is characteristic as shown by the data of nome conferences in Evros, Arta, Thesprotia, and West Attiki (Elevsis). They are shown in the following table.

	Evros	Arta	Thesprotia	W. Attiki
Farmers	44.1%	40.4%	29%	--
Blue Collar	29.2	29.3	30.9	65.6%
Professionals	12.5	11.1	11.8	6.5
Small Businessmen	9.7	11.1	25	21.3
Students	2.7	2.3	2.72	6.6
Pensioners	--	1.5	--	--
Women	1.3	1.5	--	--

Another notable fact—as shown by reliable data—is that the percentages of social stratification in the local organizations (committees) does not fully correspond to the composition of the nome committee. This, of course, (as underlined by a special party report) does not mean that the leading organs ("where the members possibly possess consciousness, political possibilities, fighting spirit") should be composed on a collectivist basis.

Just the same, the fact remains that in most nome committees professionals prevail. For instance in the Arta and Thesprotia Nomes professionals constituted 11 percent in the nome conferences while in the nome committees 54 and 45 percent, respectively. One added element which has been of concern to the leadership of the Movement is the small and often nonexistent participation of women in local committees as well as in the intermediate and central organs (even in the Central Committee). At this point we must note the intense activity and appeal of the "Women's Union of Greece."

Participation of Farmers

By contrast, the influence of the Movement and its representation in the farmers' cooperatives is visible where, at the same time, one can see clearly the potential as well as any weaknesses. The farmers' organizations at all levels are today influenced politically by PASOK. Its political theses and lines pass through them.

The existing data show that the political influence and participation of members, followers, and friends of the Movement in the farmers' clubs is extensive. Specifically, these data—unknown until now—show:

- a. In a total of 149 farmers' clubs, 99 are led exclusively by PASOK although they retain their organizational autonomy and their mass character. Five [are led] by the New Democracy, two by the Communist Party, and one by the Democratic Center Union [EDIK]. In the remaining 42 farmers' clubs with 239 members in the executive boards, PASOK has 55.04 percent, New Democracy 20.50 percent, KKE 18.41, and EDIK 10.04 percent.
- b. The data in the hands of the committee with regard to 75 associations in a total of 133 (for 58 associations we have no data because the nome committees have not replied) show the following:
- c. Of the 394 members of executive boards of associations, 106 members are members, followers or friends of PASOK, or 26.9 percent, 192 belong to the Right, or 48.7 percent, 41 are in the area of the Communist Party, or 10.4 percent, 38 are associated with the Center, or 9.64 percent, and 17 have no specific political affiliation, or 4.33 percent.

With central axis the view that "the program of change will be based always on the popular approval and the ripe targets it defines," PASOK moves forward with its organizational activities, with the objective to make a permanent democratic institution of the triptych:

- a. (City) quarter committees in the urban centers.
- b. Popular conferences in the villages.
- c. Farmers' clubs in the central villages.

Thus, in the next 2 or 3 months, side by side with the fund-raising campaign for the electoral needs, there will be an exceptionally intensive organizational activity.

A party document states in this regard: "...The next 2 or 3 months should not be months of a simple improvement of the quantitative and qualitative situation in our organization. It must be the time when our organization will make the great leap forward, to be able to respond objectively to the requirements of the forthcoming phases in its life, in the cause of change."

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CSO:4908

STATUS ON RESTORATION OF ORDER UNITS REPORTED

New Units

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 14 Oct 80 pp 1, 13

[Article by Spyros Karatzaferis]

[Text] MAT's [Restoration of Order Units] are spreading throughout Greece. According to reliable reports, the Ministry of Public Order is drawing up a decree with which Restoration of Order Units of the Cities Police and Gendarmerie are being established also in the cities of Larisa, Patrai, and Irakleion, as well as "in any other city where it is deemed expedient." Up to now, MAT's have existed only in Athens and Salonica, and they have been transferred by boat or airplane to the various areas where there have been popular demonstrations.

The decree on the expansion of MAT units to all of Greece is being prepared by Minister of Public Order Davakis himself, who asked his associates to not leak the news to the press until it was signed.

The official reason for the expansion of the MAT's is that supposedly their transportation expenses to the various "hot-spots" of the country are very great (traveling costs, off-base allowances, and so forth), and that there will be significant savings if new units are established in the large cities.

In reality, the expansion of the MAT was decided on because the YPEA [National Security Service] informed the minister that "violent demonstrations are expected in the countryside as the election-campaign period approaches."

The New Democracy administration, which up to now has based its electoral strength in the rural areas, has found that the rural people, by a large majority, are not its followers any more. And it is worried that there will be agitations, which it wants to put down by means of the MAT's, thus creating a climate of fear.

The MAT's, which are the motorized units of the Security Forces, make use of three "fronts" when they come up against a demonstration of people, in accordance with their standing orders. The first is that of the club-wielders, the next are the Avres [Armored cars used by the MAT--restoration of order units] with their chemicals, and the third is the armed detachment.

If the demonstrators manage to break through the two first detachments, the third intervenes, whose standing orders allow it to shoot to kill.

Incentives for Recruits

Athens: ELEVTHERTYPIA in Greek 15 Oct 80 pp 1, 15

[Article by Sp. Karatsaferis,

[Text] The Ministry of Public Order corroborated yesterday, through a statement by its representative, the revealing article by the ELEVTHERTYPIA yesterday that the MAT's are spreading throughout Greece. But it was learned that the policemen are showing an unwillingness to serve in this special service, the result being that the Athens police chief, Mr Laos, has promised an increase in the "clubbing bonus" from 1,000 drachmas per month to 3,000 drachmas.

The police chief is visiting various police bureaus (Saturday before last he went to the traffic police) and is entreating the policemen to accept service in the MAT: "You will receive 3,000 drachmas per month, aside from the overtime pay, which comes to 2,400 drachmas," promises Mr Laos.

Most of the policemen retort that they are not disposed to serve in a service whose only preoccupation is clubbing, and moreover they are worried about the reactions of the people.

Today--in Athens and Salonica--some 3,000 officers and men are serving in the MAT's, and in order to staff the new MAT units now being established in Larisa, Patrai, and Iraklion, approximately another 1,500 people are needed.

However, in emergency situations hundreds of policemen of the public-order-troops also masquerade as MAT men. Within the police stations, in special lockers, there are helmets, shields, marks, tear gas, and military weapons (170 M-1's and "Enfields" for each station). When demonstrations take place and there are public manifestations, the policemen of these stations masquerade as MAT units, although they do not have any special training, in order to "intimidate the people," as a policeman said characteristically.

These temporary MAT policemen do not receive the special clubbing bonus, and every so often there are protests. But the MAT men protest as well (there are many resignations which are not accepted) about the harsh training which they undergo and about their pay.

The MAT's of the Cities Police in Athens are lodged in buildings in Kallithea and on Piraeus Road. About 15 days from now, however, they are moving into a specially fixed-up area in Goudi.

The MAT's of the police are commanded by Police Chief First Class Theod. Kharalavtis, his immediate subordinate being Police Chief Second Class Sklavounos. About 1,000 men belong to these MAT forces.

The MAT's of the police have the following administrative divisions:

Some 20 platoons of 33 men each--that is, 660 persons. Each platoon has 30 men, one lieutenant, and two master sergeants.

There are 20 captains. Each two platoons form a command, and these have a captain as commander and as deputy commander.

Some 150 officers and men on board the armored cars, the famous Avres.

Some 70 officers and men for special missions, and

About 100 people in general services.

For the suburbs of Athens, the Gendarmerie maintains about 30 platoons with 1,500 men and a director as commander, while in Salonica it has 10 platoons with about 500 men.

The Ministry

A representative of the Ministry of Public Order, when asked about the revelations of the ELEVTHEROITYPIA, stated: "The formation of Restoration of Order Units in Patrai, Irakleion, and Larisa is provided for by Presidential Decree 393/24 April 1980, through the reorganization of the existing forces. Except that it has proved impossible for these to be operative at the present time because problems are being encountered with respect to meeting space requirements, and so forth."

This "so forth" refers to the unwillingness of policemen to serve in the MAT's, and the ministry is contemplating an increase in the police force with new policemen and gendarmes.

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CSO: 4908

BUDGET IS BALANCED WITHOUT IMPOSING NEW TAXES

Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 28 Nov 80 p 9

[Text] The 1981 budget that was presented in Parliament yesterday by Finance Minister Miltiades Evert, is balanced at drs. 697,290 million — i.e. 24.3 per cent over the final amount of the 1980 budget, and without the imposition of any new taxes.

Mr. Evert said the new budget arranges in the best possible way for the pursuit of objectives of economic development, social justice and monetary stability. Furthermore, it introduces certain institutional changes for rapidly overcoming basic structural problems of the Greek economy. The 1981 contribution to investments by the public sector will be considerable, Mr. Evert said. The public investment program provides for drs. 95,000 million, compared with drs. 61,000 million in 1980 — an increase of 54.1 per cent. Also the total investment program of the major public corporations and agencies is set at drs. 78,000 million, as against drs. 55,000 million last year: a 45.3 per cent increase.

It was expected, Mr. Evert added, that following the new law on incentives private investments would also show an increase. The development role of the public sector, however, would be strengthened further by the net influx of the Community Funds, estimated at about drs. 10,900 million. Increased housing loans to

be granted in 1981, after they continued low levels in 1980, are expected to play a similar role.

Mr. Evert said that the public sector's share in increased inflation in 1981 will be very low, since its total fund deficit will be increasing at a much lower rate than the increase in the monetary gross domestic product. The State budget, he continued, would also have an important effect on the redistribution of income, not only because of tax cuts in favour small and medium income-earners, but also because acquisition of a first house will no longer be subject to capital-transfer tax.

Mr. Evert listed the objectives of the budget as follows:

- To soften the effects of inflation, especially on lower and middle income groups.

- To restrain inflationary pressures by the public sector.

- To support of population dispersal by making the provinces attractive.

- To reinvigorate domestic demand, encourage investment activity, and keep unemployment at the lowest possible level.

- To devise a more effective approach to the problem of tax evasion.

- To ensure fuller use of the State's fluid assets and real estate.

- To modernise services, procedures and institutions in the public sector and to gradually bring the public and legal system in line with that of the Community.

With respect to agriculture, Mr. Evert said budget provisions would be 4.1 per cent higher in 1981 (from drs. 2,180 to 2,270 million drachmas), on top of total agricultural expenditure in the region of drs. 70,870 million, compared to drs. 55,153 in 1980 (an expenditure increase of 28.3 per cent).

Social welfare programs will receive 19.8 per cent more cash, and Education 13.1 per cent more than this year (not including salary increases for teachers). National Defence expenditures will go up by 16.7 per cent and amount to 21.93 per cent of the total regular-budget expenditures.

The new budget puts into effect a number of government policy statements concerning tax reductions to benefit the low to middle income groups. As far as government expenditures is concerned, particular emphasis is laid on satisfying fundamental social needs such as education, health, social welfare, etc. In addition, expenditures for agricultural subsidies, the greater part of which will be covered by the EEC, have gone up considerably.

Mr. Evert said that over the last two years, the government had followed a restrictive economic policy in order to achieve two things: to lower the balance of current-accounts deficit, and to curb the rate of inflation, while at the same time preventing the economy from going into a recession.

Mr. Evert said these aims had to a great extent been achieved, and while the Gross Domestic Product was expected to increase by 1.8 per cent this year, unemployment had been held at low levels (2.5 per cent); moreover, the balance-of-payments deficit is expected to amount to drs. 1,000 million, compared to 1.9 thousand million in 1979, even though the economy was burdened recently with a further \$900 million increase in the price of crude oil. He said 70 per cent of this deficit was being covered by the influx of private capital. The annual rate of inflation for this year seemed to have been held at the 1979 level, although the price of crude oil, agricultural products, etc. had gone up and inflation had increased in all countries, independently of their metal systems.

Commenting on the income of farmers in this country, Mr. Evert said that it had gone up by more than 22 per cent over the last two years (1979-80) (increasing at approximately the same rate as the Retail Price Index), as opposed to increase of about 7.3 per cent over the last four years before 1979.

He said that the 1980 flow of cash abroad to pay for oil bills had not left enough to grant real wage increases to workers, but nevertheless wage earners had benefited from tax relief.

Concerning 1981, Mr. Evert said, there were unfavourable forecasts with respect to the price of crude

oil, which would restrict the possibilities of a direct return to the high rates of past economic progress.

The Finance Minister said that the noted increase in both domestic demand and expenditure and hence primarily a credit of increase in consumption due to increases in real disposable income. Mr. Evert said that the administration's anti-inflationary policies adopted in 1980 had resulted in keeping total demand at approximately its 1979 level. This figure is expected to go up to 2.8 per cent in 1981. The government believes that keeping demand restricted to the above levels is absolutely necessary, given the instability of the price of crude next year.

Private consumption in 1981 is expected to rise by 2 per cent, but this is not likely to cause major inflationary pressures, since the increase in the supply of goods will be greater. State consumption is expected to increase by 5.3 per cent as a result of increases in social services (such as health and education) which will be responsible for the largest increases in public spending.

Even though total private investments of fixed capital are expected to increase, this increase is likely to be only around 3 per cent. Structural changes about to be implemented will significantly increasing the economy's productive capital, so that next year industrial investments may be expected to increase at a rate higher than the average rate for total investments in the economy. In part, this will be the result of government investment incentives, and in part it will be due to the country's forthcoming EEC entry.

Investments in the public sector are expected to reach a 4.5 per cent increase (compared to a 6.2 per cent drop in 1980), as a result

of investments by public corporations and enterprises.

Exports are expected to increase at a higher rate in 1981 than previously expected, while the low rate of imports in 1980 is forecast to increase due to expansion in economic activity. At the same time, an upsurge in income from abroad is expected for next year, given that it was at very low levels this year.

Government support for agriculture has contributed to an augmentation of farmers' income. The 0.5 per cent increase in Gross agricultural production was a record for the past fifteen years, and had led to higher exports of agricultural products.

Mr. Evert said the basic restrictive factors connected with the 1981 Budget took into consideration the increase in the price of crude oil which affected cost increases and therefore fuelled domestic inflation, as well as creating serious balance-of-payments problems.

He said the measures adopted to combat the consequences of the energy crisis had resulted in a downturn of the growth rate of incomes and economic activity in general, and to a significant reduction in tax revenue. He said the continuing energy crisis and the need to satisfy new social needs and the preservation of defence, education, health and social welfare programs at high levels, left only limited margins for a cut in public spending.

Studies for the establishment of a new type of State lottery, the income of which will be used for cultural projects, have been completed. Finance Minister said in answer to newsmen.

He also said that if new needs-for tax relief should arise in 1981, new tax relief measures would be included

in the 1929 Budget. In addition, rather than leave the owners of small privately-owned commercial enterprises in their current income-tax brackets, a special law would be promulgated, if they agreed, charging them with a professional tax instead; this new law would not, however, apply to the other professions (doctors, lawyers, etc.).

M. Evert suggested that should begin in the Voud the debate on the Budget (Parliament) on 19 December.

CSO: 4920

GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS PALESTINIANS

Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 29 Nov 80 p 4

[Text] Foreign Minister Constantine Mitsotakis has sent a message to the President of the U. N. committee for the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinians on "Solidarity Day with the Palestinian people."

The message assures Greece's continuing support for Palestinian rights, including the right to establish their own state. "The right of self-determination is included in the U. N. Charter and is indeed one of its basic principles," Mr Mitsotakis said. "It has led many peoples to independence since the end of World War II. The fact that the noble people of Palestine, who have lived in their historic land for centuries, should be deprived of deciding on their own future and that of their children, is totally unacceptable."

International Society must make every possible effort for the Palestinians to achieve their aims, Mr. Mitsotakis added. Greece, he underscored, will continue to support these efforts, believing that a just settlement of the Palestine problem is a basic precondition for a durable peace in the Middle East, which is in the interest of all peoples in the region.

CSO: 4920

OLYMPIC GROUP LIKES KALFA AS GAMES SITE

Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 29 Nov 80 p 12

[Text] A three-member committee set up by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has selected the location for the Olympic Games should the IOC decide on the permanent return of the Games to Greece, its chairman Louis Guirandou said in Athens Friday.

Speaking to reporters at a conference after a three-day fact-finding mission here, Mr. Guirandou said that from three proposed locations his committee had chosen the area of Kalfa, 27 kilometers (17 miles) from ancient Olympia, the cradle of the Olympic Games.

The proposal for the permanent return of the Games to its ancient site was made by President Constantine Karamanlis last January when he was Prime Minister of Greece.

Mr. Karamanlis proposed to the IOC that the Games be returned to their birthplace to prevent them being the subject of political and financial wrangling and exploitation.

His proposal followed the United States' decision to boycott the Moscow Games in protest against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Mr. Guirandou said the 1,250-acre (506-hectare) area of Kalfa was far away from the archaeological treasures of ancient Olympia and there was no fear for their safety. "The IOC considers it part of its mission to protect ancient Olympia," he said.

CSO: 4920

CHEMICALS IN FOOD PROCESSING DEPLORED BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 22 Oct 80 pp 1, 9

[Text] The general director of the State General Chemical Laboratory, Khr. Koutsikopoulos, granted exclusively to the AKROPOLIS a shockingly revealing interview on the orgy of adulteration which is taking place with foodstuffs, the fixed aim of which is to make a profit, the only victim being the public's health.

As for the volume of this adulteration, Mr Koutsikopoulos stated characteristically that 1 in 10 samples which are submitted to the chemical laboratory for checking come from a product which is either unfit for or dangerous to the consumers. And as for the kind of adulteration on a case-by-case basis, he cited a number of hair-raising revelations to us. And here are some of them:

1. "Tough" chops of thick fresh meat are made very "tender" by the admixture of the "meat tenderizer" powder, which has come under suspicion.
2. Pastry for "kabobs" prepared with an admixture of a kind of powdered milk which is imported and used as an animal feed (it contains antibiotics).
3. Peanuts dyed with carcinogenic artificial colorings like those which are used in the dyeing of fabrics.
4. Chocolates and chocolate-containing products which instead of cocoa butter contain hydrogenated fats which have a high melting point.
5. Broiled beefsteak, "round", and chickens are sprinkled with a powder, sodium glutamate, in order to make them tasty and to remove any strong smells.

Also present at the interview was the director in charge of chemical applications of the General Chemical Laboratory, Khr. Konstandopoulos.

All these findings concerning foods which are unfit or dangerous to the public health constitute just some of the less known criminal adulterations or acts which are engaged in by certain unscrupulous small manufacturers and businessmen, their objective being profiteering or the mere improvement of the appearance of their products.

But in any case, in both these lawless aspirations the result is the same: That the public health is directly endangered, sometimes momentarily (stomach upsets), and sometimes seriously.

One in Ten "Samples" are Adulterated

There revelations and the relevant conclusions are contained in the interview with Koutsikopoulos, who says in his response to the issue of adulteration:

One out of ten samples which are brought to the General Chemical Laboratory (food, liquids, fuel, and so forth) are generally unfit and sometimes dangerous (when it is a matter of food) to the public's health. But such a labeling--he adds--falls within the area of jurisdiction of the health ministry, and of course the responsibility for the relevant characterization lies with its services.

Question: How many "samples" are examined every year at the General Chemical laboratories?

Answer: You will count about 10,000 "samples" per month there. Consequently, in the 10-month period (January-October) which has passed since the beginning of the year, we are already approaching 100,000 "samples" examined.

Artificial Colorings in Peanuts and Sausages

Question: Which of the adulterations which are found by laboratory tests do you consider to be the most dangerous to people?

Answer: Those artificial colorings which are designated as carcinogenic and which are encountered frequently as additives in analyses of various foods are certainly very dangerous. For example, the preservatives benzoic acid, sodium sorbate, and others can be used in a concentration of 1 percent. Any higher admixture of these, however, can have a dangerous result for the unsuspecting consumer.

Do not forget that some time ago artificial colorings were found:

- 1) In samples of sausages, and
- 2) In peanuts, which were dyed with an aniline dye. That is, with a synthetic die for fabrics, which is pure poison in an uncontrolled admixture!

Of course, such a coloration, if done for reasons of a good appearance for the product, is not adulteration. But it is a criminal error of ignorance. And, worse yet, this can prove to be more tragic even than such an "admixed" adulteration.

Chocolates With Hydrogenated Fats

And Mr Konstandopolous added that even chocolates and chocolate-containing products generally--which are, perhaps, the most beloved sweets of small children--have been found repeatedly by us to have been marketed in an adulterated form which is not harmless, certainly, to the public health.

It has been observed that a limited number of manufacturers--in periods of great demand for chocolate-containing products (Christmas, Easter)--replace cocoa butter with other hydrogenated fats, which are much cheaper but also very indigestible.

These fats (they have been found also in the preparation of cheese-pie) have a high melting point, and when introduced into the stomach they hinder normal digestion. Thus, they frequently cause serious upsets, feverish conditions, and so forth.

"Tender" Chops With "Papain" Enzyme

Have you noticed recently--Mr Konstandopoulos asks me--that at the various dining places, usually extremely "tender" chops are being offered? And without waiting for my answer, the same person observes:

Unfortunately, in many of these cases, the meat is not "made naturally tender by hanging," as one might think. The chop simply has been cooked after being "dusted" with the suspect powder which is called "meat tenderizer."

And to be more specific, we are talking about the enzyme "papain," which, however, is not allowed to be marketed in Greece. Nevertheless it must exist here, since we have found that it is being used.

Question: What effects can its use have?

Answer: But it is simple. Just as it "tenderized" the chop, naturally it "tenderizes" the stomach as well. And just think what the result may be where there are ulcers and other disorders of the stomach.

Another Harmful Powder for Chickens and "Round"

You should note further--our specialist interlocutors reveal to us--that it is not an incidental fact that at certain grill-rooms in Athens, very appetizing beefsteaks, "round," barbecued chickens, and so forth are being offered.

Their exceptional tastiness is due often--they stress--to sodium glutamate which is recklessly used in their preparation.

The aim is to impart tastiness to the meat and to cancel strong smells, from the chickens, for example.

However, they observe, sodium glutamate powder is still a chemical, and of course its use by unqualified people can prove detrimental to the health of their customers.

Of the "samples" of gasoline which are submitted to the chemical laboratory for examination, a certain percentage, around 10 percent, always turns up adulterated.

The most common form of falsification in these cases is: The selling of regular gasoline as "super."

We learned in fact that this kind of falsification--or, more correctly, fraud--flourishes especially on Sundays and on holidays, when the special verification crews are not working.

Exported Cheese Returned

Mr Konstandopoulos stated to us in addition that a few years ago a large quantity of cheeses were returned to a Greek exporter from the United States, on the grounds that they were unfit to eat.

In a relevant check, traces of dangerous pesticides had been found.

And the explanation: The milk which was used as the raw material came from animals which were being fed with fodders which had been sprayed with pesticides.

12114

CSO: 4908

BRIEFS

FIVE DAY WEEK—Greek schools will as of 1st January operate on the basis of a five day week following the Premier, George Rallis' announcement to this effect in what political observers have interpreted as a preelectoral pledge aimed at giving New Democracy support from workers. The five day week will also apply to state enterprises and civil servants and will be gradually implemented in the private sector as well. Foreign schools are also expected to follow suit and operate on the basis of a five day week. Educational Minister Athanassios Taliadouros said a study on the implementation of a five day week by the government has been completed. [Text] [Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 1 Dec 80 p 7]

CSO: 4920

CONSERVATIVE PARTY MP LANGSLET ATTACKS SECURITY AFFAIRS PANEL

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 28 Nov 80 p 4

[Article by Morten Fyhn]

[Text] The appointment of a special panel of experts on security and peace research in Norway has met with a storm of protest from broad groups in the area of research involved. The new panel is accused of being professionally one-sided in its makeup and its dissolution is called for on those grounds. Storting representative Lars Roar Langslet (Conservative) calls the panel a scandal. He says the responsible people in the Major Committee for Norwegian Research, which was behind the appointment, have revealed such poor judgment that they should consider resigning their positions.

The Major Committee comes under the Ministry of Church and Education and provides the minister with advice on matters he asks the committee to look into. It can also take up issues itself if it seems necessary. Cabinet Minister Einar Forde told AFTENPOSTEN he was unfamiliar with the reactions to the establishment of the panel. Therefore he did not wish to comment on the matter at this time.

There are currently four bodies primarily dealing with security policy and conflict and peace research, the Fridtjof Nansen Foundation at Polhogda, the Political Science Institute at Oslo University, the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute and the Institute for Peace Research. A joint statement issued by the leaders of the first three institutes, Willy Ostreng, Olav Knudsen and Daniel Heradstveit, said that the composition of the new panel is not very representative of Norwegian research circles in this area.

"None of the three institutions were consulted about the panel's mandate or its composition," said the three who are demanding that the Major Committee withdraw the matter and reconsider the panel's mandate and composition on a free basis. The new professor in peace and conflict research, Oivind Osterud, was not consulted or informed about the new panel either.

The criticism of the three institute leaders is based mainly on professional criteria but AFTENPOSTEN has learned that they are also surprised at the somewhat one-sided political makeup of the panel.

In a speech in Oslo last night the former chairman for many years of the Storting Church and Education Committee, Lars Roar Langslet (Conservative, sharply criticized the establishment of the panel.

"The Major Committee for Norwegian Research, which is responsible for the remarkable creation, is appointed by the government and has a key function as professional advisory organ on research policy matters. It is reasonable to suspect that it is the victim of a political coup in this case. At least it would be more of an insult to assume that this could be the result of serious consideration.

"The result is a regular scandal, leading to strong doubts that we can take the committee's advice in other areas seriously from now on," Langslet said.

"The least we can expect is the immediate withdrawal of the creation followed by a responsible professional evaluation in consultation with the research institutions concerned before anything more is done with the matter. The government and Norwegian research have nothing to gain from a new state-financed pressure group where old and well-known opponents of Norwegian foreign policy and security policy can operate under cover of being 'experts' in research," he said.

Without naming any names Langslet said "very few" of the 10 "experts" have research competence in the areas involved here.

The panel is made up of these people: Tertit Aasland, research worker at the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute, Gunnar Aksnes, professor of chemistry at the University of Bergen, Vilhelm Aubert, sociology professor, Oslo University, Odd Bull, Lieutenant General, Asbjorn Eide, research worker at the Institute for Peace Research, Wenche Haaland, chief psychologist, University of Bergen, Per Christian Hemmer, professor of physics, Norwegian Technical College, Per Oftedal, professor of genetics, Oslo University, Helge Sivertsen, education director in Oslo, and Ole Wiig, assistant director of the Major Committee for Norwegian Research.

The chairman of the Major Committee, Knud Dahl Jacobsen, told NTB [NORWEGIAN PRESS BUREAU] that he did not wish to comment on the statement from the three institution leaders before he had studied it in more detail. If he found reason to do so their views would be presented to the committee's working group.

The committee's general secretary, Erling Fjellbirkeland, said the panel members were chosen personally and do not represent their institutions.

"It is often a dilemma to find the proper makeup of a panel." He did not know the political affiliation of the various members himself, he told NTB.

The Major Committee has stressed that the idea for the panel was conceived in the spring, in other words before the debate on Norwegian security policy flared up to full strength.

STORTING VOTES FOREIGN AID LAW, INCREASES AFGHANS' AID

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Nov 80 p 3

[Text] An additional appropriation of 25 million kroner for Afghan refugee aid was the only big surprise when Storting debated the Foreign Ministry's budget for 1981 yesterday. This increase was supported by all the nonsocialist parties and the Socialist-Left Party and received a majority when one of the Labor Party representatives abstained from voting. Most of the debate centered on development assistance but aside from minor disagreements there was broad unanimity on the total appropriations of close to 3 billion kroner.

There was also disagreement this year on aid to Vietnam and Jamaica while for the first time Mozambique gained support from all parties.

Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Gro Harlem Brundtland pointed out that this year's budget recommendation was characterized by even more agreement on tasks and priorities than has been the case in the past.

"Norway is still in the forefront of industrialized lands when it comes to the extent of aid for development," she said and added: "I should certainly hope so too.

"The Labor Party members on the Foreign Affairs Committee try to emphasize that our goal is an escalation of assistance for development and humanitarian aid to 1.3 percent of our gross national product," said Ms Harlem Brundtland.

She said further that in its recommendation the committee stressed the indisputable fact that international cooperation is increasing in importance and scope. A dedicated and skilled effort is being made in this area which deserves recognition and there can be no doubt that Norway is pursuing a foreign policy activity that is just as important as that of the other Nordic lands, even though our foreign service has considerably fewer employees, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee said.

The main Conservative spokesman, Lars Roar Langset, said there is broad agreement on the interests our foreign policy should serve and on the best way to accomplish this. He stressed that the dissension in this year's budget report on development aid is of fundamental importance but he said this should not

overshadow the fact that the parties stand united in their desire to give Norwegian aid a scope corresponding to our international obligations.

"The Conservative goal is to have aid in 1981 amount to 1 percent of our gross national product," continued Langalet, bringing up the important question of how to achieve the best possible results from the money we invest.

The Conservatives voted against the entire 20 million kroner appropriation for Jamaica, explaining that aid cooperation with this country has been a textbook example of how not to conduct aid policy. The Conservatives also opposed funds for Vietnam and Langalet said the party could not support a state which can afford to keep two neighboring countries under military occupation.

Jakob Aano presented the Christian People's Party's views on the Foreign Ministry budget and stressed that his party wants to spend more in development aid than 1 percent of the gross national product. "We must do more," said Aano who proposed appropriating 300 million kroner more for next year.

The big oil revenues make Norway even more obligated to help the poorest people in the world, said Aano who recalled earlier pledges to step up Norwegian aid.

Of the extra 300 million kroner Aano would give 10 million more to Kenya, 50 million to Tanzania and 25 million to Zambia, Botswana, Bangladesh and Mozambique. In addition 5.2 million extra to Madagascar and a final appropriation for Vietnam to conclude the cooperation there. He supported the proposal of 20 million for Jamaica as well as an increase for refugee work.

The parliamentary leader of the Center Party, Johan J. Jakobsen, was in favor of cutting off aid to Jamaica, preferring to use the 20 million for expanded refugee assistance. He stressed the need to support the steadily increasing number of refugees and proposed on behalf of the Center and Conservative parties a proposal to increase the appropriation for Afghan refugees by 25 million kroner, a proposal backed during the voting by all the nonsocialist parties and the Socialist-Left Party. With the help of the president's double vote and an abstaining Labor representative, the proposal gained majority support.

"In its proposed national budget for 1981 the government promises tax relief amounting to 4.7 billion kroner and a general consumption increase for most income groups," said Odd Einar Dorum of the Liberal Party, "but the government can't make similar promises when it comes to our payments to the impoverished part of the world." He stressed that the Liberals see increased aid to developing nations as one of the politically and economically acceptable ways to use the oil money and he supported the Christian People's Party's proposal to raise next year's appropriations by 300 million kroner.

Stein Ornhøi of the Socialist-Left Party felt today's development assistance is only a drop in the ocean. However the party is not saying that our development assistance is totally wrong but Ornhøi sharply criticized increasing Norway's aid with a view to involving Norwegian businesses in developing countries. The party also supported the Christian People's Party's proposal to increase the

appropriation by 300 million kroner and called for a further 125 million for Vietnam. On one point the party agreed with the Conservatives, namely in opposing funds for Jamaica, and it also opposed appropriations for Indonesia and Pakistan.

6578

CSO: 3108

'CONSERVATIVES' BENKOW URGES INCREASED SVALBARD DEVELOPMENT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Nov 80 p 5

[Article by Einar Solvoll]

[Text] "There should be a larger population of Norwegians on Svalbard. Today there are only 1200 in the Norwegian communities of Longyearbyen, Ny-Alesund, Svea and Isfjord Radio, while there are more than 2,000 Russians in Barentsburg and Pyramiden. To better exercise our sovereignty on this group of islands, it would be advantageous to have a larger Norwegian colony. Hence, we must get behind the Svea project and not just view it in terms of industrial profitability."

These ideas were voiced by Conservative Party Chairman Jo Benkow--former chairman of the Justice Committee in Parliament which deals with issues concerning Svalbard--in a conversation with District Governor Jan Grondahl on a visit to Svalbard.

The district governor told Benkow there are clear signs that the Russians are gradually showing greater respect for Norwegian authority. Grondahl mentioned they had recently reached a compromise with the Russians concerning helicopter flights over protected land areas. All flights are to be reported 24 hours in advance and if the Russians do not hear anything from Norwegian authorities, they may assume to have permission in the form of a dispensation. This has developed as a purely temporary arrangement.

The district governor is also very pleased with the twin-engine helicopter featuring advanced navigational equipment which will be placed at his disposal in 1981, according to a national budget proposal. Not many years ago the district governor had to cover the islands by dogsled. Transportation on these islands is everything. The sealing vessel "Polaris" is the best of its kind, like the helicopter. "If we were to submit another request, it would have to be for improved communications equipment to keep in touch with people on these islands," said Grondahl, who at his office in the new administration building in Longyearbyen always keeps a knapsack packed and ready to go wherever he is needed on short notice.

Plans concerning Svea's future as a coal-mining town are now being discussed in the Department of Industry and will later be taken up in the government and in Parliament. Original plans for a billion-kroner project have been shelved due to lack of profitability and a project half that size is now being considered. Originally,

a new community of almost 1,000 persons had been envisioned--almost the size of Longyearbyen, "the capital." That figure has not been reduced to 400 to 500 persons, which is more in keeping with the profitability of the Svea project, according to some sources.

Considering the matter of sovereignty, on the other hand, the importance of the project could go beyond that of a purely industrial one. Norway would have the opportunity to develop a new mining town and to strengthen its position on these islands--which is also our responsibility as far as exercising sovereignty.

When the Department of Industry submits its revised plans for the Svea project, we could have an interesting political discussion about which factors should be considered in the development of Svea on Svalbard.

8952

CSO: 3108

LABOR PARTY'S SUDDEN LOSS OF SUPPORT WORRIES LEADERS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Nov 80 p 3

[Article by Kjell Harberg]

[Text] The Labor Party is approaching some momentous days and weeks. A grave party leadership, well aware of declining confidence among both party members and voters, will try over the weekend for the second time in the last few years to consolidate forces and gather strength to work for new advances for the worn-down ruling party. This will occur at the national committee meeting in Hamar at which the party's policies and its situation will both be discussed. But the gap between the party and the voters and--perhaps more important to party leaders--between the party leadership and its own "grassroots" appears to be wider than ever. This is affecting confidence--in the party leadership as well as in party policy.

Through the years the strength of the Labor Party has been the party organization where loyal and hardworking elected deputies have led the troops to new advances when disconsolate voter defections have been at their worst. Today the Labor Party seems to have lost some of its grip on this organization. In the past members and deputies around the country could unite in bracing solidarity around the leadership and party policy. Now there is a feeling that the party leaders and other elected top officials are working directly counter to the "grassroots" feelings with regard to the most vital political tasks, a situation leading to frustration and defection.

Party chairman Reiulf Steen, after traveling around to local party groups across the country, can personally attest to the reactions. Moves at a high level in the party, usually by individuals, are regarded as destructive. What local party people consider their own important contribution to political issues is often undermined when the debate concentrates on individual initiatives that fire up large groups.

In the last year it has been announced steadily to all the people: the Labor Party lacks firm political leadership. That led to the personality debate and the search for scapegoats. And then came the demands for Reiulf Steen's resignation, the desire for a "strong man" in the top leadership of the party, personified by the man who stirs great controversy inside the party, Bjartmar Gjerde, the demands for a double role for Odvar Nordli as prime minister and

party chairman. And the ruling party ends up in a situation that does not resolve but intensifies the party conflict, locks positions in--and reduces voter confidence. People no longer believe in the party's ability to govern.

The Labor Party has been able to exist in the certainty that despite periodic disagreement on political issues and personalities too the loyalty of members and voters could be relied on when it really counted. It is true that this has taken more and more effort. But this time after the disruptive internal debate this fall in the ruling party more than political disagreement is involved. At stake are things regarded by the Social Democrat--who is still the pillar beneath the "Labor Party building" which continues to contain a third of the nation's voters--as vital for the nation, for the independence and freedom of our country.

Why do former Labor Party voters--80,000 have left the party since the 1977 election--react when our defense and security policy is discussed in the government party although there is no doubt of the outcome in leading party organs with regard to the concrete issue of stockpiling? Precisely because party tactical considerations, despite concrete positions, create great doubt concerning the firmness and strength of Labor Party involvement in maintaining the total national defense and security policy. The simple question is: is this a party that can guarantee that the nation will stick to a policy rooted in western defense cooperation with a separate Norwegian contribution that creates credibility in our participation in the alliance? A growing number of people say no!

The sharp decline in voter support for the Labor Party is not a sudden process. Doubt as to the justification of the party's numerical top position in Norwegian politics has been mounting for many years and has resulted even earlier in voter support figures well down in the 30's in voter opinion polls. And even though great efforts have added 5 or 10 percent to these record lows the Labor Party can no longer manage to hold onto its voters. Then come the triggering factors--the defense debate, the effects of the economic policy, the fall budget bill, etc. Labor Party voters are deserting their party, new voters are seeking other political paths.

Who can lead the Labor Party to new gains? Regardless of the formal agenda that question will be one of the most important topics in the debate in the national committee on Monday and Tuesday and in the discussion between elected officials and members prior to the national congress next spring. The ruling party's situation is marked by the general picture in today's political life in Norway: there is a shortage of suitable leaders. And how are things in the Labor Party? The "strong" Bjartmar Gjerde is more than the party's left wing can swallow. His party comrades are trying to throw Reiulf Steen out. Odvar Nordli, often regarded as the party's political leader to a greater extent than he actually has been--the political initiatives are often made by others--may be able to unite the party but can he motivate it to new gains? Gro Harlem Brundtland has strong support but equally strong opposition. The leadership crisis in the nation's ruling party is obvious.

And the Labor Party is in the middle of a political mess. It will be increasingly difficult to get out of it.

BRIEFS

LIBERALS' ROSSBACH ON PRESTOCKAGE--Liberal leader Hans Hammond Rossback has strongly criticized Kare Willoch's contention that the Liberals have created confusion about the stockpiling of American military equipment in Norway. "The Conservative leader in Parliament is trying to sow doubt about the Liberals' defense policy. The Liberal Party favors strong and reliable defense within the NATO alliance. We have accepted the principle of stockpiling, but want to evaluate specific instances of such prestockage," said Rossbach at an election conference in Alesund. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Nov 80 p 5] 8952

CSO: 3108

CHURCH-STATE, MILITARY, ECONOMIC FACTORS IN POLITICAL CHANGE

Paris LE MONDE in French 25, 26, 27 Nov 80

[Article by Jose Rebelo: "Portugal in Permanent Transition"]

[25 Nov 80, pp 1, 7]

[Text] I. The Left Wing Manipulated the Crisis

Lisbon--In 1975, the people of Portugal chose the delegates to their constituent assembly in full freedom. A year later, they were again summoned to the polls to elect the members of the Legislative Assembly. In July 1976, they chose the president of the republic. With the local elections in December of the same year, the democratic structure promised by the "April captains" was established.

Thus the country embarked on a "period of transition" of 4 years during which the new economic, political and social structures were to be put to the test.

The legislative elections of 4 October last and the presidential election, the first round of which will take place on 7 December, formally marked the end of this "period of transition." In reality, however, all of Portugal remains provisional.

In the course of these last 4 years, the most varied experiments were tried: the formula of a homogenous government but with a minority in the assembly a majority government produced by a coalition, governments cut off from the political parties and enjoying exclusively the "confidence of the president of the republic." Just after the early elections in December of 1979, a new formula was implemented: that of a majority government which was politically opposed to the chief of state.

Portugal is a complicated country in which even the names of the political parties fail to correspond with their real orientations. Doesn't the socialist party claim to be social democratic? Doesn't the social democratic party pursue goals characteristic of the most traditional liberalism? Doesn't the democratic and social center, of Christian democratic inspiration, accept into its ranks certain individuals from the most reactionary right wing? Doesn't the communist party make an effort through the central trade union organization it controls to prevent the outbreak of strikes, becoming the main stabilizing element in a society

dominated by a crisis in which the purchasing power of the workers never ceases to decline?

The banks and the insurance companies as well as the other enterprises belonging to the key sectors of the economy have indeed been nationalized. Television and radio as well as the majority of the daily newspapers are controlled by the state. The army is, according to the constitution, in the service of the people. The courts are, it is assured, governed by democratic norms. Idealistic, the "revolution of the carnations" did not want to follow the example of the old regime. And purges have been rare. In the banks and the insurance companies, in television, radio and the newspapers, in the army and in the courts, the orders are given by administrators, journalists, colonels and judges who served the Salazar regime. Many of them have never left their posts. Others returned after a short hiatus in the desert.

Little by little the signs of the revolution are fading. Lisbon offers visitors a duller image. The public square, the meeting place in 1975 for the international left wing, has become again a transit point for thousands of Portuguese finishing their purchases in the neighborhood shops in the evening. The great hotels are having their upholstery and paintings replaced or cleaned. Nothing inside any longer recalls the "forced stay" of the 600,000 persons repatriated from the former colonies who arrived in Lisbon in 1975 and 1976. The majority of those who have returned have today been absorbed.

A More Relaxed Situation

Along Liberty Avenue, the main boulevard of the city, the beautiful vestiges of the early days of the century are giving way to buildings occupied by banks or large private companies. The smart restaurants are full. Whiskey flows freely in the nightclubs which are invaded every evening by the young representatives of a flourishing bourgeoisie. Traffic is heavy and on the weekends there are lines waiting to get onto the huge toll bridge across the Tagus. A number of high officials who, frightened away by the revolution, fled to Brazil, are moving into their apartments in Cascais and Estoril again.

This apparent prosperity is difficult to explain if one is aware of the figures contained in the official statistics. Compared to the developed countries with which Portugal has trade relations, the role played by wages in production costs dropped by 33 percent between 1976 and 1979. The drop was 40 percent in comparison to Spain and Greece. Moreover, and all those following the development of the Portuguese economy confirm this, the small and average bourgeoisie in the cities represent the population sectors most harshly affected by the austerity policy of the socialist government.

For example, the cost of a medium-power vehicle represents 20 months' wages for a bank employee, 16 months' wages for a university assistant, and 10 months' wages for a high-level technician in the aircraft industry. Finally, the establishment of a maximum wage, recently increased to a little more than 5,000 francs, as well as the reduction of the range of allocations, measures dating from the early days of the revolution, have led to bizarre situations. To pay for a given vehicle in

full, the prime minister would have to pay out the whole of his salary for 6 1/2 months, while a deputy or a secretary of state would have to commit their salaries for almost a year.

What is the key to the mystery? According to Mr Salgueiro, manager of the Development Bank, when a highly skilled employee is hired the enterprise often reimburses him for telephone bills, provides him with a company vehicle and, why not, a second residence. All of this is accompanied with considerable tolerance with regard to his expense account. For those in less sought-after professions, the solution lies in finding supplementary income: a teacher will tutor at home, and a bank employee will take charge of the books of a small enterprise. At the bottom of the scale, weekend leisure will involve a limitation on certain expenditures, in particular for food.

In economic and financial terms, the situation is undeniably more relaxed than in 1978. A very heavy balance of payments deficit, which totaled 6 billion francs at that time, forced the government in Lisbon to negotiate an agreement with the IMF. This agreement allowed Portuguese citizens to benefit from credit totaling 57.35 million in special drawing rights (SDR), and to move ahead with talks with an international trust involving a loan of \$750 million.

In exchange, the cabinet headed at that time by Mr Soares agreed to implement the traditional "recipe" of the IMF: raising discount rates, restricting credit, limiting the increase in and devaluating the currency. The task was accomplished, and without reservation. The goal of the socialist government was it is true to create the conditions which would allow it to loosen the belts again just prior to the legislative elections. As a result, the deficit in the balance of payments had already dropped by 25 percent by December 1978. It was entirely eliminated a year later. Having regained their confidence in the future of the country, the emigres filled the coffers of the Portuguese banks again with the product of their savings. With the "communist threat" averted, Portugal also became a tourist country again. With the situation within the enterprises "normalized," the owners decided to invest and above all to use up the stocks they had jealously hoarded during the preceding years. The same was true for foreign investment, which reached 350 million francs in 1979.

Who Is Interested in the Poor?

In 2 years, the extent to which imports were covered by exports thus increased from 43 to 54 percent. Thanks in particular to the revaluation of gold, the reserves of the Bank of Portugal currently total 45 billion francs, a sum exceeding the foreign debt total by more than 8 billion.

But in 1980, the socialists were no longer in government to harvest the fruit of their labors. "The left wing manipulated the crisis and the right wing derived profit therefrom," it is said in Lisbon. Exploiting the legacy left by his predecessors, skillfully without a doubt, Mr Sa Carneiro approved a series of manifestly electoral measures which in part justify his triumph last October. He lowered taxes, halted the devaluation of the escudo, reduced the rate of inflation and increased family allocations, retirement pensions and the minimum wage. "Who then is more interested in the poor? We or the socialists?" a leader of the Social

Democratic Center Party, a political group included in the coalition in power, was able to demand with some irony.

But all of these gains are the result of temporary situations, and the main basic decisions have not yet been made.

No long- or medium-term plan has ever been adopted. "Earlier, there was no planning, but everyone recognized the urgent need to plan. Today things are worse. There is no planning because the opposite concept, that of free competition, is defended," explains Mr Costa Leal, president and general manager of the Setenave naval shipyards. The government does not of course touch the nationalized sector. The constitution forbids it. Pending the review of the basic law which, it is hoped in the circles close to the Democratic Alliance, will allow private capital access to the banking and insurance sectors, the most vulnerable enterprises are slowly being allowed to die. This is the case for example with the public transportation enterprises which, nationalized in 1975, are forced to charge rates clearly below the real value of the services provided. Thus they find themselves wholly dependent on state subsidies.

The majority of the modernization projects for the industrial structures in the country are still awaiting realization. About 80 percent of the private Portuguese businesses employ fewer than 100 workers. In the textiles sector, which contributes more than 25 percent to the total export value, this scattering is still more obvious for in the majority of cases these are small family units employing 5 to 10 persons.

In the agricultural sector, the sector is not very different. In the Oporto wine region, each vinegrower cultivates an average of less than a hectare of land. Of the 29,000 vinegrowers counted in the census, 61 percent produced less than 5 tons annually and only 9 more than 300. If the plans to organize farmers in cooperatives in the North remains on the level of good intentions, the days of agrarian reform are numbered, on the other hand, in the South. The process of dissolving the collective production units is continuing. On the basis of a very liberal interpretation of the law approved in 1977, the government is returning the best land to its former owners. What remains is distributed to small farmers or any other person who feels called upon to farm. Encouraging the breakup of the collective units, the government was seeking a basically political goal: to reduce the influence of the communist party in the region. "The day will come when it will be necessary to collectivize the land again," certain local leaders in the social democratic party predict.

Lisbon and other Portuguese cities such as Oporto are already marching in step with the Common Market. But the rest of the country, in particular the interior, is far from it.

[26 Nov 80, p 5]

[Text] II. The Shaky Empire of the Church

In Portugal, where the signs of the 1974-75 revolution are fading, consumption is picking up and the economic and financial situation has improved, in part thanks to the steps taken by the left wing

when it was in power. If the presidential election on 7 December does not lead to a crisis in the regime, draconian decisions will in any case have to be adopted to modernize the economy of the country.

Lisbon--Lost in the heart of 200,000 hectares of pine forest, the commune of Proenca a Nova is resisting civilization. Here there are no moving picture theaters and no cafes. Only a few bars where a meal can be improvised. The deluxe menu is pork with cabbage, potatoes or beans, with plenty to wash it down, for there is no shortage of wine. Not very long ago, mothers were still giving their infants morsels of bread soaked in wine. Such a child would remain in a state of semi-consciousness while the mother proceeded to prepare his food.

Proenca a Nova is 3 hours away from Lisbon. And yet it belongs to another world. "No, there are no political party premises here," an agent of the national republican guard answered. What about local political officials? "But of course, there is the teacher, who is a member of the PSD [Social Democratic Party], and another man too. But he is a hunter and the hunting season opens today. So you'd better try to find the teacher."

The teacher was not at home either. It was Sunday. No party headquarters. Almost no party leaders. What does it matter? When the time comes to vote, the people vote. And they vote "well." Last 5 October, 6,200 of the 8,000 voters opted for Mr Sa Carneiro's Democratic Alliance. Opted? What does Father Alfredo think about it? The old priest, tall and thin, plays the role of a mentor in the town. A few days before the elections, he rallied the faithful to teach them how to vote. Equipped with a sample ballot, he insisted, above all to the illiterate, that they should make an X. There--immediately after the letters AD. Was it a question of voting for the right? No. For Father Alfredo, there is no left or right, only Christians and Marxists. The good men and the bad. He promises paradise to the former and hell to the latter.

Father Alfredo is respected in the town. For more than 30 years, he has performed the baptisms, weddings and funerals. He is an upright man. Everyone admits this. He accepts no money. He is poor. His church is dilapidated. He limps a little: "As a penitential act, Father Alfredo puts a pebble in each of his shoes," Mr Anibal Pedro, one of the few local socialists, explains. Like many other young people, Mr Pedro pursued his secondary schooling in a seminar. "There were more than a hundred of us," he explains. There were no schools in the communes and the families did not have enough money to send their children to Castelo Branco, the capital of the department. The seminary thus became the alternative. Since then a public school has been built and the enrollment at the seminary has dropped.

In 1975, a leftist military group came to the village to undertake "cultural dynamization." "The result was catastrophic," Mr Pedro told us, "for the military were unable to understand the ancestral habits of the citizens." The mayor, affiliated with the old regime, was replaced by an officer. But the experiment lasted no more than a month. "The tocsin was sounded in the tower of the church every day, and the officer was obliged to depart." According to Mr Pedro, such words as "fascism" and "democracy" have no real meaning in Proenca a Nova. "For

these people who want to live and die in peace, politics is an illness from which one must protect himself," he adds. The left wing in Lisbon could not understand that. The result is that the present mayor, also a priest, is the former director of a religious school known for its extremely harsh discipline. He had left the region after 25 April, since the times did not exactly favor his concept of justice. Today he, together with Father Alfredo, determines the future of the town.

Drown the Communists!

But Proenca a Nova is not an isolated case in the interior of Portugal. In Tras os Montes and in a large part of Minho, one can find innumerable villages with the same characteristics, in which illiteracy prevails and poverty is regarded as a part of life.

The events of 1974 caused a wind of panic to blow through these regions, in which small ownership prevails. Entrenched in their villages, the peasants awaited the arrival of the "communists" in anguish, thinking that they would seize their land and their children. In the churches, they prayed for better days. Some more activist-minded churchmen, such as a famous priest in Braga named Melo Peixoto, launched appeals for resistance. "We must descend on Lisbon and drown all the communists in the Tagus!" this priest exclaimed. Such radicalism was not however shared by the hierarchy which wanted above all to limit the damage. Showing remarkable prudence, the episcopate supported Mr Mario Soares in the 1975 and 1976 elections. Hadn't the socialists become the most effective obstacle to the advance of the communist party?

Under the socialist government, relations between the Church and the state developed under the same sign of moderation. At the end of 1977, the government obtained agreement from Rome for revision of the concordat. Portuguese citizens won the right to divorce and, in exchange, the government committed itself to maintaining the teaching of religion in secondary-level public schools.

With the fall of the second PS [Socialist Party] government and the investiture of Mr Mota Pinto, the swing to the right was intensified. The Church could finally take the offensive. And the pretext was not long in coming. A television program entitled "The Years of the Century" which described the relations between the episcopate and the Salazar regime, as well as a film called "The Hours of Maria" shown in a theater in the nation's capital, caused a violent reaction on the part of the Church as well as conservative political circles.

"The Time Has Come to Assert the Christian Conscience of Portugal" was the headline in the 13 March 1979 issue of the right-wing daily newspaper O DLA. A week later, the archbishop of Braga voiced a protest against the "communist plague," and his entourage convoked a meeting to demonstrate "total support of the patriarch, the archbishop and Mr Mota Pinto."

The establishment of a government headed by Miss Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo in July of the same year was to aggravate the situation. Charged with "leftism," the new prime minister was however a member of the lay movement known as The Grail and a militant Catholic of high repute, both within the country and abroad. Meeting to study the problem, the permanent council of the Portuguese episcopate proved divided on the strategy to be adopted. But it did not prohibit the more

conservative members of the hierarchy from raising their voices against what they regarded as a "trap."

Impassioned views were held by the archbishop of Braga. Speaking to a group of Catholics and good sisters who had made a pilgrimage to the Vila Verde sanctuary, he gave this advice: "On election day, you may miss mass, you may leave the cloister, but above all, vote." "The elections offer a choice between reform and subversion," said the bishop of Oporto, a personality who was moreover known for his opposition to the old regime, for his part. There were very few bishops who refused to participate in this campaign. The best-known example is that of the bishop of Setubal, who when interviewed by the socialist daily newspaper PORTUGAL HOJE voiced his protest against the use of the pulpit for political purposes.

Numerous leftist political leaders attempted moreover to effect a rapprochement with the traditional Catholic electorate. In a meeting near Lisbon, Mr Alvaro Cunhal stated in peremptory fashion that "thousands of Catholics will vote for the Communist Party." A month before the December elections, Mr Soares took up the pilgrim's staff to explain to the bishops that the Socialist Party "is not a Marxist party."

On 2 December 1979, the Church discreetly hailed the triumph of Mr Sa Carneiro's Democratic Alliance. A new era began. Hadn't the center-right wing majority produced by the elections made a certain number of commitments? Now, it was thought in the circles close to the episcopate, the time had come to make them concrete.

Relying on 4,000 priests, half of whom head parishes, the apparatus of the Portuguese Church extends its direct influence over about 2 million persons. In the view of Father Luis Franca, a Dominican who is pursuing studies in the sociology of religion in Portugal, the number of participants at Sunday services does not exceed 1.5 million. This total is distributed unequally: half of the population in the North and the interior of the country goes regularly to mass, as compared to 5 percent of the population in Alentejo, where the number of Catholic marriages, moreover, is dropping sharply. In addition, a phenomenon common to developed societies can be seen in Portugal: the attendance at mass is 50 percent for the inhabitants in the farm sectors, except, naturally, in Alentejo, where large estate ownership has historically created the conditions favoring the development of leftist ideals, while 30 percent attend in industrial environments and 15 percent in the urban sector.

Two Bastions of the Church

Aware of this development, the Portuguese Church is trying to retain and consolidate its positions in two basic sectors: education and health. Just prior to 25 April, three-quarters of the private educational establishments with more than 700 students belonged to the church, which also owned more than 60 percent of the hospitals.

The overthrow of the Salazar regime shook this empire. Private education has fallen into disgrace and the hospitals have been expropriated. It took the victory of the Democratic Alliance to put the situation back in balance. The private-school statutes approved by the parliament in 1980 placed this type of institution

on a footing of equality with the public institutions. A decree promulgated this same year returns the hospitals as well as all "almshouse" assets to their former owners.

The new majority has kept its promises. Meanwhile, the Church notables who for years took shelter under the umbrella of the Salazar regime are beginning to disappear. Little by little they are yielding to a generation which is more dynamic and relatively permeable to the influence of the Opus Dei. This organization is gradually taking over control of the hospitals and schools. Developing broadly within the Catholic University of Lisbon, it is preparing to open higher institutes of law and economics in other cities in the country. With the explicit support of certain bishops such as those of Viseu, Lamego and Leiria, Opus Dei can always command a hearing from one of the parties in the coalition in power, the CDS.

Heavily attacked by Cerejeiro, the intimate friend of Salazar, is the Opus Dei, said to have recently made an offer to purchase Radio Renaissance, the only private broadcasting station in Portugal, tolerated by the present cardinal of Lisbon? Apparently not. This fact would explain in part the atmosphere of unease which seems to characterize the relations between the government and Dom Antonio Ribeiro. Last August, the leftist weekly O JORNAL reported on pressures said to be exerted on the Vatican to replace the head of the Portuguese Church. The nuncio in Lisbon denied these rumors, of course. But the reaction of the episcopate was more reserved: "We have no comment to make on this subject."

The leftist Catholics, for their part, are waiting for a second wind. A publication called REFLEXION CHRETIENNE, headed by Mrs Manuela Silva, former secretary of state for planning in the first Soares government, among other notables, denounces the "rightist" option of the Church in Portugal. Meeting last September in a private secondary school in the capital, more than 2,000 Christians defended a Church which is "free, democratic and in the service of the poor."

"Prior to 25 April," one of the participants at this meeting asserted, "the Church was the ideal field of battle against the Salazar regime. Then each of us joined a political party. Politics has separated us. At a time when the right wing threatens to continue eternally in power, the rallying of all progressive Catholics becomes necessary. And we will begin again at the start."

[27 Nov 80, p 6]

[Text] III. The Return of the Salazar Generals

The election of the next president of the Portuguese Republic on 7 December will perhaps not put an end to the period of transition inaugurated by the 1974-1975 revolution, but in any case basic measures must be undertaken to modernize the economy of the country, according to the first article by our Lisbon correspondent. Jose Rebelo went on to focus on one of the components in Portuguese society which weighs heavily in the political debate--the Church.

Lisbon--In a Lisbon church, Mrs Eanes, representing her husband, attended a mass celebrated in memory of Marcelo Caetano, who died in exile in Rio de Janeiro. At

the same hour, in a small village in the interior, General Soares Carneiro placed a spray of flowers at the foot of the monument to Gen Humberto Delgado.

This happened on Sunday, 2 November. The president of the republic, a candidate for reelection with the explicit support of the socialists, and indirectly, of the communists, rendered homage in this way to the man who was ousted from power in April of 1974. His main adversary, an ultra-conservative military officer, formerly in charge of a concentration camp in Angola, bowed, for his part, before the "general sans peur," the candidate of the general democratic opposition in the 1958 elections, who was assassinated 7 years later by Salazar's political police.

On all sides an effort is being made to explain an attitude which might inspire a cartoonist. "One of the sons and the brother-in-law of Mr Caetano, indefatigable democrats, are participating actively in General Eanes' campaign," it is stressed in circles close to the palace in Belem. "Before going over to the opposition, General Delgado was not closely linked with the Salazar regime either," the friends of the Democratic Alliance candidate insist. But there are other, doubtless more powerful reasons, underlying the behavior of the two main candidates in the elections this coming 7 December. After 6 years of political struggle, the people of Portugal have been overcome with lethargy. They are waiting for the merits of democracy to manifest themselves in their daily lives. In the health and education sectors, for example, and despite certain advances, the gap between Portugal and the other European countries remains substantial. The infant mortality rate is 25 per 1,000. There is only 1 doctor for every 600 inhabitants. Twenty-six percent of the women and 19 percent of the men over 15 years of age do not know how to read or write. And the true situation in the country would emerge more clearly if the statistics were broken down by regions.

Thus it is not the moment for violent clashes or oratory jousting. Therefore General Eanes and General Soares Carneiro are preaching reconciliation. The same colors, the red and the green of the Portuguese flag, frame the posters for the two candidates. General Eanes is represented there as "the president of all the Portuguese." General Soares Carneiro is urged as "the national candidate."

"Six of one thing or half a dozen of the other," the extreme left wing is saying, and yet rather different political goals can be seen behind these two military personalities.

For the present chief of state, it is a question of preventing the center-right coalition, already triumphant in the legislative elections last October, from winning control of all branches. The year 1981 will be marked by a revision of the constitution. "A profound revision," the parties of Mr Sa Carneiro's Democratic Alliance are already saying, rising up against the "militaristic, Marxist, collectivist and revolutionary" nature of a text which was however approved in April of 1976 by 84 percent of the deputies then in office. The PDS and the CDS thus propose to adapt the basic statutes "to the way in which the great majority of our people feel and think," giving private business the role of motive force of the economy, and eliminating the provisions which prevent the sale from sending nationalized assets to private parties and protecting Portuguese and foreign investors against the new expropriations. Their proposal thus calls for a certain limitation of the powers of the president of the republic, who can

no longer dismiss majority governments or utilize the "pocket veto," a formula allowing him to table a draft law proposed by the executive branch for an indefinite period of time. Finally, according to the AD, the constitution should be purged of all the articles pertaining to the electoral system, which would come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the parliament. With a generous majority in the chamber, the Democratic Alliance would then be in a position to alter the electoral districts, to increase the number of deputies elected by the Portuguese citizens living abroad substantially, and thus to remain in power indefinitely.

Constitutional Revision

But all of these intentions come up against a major problem: amendment of the constitution requires a favorable vote by two-thirds of the deputies, which cannot be obtained under the present circumstances, since the rapprochement between the AD and the socialists is at least for the time being out of the question. In order to get around this obstacle, the government and Mr Sa Carneiro are thinking of submitting their proposed constitutional revision to a referendum. However, the law provides for no such procedure. This has provoked opposition from all the leftist circles and from General Eanes.

A conservative who loves order and discipline and who favors the economic models of the Western countries, the current president is a legalist. He is against any form of amendment which does not take into account the limitations imposed by the constitution itself. "Take a military discipline regulation as an example: one may not like it, but one is bound to respect it," he said. Therefore he is committed to promulgating no law on the referendum and to blocking the path of efforts designed "to raise the issue of alternation in power again."

For leftist political leaders, the general represents an "emergency solution." For the progressive military factions, he represents, paradoxically, the only obstacle to a process he himself launched: the swing of the armed forces to the right. After his appointment as chief of staff of the land army at the end of 1975, General Eanes decided in fact to undertake the "normalization" of the army. His goal, he gave assurance, involved bringing about the synthesis of "the generosity of the young military faction and the experience of their elders." But the result of his action, which has extended throughout his term of office as president of the republic, is seen in the return in force of the generals who for long years had served as a support of the Salazar regime. They have organized a veritable witch-hunt in the barracks in the interior. A number of democratic officers have been forced out, and in many cases references to the "revolution of the carnations" have been forbidden.

On 30 July 1979, an officer was sentenced to serve a term because during the annual celebration held by his regiment he asked the orchestra to play the music which served as a signal to the revolutionary military officers on the night of 25 April to go into the streets. A year later, in a town in Porto Alegre, a colonel commanding a regiment spoke out publicly against the "traitors" who "sold out the overseas provinces to the communists." This speech was delivered in the presence of the deputy chief of staff of the land army. The leftist newspapers reported it. The Council of the Revolution was outraged. But the matter

was hushed up, with certain rightist daily newspapers reporting some time later that the speech by the "great patriot" had won the admiration of broad sectors of the armed forces.

The Example of Turkey

Any military apparatus today is controlled by a hierarchy. The higher disciplinary councils, which come under the direct jurisdiction of the chiefs of staff of the three branches of the armed forces, can, without need for justification, banish any military personnel whose "profiles" are judged "morally undesirable."

The same measure of exclusion, in this case for "lack of professional competence," can be decreed by the bodies called higher councils in the land army or navy and the technical commissions in the land army. These councils and commissions are moreover called upon to rule on proposed promotions. A military man excluded three times from the group which because of age have earned promotion to a higher rank automatically is transferred to the reserves.

A proposal designed to "humanize" the functioning of these bodies, giving an individual among other things an opportunity to defend himself, was submitted to the Council of the Revolution almost a year ago. Discussion of it has been systematically postponed. Last October, General Eanes, who in his capacity as chief of state presides at the meetings of this political-military body, finally put it on the agenda of subjects to be debated. "Let us hope that it is not too late," a member of the Council of the Revolution, visibly concerned about the future, said.

In the leftist factions in the armed forces, there is fear in fact that a future victory for General Soares Carneiro might plunge the country into a kind of "strong-arm democracy." With the Azores and Madeira archipelagoes, Portugal occupies a position of undeniable geostrategic importance, as NATO moreover recognizes. Also a number of proposals having to do among other things with the building of a nuclear base, an oil pipeline and an anchorage in Portuguese waters for American aircraft carriers are reportedly already under study. Many Portuguese generals think moreover that the country cannot fully play its role within NATO without "eliminating the enemy within." This enemy is seen not only as including the communists but the socialists as well, indeed those "for socialization."

The example of Turkey has doubtless given the "hawks" in the Portuguese army something to dream about: isn't a military coup d'etat possible in a European country which is a candidate for the Common Market?

Another hypothesis is the establishment of a strong regime which would retain a democratic facade. The partisans of this strategy feel encouraged by the triumph of Ronald Reagan in the United States. Portugal had a first republic from 1910 to 1933. The Salazar constitution marked the beginning of the second, which lasted until the "revolution of the carnations." The third began with the "captains' movement." Discussing the subject of the elections and the constitutional amendment recently, Mr Amaro da Costa, vice president of the CDS and currently minister of defense, explained: "This will perhaps mean the beginning of the fourth Portuguese republic."

CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR CATALONIAN AUTONOMY, GENERALITAT POWERS

Paris REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE in French Oct 80 pp 1012-1047

[Article by Gerard Camilleri, University of Perpignan, and Claude Galiay, University of Perpignan: "The Catalanian Autonomy Statute"]

[Excerpts] [Abstract] The Catalanian Autonomy Statute by Gerard Camilleri and Claude Galiay. Will the new institutions of autonomy, established in Catalonia, make it possible to reduce the antagonism which has been prevailing for many centuries in relations between the Spanish state and the Catalan community? Beyond the uncertainties deriving from the experiment undertaken, we must note that the transformation of Spain's economic and social structures makes a dialogue possible henceforth between the Castilian center and the Catalan forces. Although the experiment is only in its beginnings, conditions for success do really exist for the first time. (REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, XXX, 5, 1980, pp 1012-1047)

The Statute, which is the basic institutional norm of the Generality [Captaincy-General] of Catalonia, was not determined by the agencies of the Generality itself but was promulgated as a law of the Spanish state. The participation of Catalan representatives in the drafting of the Statute does not change this state of affairs in any way; while they did become involved during the various phases of the procedure, they did so only as representatives of the Generality which does not have any juridical existence prior to the promulgation of the Statute but only as an agency of the State since their collaboration is required by the Constitution. Contrary to the situation in federated states within the framework of a federation, the existence of the Generality of Catalonia means that its sphere of competence does not rest on the Constitution and that its institutional organization does not depend on it, itself; on the contrary, access of the Catalan Autonomous Community to legal activities, the extent of its sphere of activity, and its internal organization are based on a law of the Spanish state and the fact that Catalan representatives participated in the drafting of that law matters little in this case.

Nevertheless, one can no longer consider the Generality as a simple decentralized collectivity of a unitary state. It does as a matter of fact have the power to issue decrees in an initial fashion. Basically, a decentralized collectivity does not have legislative power but simple administrative power, that is to say, a

conditional normative power³¹. That is not the case with the Generality of Catalonia which, under the provisions of Articles 9 ff. of the Statute³² has the faculty of issuing decrees by way of initial action in domains within its exclusive competence.

In contrast to a decentralized collectivity, the Generality of Catalonia does not find itself in dealing with the Spanish state in a situation of total dependence since the Spanish state does not have legally unlimited power in dealing with autonomous communities. A decentralized collectivity as a matter of fact is totally subordinated to the State which "reserves itself rights of control over it which enables it to withdraw that which it has given"³³. Now, that is not the situation with the Generality of Catalonia. Once the Statute has been promulgated, the Spanish state can certainly amend its content but not in a discretionary fashion. A simple law passed by the Spanish Parliament as a matter of fact is powerless in suppressing or even limiting the normative competences of the autonomous community or amending its institutional organization. Under the provisions of Article 147, paragraph 3, of the Constitution, the reform of the autonomy statute must follow a procedure established by the Statute itself. Now, in its Article 57, this text establishes a very complex process, the proposition of reform, upon initiative of the Council of Government of the Generality, of the Catalan Parliament, or of the Cortes generales [General Parliament], and it must then be approved by the Parliament of Catalonia with a two-thirds majority, by means of an organic law of the Spanish Parliament, and finally through a referendum³⁴. Finally, in dealing with the Spanish state, the Generality finds itself in a situation identical to that of a federated state with respect to the federation. The autonomy it has cannot be reduced in a discretionary fashion; it can be limited under two assumptions: either with its own accord--which has just been established--or if the Spanish state should amend its constitution and decide to limit the domain of competences of the autonomous communities or even eliminate them. A case in point can also be found within the framework of a federation: "The federal state can, through successive revisions of its constitution, take even their character as a state away from the member states"³⁵. But the thing that further accentuates the resemblance is the fact that the constitutional revision can be implemented only with the support of the autonomous communities. Indeed, according to Article 176 of the Spanish Constitution, bills for the amendment of constitutional law must be approved by a three-fifths majority in each of the chambers, the congress of deputies and the senate which, being a territorial representation chamber, includes among its members the representatives of the autonomous communities³⁶.

How should one describe the Spanish solution to the problems of the regions? Confronted with a similar problem, the problem of describing the Generality of Catalonia, created by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution of 1931, Georges Burdeau, without hesitating, had concluded at the time as to the nonfederal character of the solutions adopted then. In spite of the fact that the Generality was granted the option of screening in an initial fashion, it did not seem possible to him to see a real federated state in that institution because of its nonparticipation in the formation of the will of the State³⁷ and likewise due to the absence of the power of imperium. The current facts of the problem are not the same as those of 1932 and the analysis of Georges Burdeau must be re-examined. As a matter of fact, while the Generality of Catalonia does not have a power of self-organization,

while its existence, its domain of competence, its internal organization are based on a law of the Spanish state, it does exercise real legislative power which is not subordinated and the Spanish state only has legally limited powers in dealing with that institution. Now, although it is not possible to consider the Generality to be a real federated state, it would be equally wrong to consider it as a simple decentralized collectivity. Now, half-way between complete autonomy and simple decentralization, the notion of "regionalism" seems more appropriate³⁸.

Institutional Organization of Generality

Under the provisions of Article 147, Paragraph 1, of the Constitution, the Autonomy Statute is the basic institutional norm for each autonomous community and by virtue of that fact must determine the agencies which will represent the Constitution, provide for their status, as well as their functions, and finally come up with the edict on the legal rules which will govern their relationships. However, the drafters of the Autonomy Statute had a rather limited leeway since Article 152 of the Constitution imposed a number of obligations upon them, in particular the obligation to set up an assembly system. In this respect, the analysis of the text shows that the wishes of the constituent [assembly, authority] were fulfilled undoubtedly beyond what it expected. Far from trying to attenuate the assembly system character, the editors of the Autonomy Statute emphasized it, as we shall see.

The Statute provides, if not in a complete then at least in a satisfactory manner, for the role of the parliament of Catalonia; it is much less explicit regarding the president and the executive council, postponing the determination of their roles to further laws.

Parliament, which has its seat in Barcelona, is elected for 4 years by universal direct and secret suffrage according to a proportional representation system under the terms of Article 30³⁹, the choice of the electoral system having furthermore been imposed by the Spanish Constitution.

According to Article 32 of the Statute, parliament is headed by a president, a bureau, and a "permanent deputation," a body charged with representing it outside regular sessions and, together with the president of parliament, having the right to call it into special session. Besides, provision is made for the establishment of permanent commissions [committees] (Article 31-2) as well as the formation of parliamentary groups (Article 31-3), while the Autonomy Statute leaves for internal regulation the determination of the methods of establishing and operating these bodies.

The autonomy text is much less explicit regarding the status of the president of the Generality and the Executive Council. In the case of the president, in its Article 36-1, it is content with picking up on this point a provision of Article 152 of the Constitution, indicating that the president is chosen by parliament from among its members and appointed by the king. It must be noted in this regard that--due to the procedure used for nomination--there is a link of hierarchical subordination between parliament and the president, to the detriment of the latter, who is obligatorily a member of parliament and whose nomination depends on his colleagues, with the king

in this regard having to back up the choice of parliament. As for the status of the executive council, the government organ as such, there are no provisions in the text, except that it is supposed to meet in Barcelona (Article 37-3). The rest, that is to say, the essential portion, would have to be determined by a law of parliament (Article 37-1).

The distribution of powers established by the Statute is handled in accordance with the principles of the assembly system: Parliament within itself concentrates the most important powers, while the president of the Generality and the council of government exercise executive power under parliamentary control.

Thus, under the terms of the Statute (Article 30-1), parliament represents the Catalan people in the same way as does the president of the Generality by the way (Article 36-2). This parliamentary representation function however was not always provided for in Article 152 of the Constitution which designated only the president of the autonomous community as its titular head. Undoubtedly, this must be interpreted as the desire on the part of the persons writing the Statute to put the president of the Generality and the Catalan parliament on a level of equality in this domain.

Article 30-1 of the Statute by the way gives parliament legislative, budget, and executive control power [power of control over the executive branch]. The domain of the competences of parliament was in no way limited by the Statute and parliament is the only holder of legislative power in matters of competences granted to the Generality. By virtue of Article 32 of the text however this power can be exercised by the different permanent parliamentary committees [commissions]. According to this article, as a matter of fact, "the permanent committee could draft and approve the laws," and the full assembly however can, during all stages of the procedure, make use of its right of discussion and vote. Thus, contrary to the solution which prevailed on the level of the central state, this power of the committees exists by virtue of a statutory provision and not on the basis of expressly granted delegation. Besides, legislative power, by way of application of Article 33-1, can be delegated to the Executive Council under the conditions provided for in articles 82, 83, and 84 of the Spanish Constitution. As for the power of control exerted over the executive branch, the Statute does not provide for the methods to be used. Falling back here on a provision of Article 152 of the Constitution, it is content with recalling that the president of the Generality and the executive council are responsible to parliament without spelling out in what way disagreement between the legislative and executive branches could be sanctioned.

Finally, the Autonomy Statute adds to the powers enumerated above and exerted obligatorily by parliament, by virtue of Article 152 of the Constitution, "a function of stimulating political and government activities." We will note in this regard that the drafters of the Statute seem to establish a distinction between properly political activities and government activities. Even though this distinction does not exactly reproduce the distinction made in the USSR between the power of the State and the administration of the State, the above-mentioned provision does grant parliament a preeminent political role. Stimulating political and governmental action, as far as parliament is concerned, boils down to spelling out, if not in detail, then at least in broad outlines, the policy for the community.

The president of the Generality and the council of government are responsible for executive functions. Under the provisions of Article 36-2 of the Statute, the president of the Generality "directs and coordinates the action of the executive council." The latter, for its part, exercises "executive and administrative functions." It does not seem however--upon analysis of the Statute--that the president of the Generality and the council of government must be content with a simple role of executors, implementing a policy in whose drafting they did not share. Article 32-6 of the Statute as a matter of fact gives the executive council the right of initiative in regard to the laws, just as it does to the deputies⁴⁰, which authorizes it, with the approval of parliament, to spell out community policy objectives. Nevertheless, the executive branch seems tightly subordinated to parliament: politically responsible to the latter, it does not on the other hand have any means of its own to restore the balance between the powers [branches], such as dissolution, and it can implement a policy only to the extent that its objectives and even its methods of application have been previously approved by parliament.

A powerful parliament, endowed with considerable power, including the power to issue decrees by way of initiation and to spell out community policy guidelines, in the face of which we have an executive branch which springs from it and is subjected to its control, an executive branch with limited attribution and subordinated functions--that is the institutional system established in Catalonia and, feature by feature, it corresponds to the definition of the assembly system, more precisely, the conventional [convention] system. The establishment of such a political system was desired by the Spanish constituent authority, demanding especially that the community executive branch be politically responsible to parliament. It was followed, even beyond that, by the authors of the Statute draft⁴¹. There are two reasons for this attitude: on the one hand, the left-wing organization of the assembly of Catalan members of parliament charged with drafting the Statute as such; on the other hand, the desire to limit as much as possible the political weight of future presidents of the Generality in order to prevent the renewal of what the Catalan political class has called "the Taradellas case." The latter, summoned by the king to head the provisionally restored generality, engaged in the authoritarian practice of power and thus kept the Catalan members of parliament away from the conduct of public affairs--which caused strong discontent.

The ability of such a political system to function properly depends on the existence of a stable and coherent majority capable of spelling out a political blueprint without ambiguity and sticking to it. The system of proportional representation and the crumbling of the Catalan political forces do not promote the materialization of this condition as witnessed by the results of the elections to the Catalan parliament which took place in March 1980⁴². The moderate Catalan nationalists of the democratic convergence (CIU [Convergent and Union]) certainly had won a big success by moving up from fourth position during the legislative elections of 1979 to first position; but the fact remains that this party is far from holding a majority. After Mr. Heribert Barrera (ERC [Republican Left of Catalonia]) was elected president of the Catalan parliament, long and difficult negotiations were started to put together a majority made up of the democratic convergence (CIU), centrists (CC-UCD [Centrists of Catalonia]), and the nationalist left (ERC). Mr. Jordi Pujol was elected president of the Generality on Thursday, 24 April 1980, during the second round of voting. At the head of composite majority, his task will be very difficult in a region where the left has a strong foothold on the labor union, association, and municipal levels.

We are therefore justified in asking ourselves whether the constitutional obligation imposed upon the drafters of the Autonomy Statutes--to set up an assembly system--was not in line with a political calculation: to prevent the functioning of the institutions of autonomy. In our opinion, this assumption is even more likely since the form of government imposed upon the autonomous communities is different from that which the constituent authority selected for the central state. On the institutional level properly speaking, the compromise between the center of the Catalan periphery thus appeared to be favorable to the central power. The existence of the Generality is certainly liable to satisfy Catalan national sentiment but the foreseeable difficulties of making this institution work are liable to counteract its role as in independent decision-making center and thus safeguard the political pre-eminence of the central state.

Functional Aspect

The determination of the domain of competences of the autonomous communities, in other words, the Generality of Catalonia, is not accomplished in a rigorous fashion by the Spanish Constitution which, in this sphere, leaves it up to the drafters of the Autonomy Statutes, within certain limits, to spell out the areas of legislative and regulatory activities of the region. The Catalan Statute in this respect grants the Generality an important area of competence but on the other hand the latter is subjected to tight control not only in jurisdictional terms but also in political terms and that control is exercised by the central government.

Important Field of Competences

While the drafters of the Statute were limited by the provisions of the Constitution regarding institutional organization of the Generality, they had great freedom of movement in determining the extent of the area of competences of the latter. Constitutional law does not confine the legislative power of the autonomous communities to specific matters. If it does not attribute the normative power of common law either to the State or to the regions, this is because it established a real system of distribution of powers whose content depends on the provisions of the various statutes. This freedom of action was utilized by the Catalan representatives since the Statute grants the Generality a field of exclusive competences which is very broad and which includes matters of essential political interest. However, the Catalan community, under the terms of the Constitution and the Statute, must also serve as executor of the legislative and regulatory provisions decreed by the Spanish State. This collaboration with the State, imposed upon the Generality or desired by it, does not give it an increase in power: Taking the chance of making it unpopular, it promotes--through the contacts which are established on this occasion--the integration of the Catalan community into the Spanish structure.

In the Spanish Constitution, the sharing of government powers between the State and the autonomous communities follows a variable system of distribution of powers, thus making possible "a la carte autonomy," according to the expression used by Guy Carcassonne.

Looking at legislative power, that is to say, the faculty to decree through initial action, the Spanish Constitution, in its Article 148, lists the competences which the

autonomous communities might possibly assume. However, this competence is only facultative: these collectivities "could assume competences" in the matters which it lists. We are dealing here with a simple possibility, not with a right since, for the State, the contrary solution prevails, because Article 149 specifies that "The State has exclusive competence in the following matters." Thus, the faculty of the autonomous communities to have the power to decree through initial action on the matters mentioned in Article 148 depends on the provisions of their respective statute which could attribute to the community the authority to govern normative power either over all matters listed by that Article or only over a portion of them and the silence of the text on one or the other point is taken as an attribution of competences to the State [Spanish Central Government]⁴³.

The list given in Article 148 moreover is not restrictive because Article 149-3 of the Constitution provides that "matters not expressly attributed to the State by this Constitution could revert to the autonomous communities by virtue of their respective status." In other words, the residual matters not provided for in Article 148 and not attributed to the State by Article 149 can be within community competence by virtue of a provision in their statute. Only the abstention of the Statute on this point constitutes the foundation for the competence of the State to legislate in this field⁴⁴.

Basically, the distribution of normative power thus instituted rules out any conflict of competence between the State and the autonomous communities and each of these collectivities exclusively has a different field of activity: here for example we have such matters as defense and the armed forces which are the subject of a regulation that is exclusively under the control of the State; or there is another case here--involving the organization of institutions of self-government--where we have a regulation of exclusively community origin. However, certain matters can be the subject of double regulation, by the government and by the community. Article 148-2 of the Constitution as a matter of fact authorizes the autonomous communities to "broaden their competences in the area of Article 149," that is to say, in the area of the competence of the State, after an interval of 5 years or immediately, depending upon the procedure used for their establishment. Does this mean the creation of an area of competing competences, like the situation prevailing in certain federal states?⁴⁵ In the absence of any jurisprudence from the Constitutional Court, the answer to that question can only be a graduated one due to contradictory constitutional provisions. Competition as a matter of fact presupposes that state and community norms regulate the same aspect of one issue and may thus in fact possibly be contradictory. That does not seem to be in line with the Spanish constitutional solutions⁴⁶. The system of distribution of normative power selected here seems to rule out the existence of areas of competing competences but does seem to recognize areas of complementary competences since the State and the autonomous communities cooperate in their normative activity to regulate a specific matter under their different aspects. When this is the case, the rules of state law and community law are complementary and thus basically not contradictory and should have equal value--a factor which leads to the dropping of the rule in force in certain federal states according to which the law of the Bund [West German Federal Government] prevails over that of the Laender [West German federal states] in matters of competing legislation. Now, this is the rule to which reference is made in Article 149-3 of the Constitution which provides that "The norms of the State prevail in case of conflict

over those of the autonomous communities in everything that is not attributed to the exclusive competence of the latter." Hence, the answer to the question we asked earlier—complementary or competitive competences—depends on the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, its strict or broad interpretation of Article 149-1 of the Constitution. In the first assumption, if it decides that the competences of the State, in a matter that is the subject of double regulation, are limited to the aspects listed by the Constitution, conflicts will be rare and government and community competences will really be complementary. On the other hand, if it permits the State, in shared matters, to regulate all legal aspects of the issue, the elements of a conflict of competences will then be here and the whole thing will be resolved to the benefit of the State collectivity by virtue of Article 149-3.

The State may furthermore delegate to the autonomous communities the power to issue decrees in matters which the Constitution attributes to it. Nevertheless, this transfer, contrary to the delegation of Article 150-1, must be allowed by an organic law; on the other hand it can involve only competences which by their nature are susceptible of such transfer.

Finally, the constitutional solutions in the matter of the execution of laws are similar to those adopted in connection with the legislative branch. Basically, thus, the execution of state laws is up to the State and the execution of community laws is up to the autonomous communities. Nevertheless, by virtue of Paragraph 2, Article 148, the Statutes of the autonomous communities could validly authorize them to execute the laws of the Spanish State. By execution we must mean, depending upon the case, either simple material execution of a legislative norm decreed by the State, whose methods of application were spelled out by government regulation (assumption of material execution) or the legislative complement and material execution of a law of the State (assumption of juridical execution). We note furthermore that, in the matter of material execution, the Constitution is silent on this point and the extent of the community competences depend on their statute.

The above subject development enabled us to become aware of the variety of possible solutions in the matter of distribution of normative between the State and the autonomous communities. The considerable freedom of movement available to the drafters of the Autonomy Statute—in the case of the Catalan Statute—worked out to the advantage of the Generality. This text spells out, to the benefit of the latter, a field of competences which is very broad and which must, on this point in any case, be considered as favorable to the autonomist theses. Far from reducing—as would have been possible—the field of activities of the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, the Statute gives the latter the integral nature of competences whose grant had been authorized by the Constitution. The intervention of representatives from the central state [government] in the drafting of the Statute, in this case, the constitutional committee of the Congress, did not result in limiting the field of activities of the Generality but in eliminating, from the Statute draft worked out by the Catalan representatives, the unconstitutional provisions. Pending the completion of this effort of legal clarification, the final statute—such as it is going to be drawn up—with minor exceptions reproduces the provisions of the Statute draft regarding the area of competences of the Generality and thus bears witness to the lineup of the central power on the positions defended by the Catalan autonomists.

Under the provisions of Article 25-2 of the Autonomy Statute, in the exercise of its exclusive competences, the Generality does have regulatory legislative power as well as power of material execution and control. In other words, this is how the matters exclusively reserved for the Catalan Autonomous Community basically completely escape control by the State which cannot intervene in these areas in any manner. However, the notion of exclusivity must be understood in two different ways, depending upon whether it deals with a subject matter covered by Article 148 or Article 149 of the Constitution⁴⁷. In the first case, the notion of exclusivity is defined with relation to the matter that is the subject of the regulation, such determined domain being the subject of legislation that is exclusively of community origin. In the second assumption--this involves areas of complementary competences--exclusivity can no longer be defined with respect to the subject to be regulated since the community normative activity is powerless by itself in regulating all aspects of an issue. Exclusivity thus does not relate to the matter which is the subject of a double regulation but rather to the content of the rule of law. In other words, exclusivity is sometimes material and sometimes functional.

Looking at matters reserved to the Generality by the Statute, we will note that, for the most part, they assume considerable administrative and even political importance. Thus, the Catalan Autonomous Community does have competence in the matter of territorial organization, justice, maintenance of public order, teaching the vernacular language, as well as different powers in social, cultural, and economic matters.

In the matter of administrative and territorial organization, the Statute grants the Catalan Autonomous Community competence for organizing its institutions of self-government, for establishing the rules of administrative procedure which derive from the particular aspects of Catalan law or the specific features of the organization of the autonomous community (Article 9, Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Statute), and finally [it grants authority] to regulate the territory of Catalonia through the creation of townships or regions (Article 5).

In the matter of justice, the Supreme Court--whose creation moreover was demanded by the Constitution--is competent under the terms of Article 20 of the Statute to rule, in civil cases when the dispute involves Catalan civil law, on all legal steps, including appeals and petitions for review, in criminal and social matters on all steps with the exception of the court of appeals, in the matter of administrative disputes on all steps directed against actions taken by the administration of the Generality within the framework of its exclusive domain of competence, involving administrative acts decreed by the State only in the first instance, and finally for resolving conflicts of competence between the relevant jurisdictions of the Generality, with the Supreme Court in turn having to resolve conflicts of competence between the courts of Catalonia and those of the rest of Spain.

In a related area, the area of public order, the Generality has competences which run parallel to those of the State in accordance with the provisions of Article 149-1, 29th, of the Constitution. Under the provisions of Article 13 of the Autonomy Statute, the Generality can create a community police for the purpose of protecting persons and property, surveillance, and protection of buildings belonging to the Generality and, finally, the maintenance of public order; the State reserves

itself competence regarding problems of an extra-community character such as, for example, border police, immigration, aliens, and extradition and expulsion systems⁴⁸. The above-mentioned article thus assigns to the Generality--in a provision identical by the way, to the one adopted in the Basque Statute--the job of seeing to the maintenance of public order. However, Article 14 of the Statute reserves the state's right to assume the functions basically turned over to the community police either on request of the Generality or on its own initiative when it believes that its interests are seriously threatened. In this case, approval is required from the security board, created by virtue of Article 13-7 of the Statute and made up equally of representatives of the State and the Generality. This board, by the way, will have competence to decree the status, regulations, structures, and makeup of the community police. We see thus that the exercise, by the Catalan Autonomous Community, of competences in the matter of public order and security is rigorously controlled by the State which--since the fight against terrorism is the job of the community police forces--can hope for a decline in such actions and in any case protects its own police services against attacks.

In cultural matters, the Generality has all competences which Article 148-1 of the Constitution allows to be attributed to the autonomous communities.

Article 15 of the Autonomy Statute recognizes "full competence" of the Generality in setting up and administering an education sector on all levels and in all special fields. However, this faculty, awarded in the matter of education, does not prevent the State from setting up its own education sector and it is precisely for this reason that the initial version of the Statute draft was not retained; it was undoubtedly deliberately ambiguous and seemed to give the Generality--to the exclusion of the State--only competence in the matter of education⁴⁹. There could thus coexist, in the field of education, two education sectors due to the competences exercised jointly by the State and the autonomous community.

Looking at the economic area, the Catalan Autonomous Community has important prerogatives. It is thus competent in the matter of territorial development, urban growth and housing, and public works which do not carry the legal qualification of general interest of the State or whose implementation does not affect another autonomous community.

To these numerous and in some cases important competences, which nevertheless do not enable us to define a real economic draft, the Statute, in its first version, had added a real power of managing the economy which permitted the Generality to determine an autonomous economic policy. Under the provisions of Article 12 of the Statute draft, the Generality had exclusive competence in the matter of planning economic activities in Catalonia, such as they involved industries, agriculture, and animal husbandry, domestic trade, and savings. The above-mentioned article certainly was contrary to the Constitution which reserves for the State the job of determining national economic policy (Article 149-1, 11th and 13th). This is why, in its final version, the Statute heavily reduced the prerogatives of the Generality in the matter of economic policy. The latter certainly, under the provisions of Article 12, can spell out a community economic project but it must do so within the foundations established in this field by the State⁵⁰. Talking of exclusive competence hereafter

as the same article does--undoubtedly for political reasons--constitutes abuse of language and is not in line with the definition of the exclusive term, established at the beginning of this paragraph. In this field, as a matter of fact, the norms issued by way of edict by the Generality are subordinated to those adopted by the State; the autonomous community does not have the power to decree by way of initial action and the competences exercised cannot be considered to be exclusive.

The exclusive competences, which we have just outlined rather incompletely, assume indisputable administrative and even political importance. However, the intervention of the Generality in these fields involving the maintenance of order and the economy does not prevent the central state from issuing an edict involving a regulation in the matter considered. This factor calls for strong collaboration by the central government and the autonomous communities and such a situation by the way also prevails, as we are going to see, in the matter of community execution of State laws.

Article 148-2 of the Constitution authorizes the autonomous communities--after an interval of 5 years or immediately, in the case of those created according to the special procedure--to complete and execute the laws passed [enacted] by the State. In this regard the Constitution does not limit community execution of state laws to certain specific matters; it merely indicates, without any limiting character, in what field such execution is possible. This means that the drafters of the Statute had every freedom in determining the fields of community execution.

We furthermore recall that execution by the Generality of the legislative norms of the State assumes two different aspects, depending upon the matter involved: under certain assumptions, the Catalan Autonomous Community must be content with material execution; it thus cannot complete, through regulations, the laws whose methods of application were decreed by the State itself. In other cases, community execution, in addition to material execution, includes the power to spell out, through subordinate norms, the manner of execution of the law. This distinction is fundamental and it was due to lack of knowledge [disregard] that it was rejected in the final version of Article 24 of the Statute draft which gave the Generality, in the exercise of all of its competences of execution, "the regulatory power and administration, including inspection."

The power of execution, strictly speaking, is provided for in Article 11 of the Autonomy Statute which by the way is somewhat behind with respect to the initial version. On that score, the intervention of the central power [government] in the drafting of the Statute--for nonjuridical but political reasons--led to a situation where the Generality was deprived of very important execution competences. Thus there disappeared from the final statute the execution of state legislation in commercial and criminal matters, in the matter of labor law, and finally the management of the State's public economic sector. On the other hand, the following were retained as main areas of competence: the execution of penitentiary legislation, of legislation in the matter of intellectual and industrial property, of weights and measures, of international fairs held in Catalonia, and finally the management of museums, archives, and libraries of the State⁵¹. Finally, the writers added competences of execution in the following matters: management of ports and airports of the State and of the railroad transportation service.

On the other hand, the field of competences of regulation execution was not reduced in the final statute as compared to the initial version. Under the provisions of Article 10 of this text, the Generality--"within the bounds of basic state legislation"--has responsibility for the legislative complement and execution of the following matters: legal system and system of responsibility of the administration of the Generality, as well as the civil service status system; system of expropriation, contracts, and administrative [local government] concessions; organization of credit, banks, and insurance companies; mining and energy systems; environmental protection; organization of coastal fishing. To its competences we can add those provided for in articles 16 and 17 of the Statute. The first of these articles gives the generality power to complete and execute state laws relative to the status of radio and television organizations and, generally, those governing the status of mass communications media, including the printed press. Paragraph 3 of that article furthermore authorizes the Generality to create and manage a television and radio service as well as its own press "in order to attain the objectives it has set for itself"⁵². As for Article 17 of the Statute, it authorizes the Generality to complete and execute the basic state legislation in the matter of health and pharmaceutical production. In the matter of social security, still on the basis of Article 17, the Catalan Autonomous Community may complete and execute the laws of the State, with the exception of those that deal with the financial system of that organization which it may nevertheless manage.

Considering the constitutional restrictions, the field of competences granted by the Statute to the Generality is the broadest possible as we can see from the above analysis. This text however cannot be considered a victory for the regionalist theses.

This is so first of all because of the fact that the current statute, to the benefit of the Generality, defines an area of competences which is much broader than the 1932 statute. The latter, as a matter of fact, gave the Generality no economic power at all and, compared to the current statute, limited the competences of the latter in cultural matters; finally it authorized the execution of state laws only in much less numerous cases. Next, this is due to the fact that the Statute draft, as an expression of Catalan autonomous aspirations, was not amended in its final version by the representatives of the central government except when it was contrary to the Constitution, which in some way evidences the fact that the State went along with the autonomist theses.

To be favorable to the autonomous undertaking, the system of normative power distribution instituted is not contrary to the interests of the Spanish state. On the one hand, community execution of state laws permits the latter--while retaining control over sectors where this execution is possible--to avoid the criticisms which its policy produces as the case may be. Community execution is thus susceptible of transforming the Generality into a screen between the citizens and the State with the Catalan Autonomous Community, as executor, being capable of being challenged or even discredited due to the fact of the institution of a policy draft [political undertaking] in whose determination it had no part⁵³.

Above all, the principle of community execution, as well as the existence of areas of complementary competences, are powerful incentives for the establishment of close collaboration between the Spanish State and the Generality. The system cannot really function harmoniously except to the extent that close contacts are established between the center and the periphery so as to arrive at agreement on state and community normative activities.

If the Spanish constituent experts, to resolve the regional problem, rejected the initial American solution, which one might refer to as "separate development," in order to adopt a solution similar to that of the FRG, this is because the existence of a field of shared competences promotes cooperation between the State and the autonomous communities, in other words, the integration of the regions into the national body. Cooperation between the center and the periphery thus, in the long run, can promote the creation of a "cooperative federalism," such as it exists in West Germany, that is to say, a political assembly which, although it may not be homogeneous, is nevertheless not disturbed by regionalist demands.

Control Exerted Over Generality

The various controls exerted by the State over the autonomous communities are provided for in the Constitution in articles 150, 153, and 154; in this respect, the Catalan Generality is not an exception to the rule; its statute does not provide for any controls other than those instituted by the above-mentioned articles. In conformity with the principles of federalism, the fundamental law sets up jurisdictional controls for the purpose of preventing any conflict of competence between the State and the autonomous communities and also for the purpose of making sure that the autonomous community, in the exercise of their normative power, will respect the hierarchically higher juridical provision. Nevertheless, this jurisdictional control does not rule out control of a political character which--although it is not in any way like power of absolute control--permits the central government to watch over community activities and keep them within certain limits.

Jurisdictional control over community normative activities pursues a double objective: first of all, its task is to ensure respect for the rules of distribution of normative power. This involves assessing the competence of an autonomous community to enact a certain juridical act in order to avoid any conflicts between state and community norms. In some way, this is a verification of the competence of the author of the challenged act. In second place, it is aimed at ensuring implementation--by the autonomous communities in their normative activities--of the rules issued through hierarchically higher norms. This is no longer control over the competence of the author of the measure but rather control over the accounting [coordination] between two juridical rules.

Conflicts of competence between the State and the autonomous communities, as a consequence of a misinterpretation of the rules of distribution of the normative power, under the provisions of Article 161-c of the Constitution, are examined by the Constitutional Court. The latter will thus have to rule on the constitutionality of community provisions having the force of law but also on the legality of regulatory provisions disregarding the rules relative to the distribution of normative power.

The general terms employed by the constituent authority in Article 161-2--"provisions and decisions adopted by the organs of the autonomous communities"--do not restrict the competence of the Constitutional Court to a mere examination of the conformity of the community laws with the Constitution but extend it to the regulatory power,

In this regard we will note that--assuming there is a conflict of competence--the Spanish State is placed in a favorable situation, more so than the situation it had within the framework of the 1931 Constitution. First of all, as a matter of fact, the Constitutional Court is exclusively made up of persons appointed by the king, upon nomination by the Congress, the Senate, the Government, and the General Council of the Judicial Branch. On the other hand, in 1931, the Court of Constitutional Guarantees, which exercised the same prerogatives as the Constitutional Court, among its members appointed by the Spanish State, included one representative of each of the regions of the State.

Moreover, Article 161-2 of the Constitution provides that a different kind of treatment be reserved for petitions addressed to the Constitutional Court, depending upon whether they come from the State or an autonomous community. The livery of seisin of the Constitutional Court by the State has the effect of suspending, for a period of 5 months, the application of the challenged community provision, be it legislative or regulatory. The legal move by the State thus has the effect of suspension and that is not true of the legal moves coming from the president or the legislative assembly of the autonomous community, in the absence of any constitutional provision along these lines. Thus the community organs can, before the constitutional judge, challenge legislative or regulatory norms of state origin which are not in conformity with the rules distributing normative power. But, to do so, they must address themselves to a state jurisdictional organ whose livery of seisin will not suspend the execution of decisions which they challenge.

Article 153 of the Constitution furthermore provides basic control to be ensured over the community provisions of a legislative character by the Constitutional Court, whereas administrative jurisdiction ensures control of legality regarding regulations issued by the autonomous community. The control provided for in Article 153 is not intended to prevent a conflict of competence between the State and an autonomous community; it is simply aimed at making sure that the community organs, in enacting laws or regulations, will abide by the hierarchically superior juridical norms. In this regard, a difficulty is liable to arise between the Supreme Court and the administrative jurisdictions regarding control over subordinate normative acts enacted by the autonomous communities in the exercise of their competences "of juridical execution." In this case, the autonomous community can "enact the legislative complement" of state norms provided it abides by them. Hence, the question comes up as to whether these norms--due to the fact of the constitutional terminology--can be considered as "normative provisions having the force of law" within the meaning of Article 153 or, due to their subordinate character, as provisions with a regulatory character. In other words, this involves a choice between the organic criterion, since this legislative complement is within the competence of the parliament of the autonomous community, or the material criterion, said provisions coming by way of complement of a law of the State which they must respect. From this choice will spring--regarding the examination of these rules--the competence of the Constitutional Court or the competence of the administrative jurisdictions.

In conclusion, we note that the administrative jurisdiction competent in judging the legality of community regulatory norms--like the Constitutional Court--can be persuaded to examine conflicts of competence between the State and the autonomous communities when a regulation is put before it which was enacted by the autonomous community in a field which is not within its competence. Nevertheless, the Spanish State has every interest in addressing itself to the Constitutional Court since the legal move will result in a suspension of 5 months, which is not the case in dealing with the administrative jurisdictions.

Article 150-3 of the Constitution, in a somewhat slightly different fashion, takes up again the rule established in Article 19-1 of the 1931 Spanish Constitution, which had been challenged in its time⁵⁴. It authorizes in effect "the State to enact laws establishing the principles necessary to harmonize the normative provisions of the autonomous communities even in the case of matters attributed to their competence, if the general interest so demands." We thus see that the imprecise character of the conditions for practical implementation permits the central state, under the cover of harmonization, to encroach upon the domain of the autonomous communities themselves. Nevertheless, there are two limitations to these possibilities of encroachment: On the one hand, the autonomous communities can, against a law of this type, raise the charge of unconstitutionality before the Supreme Court which, if it so desires, could spell out the conditions for the exercise of that power by strictly defining what the Constitution calls the demands of the general interest⁵⁵. Next, the vote on such a law supposes that each chamber will have adopted it by an absolute majority of its members. This constitutes an indirect, political guarantee since the Senate, which--under the terms of the Constitution, is the territorial representation chamber--has members equally representing the autonomous communities. Thus, the implementation of such a provision is presently more difficult than it was within the framework of the 1931 Spanish Constitution.

This political control with a parliamentary character is paralleled by governmental political control. According to Article 155 of the Constitution, "If an autonomous community does not comply with the obligations which the Constitution or the laws place upon it, or if it acts in a manner seriously harming the general interest of Spain, the government, after formally summoning [charging] the president of the community and, in case the summons is not followed, with the approval of the absolute majority of the Senate, could adopt the measures necessary to force it to discharge said obligations or so as to protect the above-mentioned general interest." Government control exercised under this provision seems much more dangerous than the one provided for to the benefit of the Spanish Parliament by Article 150-3. The conditions demanded for its implementation in effect are rather vague and imprecise: if the failure on the part of the autonomous community to discharge these constitutional or legal obligations corresponds to a precise juridical category, the situation is entirely different with the second branch of the alternative. It is difficult and even impossible a priori to specify what situations the Constitution is alluding to when it mentions the community activities that are susceptible of harming the general interest of Spain. Is the imprecision of the conditions of exercise itself liable to render discretionary the government's power of control over the autonomous communities? Undoubtedly not, because the use of such a power is subordinated to a condition with a very restrictive form: the approval of the absolute

majority of the Senate which, if it so desires, could bar the government from adopting measures of constraint toward an autonomous community when its own assessment of the general interest is different from that of the government. Nevertheless, when the government is justified in exercising this power, it does have, according to Article 155-2 of the Constitution, very effective means because "it can issue instructions to all authorities of the autonomous communities." This means that, in the case of such an assumption, the government of the State exercises real hierarchical power over the regional authorities.

We finally note that government control over the autonomous communities is possible when the latter benefit from a transfer of competences by virtue of the implementation of Article 150-2 of the Constitution. On the other hand, control over community normative activity regarding matters for which the region has received delegated authority by virtue of Article 150-1, is assured by the Cortes generales [Spanish Parliament]. In both of these assumptions, although control is strong, although it may be tantamount to real rule, the danger deriving from this fact and facing the autonomous communities is minor; what is involved here as a matter of fact is the supplement of autonomy given in a discretionary fashion by the State and not the content of the autonomy such as it emerges from the Statute.

The establishment of the Generalitat of Catalonia was designed to resolve the problem of territorial organization of the government--something which we know has poisoned the political climate in Spain for a long time. The success of this attempt is largely due to the success of the autonomous institutions, that is to say, the practical resolution of a certain number of problems arising throughout the long series of developments that came before.

First of all, it will be necessary to solve the problem of the exercise of power within the community instance so as to prevent any malfunctioning of the system. It will also be necessary to take up the issue of financial resources of the autonomous community; the establishment of a fiscal system of its own is possible under the terms of the Statute and there now remains the job of adopting an efficient system with a sufficient yield so as to permit the community to have the financial resources for its policy--otherwise, if it is forced to call upon the State for aid, it will be selling out a portion of its independence. Finally, it will be necessary strictly to spell out the respective field of state and community competences in the areas of shared competitions [as published; competences] so as to prevent any excesses in the direction toward centralization or decentralization.

It would thus be premature to make a judgment on the success of the attempt at reducing the antagonism between the Spanish State and Catalonia. However, beyond the uncertainties around the experiment undertaken here, we must above all keep in mind the change in the political climate which has been perceptible throughout the effort involved in setting up the autonomous institutions. The transformation of Spain's economic landscape has made a dialogue possible between the Spanish State and Catalan forces, whereas this sort of thing had never existed before. Although the experiment has not yet turned out successful, the conditions for success do really exist for the first time.

FOOTNOTES

31. Cf., Carre de Malberg, R, op. cit., p 185 ff.; G. Burdeau, "Traite de science politique" [Political Science Treatise], volume 2, p 364; "Federalism involves government activity, whereas decentralization concerns only the powers of administration."
32. Cf. paragraph 2.
33. Michoud, "Theorie de la personnalite morale " [Theory of Moral Personality], Paris, LGDJ, 1932, volume 1, p 301.
34. The procedure studied in the text is applicable only when the reform contemplated involves relations between the Generality and the State. When this is not the case, when the reform is content with retouching the institutional organization of the Generality, a more flexible procedure is then applicable.
35. Carre de Malberg (R.), op. cit., p 191.
36. Thus the autonomous communities as such participate in the formation of the will of the State, an element which certain authors consider to be one of the criteria of federalism; Benoit, F-P., "Le droit administratif francais," 1968, pp 122 ff.
37. We will note in this regard that the author's analysis seems to be contradictory since he says that he can find proof of the nonfederal character of Republican Spain in the fact that the regions did not participate in the formation of the will of the State, whereas he does not make this participation a condition of federalism.
38. The Italian example is often mentioned in connection with regionalism. Cf., Bibes, G., "Le systeme politique italien," Paris, PUF, 1974, pp 34 ff. The Spanish case seems much more characteristic to us regarding this middle way since the Italian regions are subjected to strict political control and do not in any way participate in the formation of the will of the central state. Cf., Lorenzoni, F., Merloni, F.: "The regions of Italy," ETUDES SUR LE REGIONALISME, publications of the Inter-University Center of Public Law, Brussels, 1973.
39. The ways of setting up such a system must furthermore be spelled out through a law passed by the Catalan parliament.
40. As well as other political bodies representative of the provinces and the people, under conditions to be spelled out by law (Article 32-6).
41. This hostility toward the executive branch is evidenced by the fact that the Autonomy Statute grants the use of regulatory power neither to the president of the Generality nor to the council of government.

42. Results of 22 March 1980 elections to the parliament of Catalonia (AVUI):
Convergencia i unio (CIU), nationalist left-center, leader: Jordi Pujol
Soley--43 deputies; Partit socialista catalan (PSC-PSOE), socialist, leader:
Joan Reventos i Carner--33 deputies; Partit socialista unificat de Catalunya
(PSUC) communist, leader: Josep Benet Morell--25 deputies; Centristes de
Catalunya (CCUCD), centrist, leader: Anton Canellas Balcells--18 deputies;
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), nationalist left, leader: Heribert
Barrera i Costa--14 deputies; Partido Andaluz (PSA), Andalusian Party, leader:
Francisco Hidalgo Gomez--2 deputies.
43. By virtue of Article 149-3: "Competence over matters which were not taken over
by the Statute shall be assumed by the State."
44. Article 148-2 imposes an interval of 5 years upon the autonomous communities,
starting from their creation, when it comes to demanding residual competences
through an amendment in their statute. However--and this is true of Catalonia--
this period of time is not required for communities created according to the
special procedure provided for in Article 151.
45. For example, in the FRG, where the sharing of legislative power between the
Federation and the Federal States is handled according to articles 71 and 72
of the Constitution relative to exclusive and concurrent [competing] legisla-
tion. Cf., Fischer, A., "German Federalism," ETUDES SUR LE REGIONALISME, op.
cit., pp 32 ff.
46. For example, in the matter of scientific research, as in other fields, Article
149-1, 15th, of the Constitution, gives the State the job of encouraging and
coordinating research. Now, a state regulation pursuing these objectives does
not regulate all legal aspects of the problem; that includes the administrative
organization of research centers, their financing, or the recruitment of per-
sonnel. These questions could then be settled through community regulations
if the Statute were to give the autonomous community which governs it a certain
competence in this field.
47. The Generality, created by virtue of the special procedure in Article 151, was
not forced to comply with the interval of 5 years in order to broaden its area
of competence to include certain matters covered by Article 149.
48. The main points in state competence are listed in Article 13-4 of the Statute
and the list given in the text is not restrictive.
49. Article 15 of the Statute draft had been worded as follows: "The Generality
must comply with the obligations which Article 27 of the Constitution gives to
the public powers, in particular, exclusive competence in the matter of educa-
tion on all levels."
50. *In accordance with the foundations and the set-up of the general economic ac-
tivity and monetary policy of the State."

51. Except if the State should decide to handle their management itself,
52. The Statute draft was less explicit and was satisfied with giving the Generality the power to complete and execute state laws relative to television, radio, and the press.
53. It is for example very significant that the final statute takes away from the Generality the execution of commercial or criminal legislation but lets it keep the execution of penitentiary legislation. The administration of the prison system is liable to present more inconveniences than advantages to the autonomous community, considering the problems of that sector at this time.
54. See Rossinyol, J., op, cit., p 616.
55. One cannot however prejudge the jurisprudence of this body which could also just as validly decide that the assessment by the Cortes generales of the requirements of the general interest is not susceptible to any jurisdictional control. See in this connection the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the FRG relating to the concurrent [competing] legislative power of the Federation and the Federal States. Thus, while the German Constitution demands that several conditions be met before the Federation can exercise legislative power in this field, the Supreme Court decided that the question of figuring out whether these conditions exist is subject to a discretionary decision of the federal legislative branch which is not subject to control. See Fischer, A., art. cit., p 33.

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PAPER BACKS ULLSTENS' CRITICISM OF USSR AT MADRID

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 14 Nov 80 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] In Madrid, where delegates to the follow-up meeting of the European Security Conference (ESK) are now staying without having any idea what tomorrow will bring, the Swedish foreign minister read the Soviet Union a lesson.

It is certainly nothing new to note how ruling Soviet circles persecute, humiliate and harass their subjects and even confine the most difficult ones to mental hospitals. But it may be the first time that the old gentlemen in the Kremlin were straightforwardly reminded of it, as in Ola Ullsten's address. There was a time when Swedish foreign ministers' addresses went to listeners' heads as quickly as flat mineral water. Ullsten should be commended for having changed that.

It was good that he did say it at the beginning of the conference because by the time all 35 nations make their opening statements it becomes unclear whether the conference will continue.

Whether Mr Ullsten's sharp criticism will have an effect is another story. In Moscow Leonid Brezhnev has already accused Western nations of having turned the Madrid conference into "a forum for cheap propaganda and demagoguery."

Indeed, the Swedish foreign minister followed the line which the Soviets feared the most at the Madrid conference.

Perhaps the Soviet leader found some consolation in the Swedish proposal to hold a disarmament conference under the direction of ESK where all disarmament alternatives can be discussed. The Swedish proposal was a compromise between similar proposals from the East and the West. However, since the Swedish proposal makes no reference to another major point in the Helsinki agreement--a reference which the Russians earlier considered to be an absolute condition--it should provide an opportunity to discuss disarmament without being bothered by what the Russians consider worrisome details, like human rights.

WALLENBERG: IMF WILL CONTROL NATION IN 4 YEARS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 8 Nov 80 p 27

[Article by Hasse Olsson]

[Text] "In 4 to 5 years Sweden will have to line up to borrow money from the International Monetary Fund, IMF. At that time IMF will carefully examine our economic policies and demand we take measures to restore our credit rating."

Marcus Wallenberg made that statement last Friday in Stockholm at the opening of the Innovation Symposium "Gulduggen," sponsored by VECKANS AFFARER and the Economic Business Council.

According to Wallenberg, Sweden has only 4 years in which to straighten its economy.

"If we continue to "borrow" money abroad at the same rate we have been, our foreign debt will be 240 billion kroner, i.e., 71,000 per household, by the middle of the 80's and 20 percent of what we manage to get in payment for our export will go to cover interest and amortization payments on foreign loans."

Blazing Appeal

Marcus Wallenberg's address to the audience, which consisted of executive directors and the Minister of Industry Nils G. Asling, became a blazing appeal to get Sweden back on its feet again.

"I have never seen Marcus Wallenberg so intense before," a listener who is close to Wallenberg told SVENSKA DAGBLADET afterward.

"Sweden is in the midst of reality," said Wallenberg, "faced with a unique challenge in modern times. And there is not much time to act."

Unfortunately, the trend is not particularly favorable.

Because of the cost-sensitive inflation (the 1973 krone is worth 55 ore today), we continue to lose export market shares, which in turn means we cannot fully utilize our industrial production capacity.

Paradoxically, we are plagued by over-consumption (which is covered by foreign loans) and under-production (factories operating at half capacity).

Since we are faced with an enormous debt, we must all be willing to forego things we can temporarily do without."

Economic Incitement

Marcus Wallenberg also punctured the myth that increased efforts in the area of research and development will improve the economy.

"Innovations and economic growth are least of all automatically stimulated by research and development. Innovation is solely dependent upon human efforts in terms of energy, diligent and creative work.

It needs economic incitement, which is not available. Is there any rhyme or reason in taxing income from everything, including lottery bonds, less than innovative rewards? Generosity in this area is important, costs very little and will be returned many times over. I am not exaggerating when I say that our tax system is outdated and despised by Swedish citizens.

And is it politically impossible to make natural and self-evident adjustments in the tax system?"

Small Business Stocks

In his speech, Minister of Industry Nils G. Asling agreed that the tax system encourages the wrongful use of money. He felt that the government's proposal to cut taxes on dividend income represented a desire to change the system.

He also revealed that the Department of Industry is considering new methods to encourage the purchase of small business stocks. He was particularly impressed with the American incentive, i.e. the Small Business Investment Act. He also said that the director of this small business fund in the United States, Milton Stuard, had been invited by the Department of Industry to talk about his experiences.

This year's Guldkugge stipend for the best innovation in 1980 was awarded to Erik Lavon, engineer at Atlas Copco, and Leif Lundblad, assistant director of Inter Innovation, Inc. Erik Lavon designed a water cannon which can break up the boulders that remain after blasting a mountain. The machine drills holes in the boulder and forces water into it with such a force that it breaks apart and can be carried away.

Leif Lundblad received the reward for a pocket calculator around which he quickly built an export industry with sales valued at 100 million kroner. At the meeting last Friday he announced that Inter Innovation, Inc. had received an order from Data-Saab in the amount of 20 million kroner that day.

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BOHMAN DISCUSSES ECONOMY, WAGE NEGOTIATIONS, PARTY

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 9 Nov 80 p VII

[Interview with Ola Gunnesson; date and place not given]

[Text] On 14 November 1970, almost 10 years ago, Gosta Bohman became the elected leader of the Conservative Party after a tough struggle for power. Behind Bohman stood a split party.

A decade later the outlook is considerably brighter from a conservative point of view. The 70's were very good years for the Conservatives, not least for Gosta Bohman personally.

The Conservative leader gives the reasons for that as well as the difficulties which the economic minister and the government are now wrestling with in an interview with Ola Gunnesson.

OG: What were your thoughts the moment you approached the podium in Farsta High School as a newly elected party leader?

GB: What I thought at the time was actually this: How can I handle this? In spite of what others may think, the fact is that I never wanted to become party leader, never dreamed it would ever be possible. I have too much of an inferiority complex for this position.

But I also have a strong competitive instinct. I compete with myself in life. I compete with myself all the time, take on more than I actually should.

During the summer of 1970 there were those who wanted to get rid of me. At the same time, many party members insisted I should definitely not leave politics. Some said I had to go, others said I had to stay and that awakened the competitive instinct in me: I am not just going to lie down; upon my word I will show them.

OG: You won and all went well, better than you ever expected?

GB: All went well and I would like to say that one of the more important reasons for it was that the election committee held together through thick and thin. Even when the going was rough, the solidarity between Staffan (Burenstam Linder), Eric (Kronmark) and myself was 105 percent. That also helped us overcome problems along the way.

Policies Must Be Consistent

OG: That is one explanation. There must be others.

GB: I have always said, and still do, that you must be consistent in your policies. After the debacle involving Svard and Hjalmarson in the beginning of the 60's, the Conservative Party gave the impression it was changing its course considerably. That led to an important loss of trust and many votes as well.

A party must pursue the same policies in good times and bad. It is interesting to note that when I became party leader the opinion polls showed us to have 9.5 percent of the votes and we continued to stay at that low level until the fateful Christmas when Palme stated his position on Vietnam. There was great pressure on us to sign a unilateral condemnation of the United States. Many Conservatives yielded. We were in the country and our telephone never stopped ringing at night. Christina Jutter Strom came out in a helicopter and interviewed me in the wind.

We said we could not support a unilateral condemnation. If there was to be any branding, both sides should be branded.

We stood firm and refused to give in. That caused the figures to change.

I am not saying that was the only reason, just emphasizing that the figures began to change at that time. I also believe we have tried to pursue consistent, down-to-earth and realistic policies since then.

That Fueled Conservative Movement

We have studied what has been happening in the Swedish community. We know the feelings of the Swedish worker and the civil servant when it does not pay him to work harder and when his children do poorly in school because the school is inadequate. We came up with the idea of the new insecurity and the new individualism. Bertil of Ugglas deserves much of the credit for that idea--the upper class urchin who was indeed able to analyze the trend in Sweden.

That fueled the Conservative movement, earlier than in other countries. Palme scorned me; I became his principle opponent.

OG: According to Sifo, the Conservatives now have the support of almost 25 percent of the voters and Gosta Bohman has optimum support. Is that correct?

GB: That we have not achieved. We can go much, much further. The old class society is gone; we have had a class reform. It has meant a great deal to us. When I first became party leader, I was indeed considered upper class. That is no longer true.

Sleeps Poorly at Night

OG: Is Gosta Bohman satisfied with his honor and fame?

GB: Seriously speaking, I am always dissatisfied. I am happy when I can fight for something, but I sleep poorly at night because I always see problems ahead of me.

I am a pessimist by nature, have tendencies toward Tegner's hypochondria and am always uneasy--till I find myself in the middle of a struggle. If I then succeed, I am obviously pleased.

OG: Your advice to your successor!

GB: Be consistent and high-principled; take stock of the situation. One should stick to one's principles. You may deviate from them if you know you are doing it. You should recognize that in order to deal with one problem or another you might need to compromise and abandon a principle. You cannot deceive yourself; you must be truthful. This is a dilemma for the parties in a coalition government. You cannot always have everything you want. But, basically, you need to be high-principled.

Same Old Bureaucracy?

OG: New and higher taxes, more regulations and restrictions, the same old bureaucracy, only a little bigger. This is how many feel after 4 years of a nonsocialist government. What goals have you actually realized?

GB: When you try to evaluate what we have done, let us first look at existing monopolies and what has been done to encourage free competition.

Today you no longer need a building permit to construct an outbuilding on your property or add a porch. You have to report such construction, but you do not have to apply for a special building permit. This is an important simplification.

And take our census form, compared with the last one! That was a four tightly-written-page form you had to fill out. This year's housing census only required that you fill in a few items.

No, it is absolutely untrue that we have made life more complicated for Swedish citizens!

OG: One often hears that the government lacks a long-term strategy. What offensive elements are there in your policies? What are you doing to encourage a nation which seems to be very depressed and has no hope for the future?

GB: When we began to deal with the acute economic crisis in 1976, the Department of Economy outlines a four-phased strategy. According to that strategy, we would cut government costs little by little, restore competition, increase productivity, regain market shares and further increase productivity.

That strategy held until the first three-party government collapsed in the fall of 1978. We had cut inflation in half, showed a trade balance surplus and a gain in production for the first time since 1974. All that in spite of slow investments.

Revengeful Parties

Then we ask ourselves what happened when we cannot know what the Social Democrats would have done had they been in power. Secondly, you must be aware the economic problems were far more severe than anybody could imagine when we came to power.

We raised the capital gains tax in 1977; that was necessary to survive the devaluation. We are raising the capital gains tax again this year; the reason this time is costly wage agreements. The tax quota has remained the same for the last 3 years. It would have been lower had municipalities not raised taxes when state taxes were reduced. And now the tax quota will go up, thanks to the costly wage agreements.

There have been no other tax increases, except for inflation adjustments on wine, liquor and energy etc.

You should not forget that we said "no" to a multitude of social democratic tax-increase proposals and that we introduced tax indexing. If we had not done that, taxes would have risen by 7.5 billion kroner. Had the Social Democrats had their way, we would exact 30 billion more in taxes than we do today, i.e. 7,500 kroner more from each taxpayer. We also set the tax ceiling at 80-85 percent. These things are all part of the picture.

OG: But you are still regulating at an undiminished rate.

GB: I assure you we have systematically worked to reduce the bureaucracy in Sweden. In my own department, for example, we have taken advantage of every opportunity to simplify things. A proposal has been submitted to eliminate the control of banks. However, it is true that due to budget deficits and loans we have had to strictly regulate credit.

Abolishing Monopolies

Another element in three-party-government policies has been to abolish monopolies. We abolished the Swedair monopoly, the PK-Bank Monopoly and we are planning to terminate the SJ Travel Bureau monopoly and the Liber monopoly. We will also abolish 20 fourth-phase monopolies. The fourth-phase strategy calls for a tightening of the economy to avoid inflation when economic conditions improve. We have followed that strategy.

Then the government collapsed and what happened then? A small minority People's Party government took over. There was already a revengeful party in Parliament; now there were two more. The government did not have the power to tighten the screws. Parliament raised its bid: in 2 months the budget deficit grew by 6 billion kroner. And, even more importantly, there was another hike in oil prices. The budget deficit now became 15 billion. Our balance of trade deteriorated drastically.

OG: You are saying you had a strategy for solving the acute crisis which was not fully realized. What is the present long-term strategy?

GB: We now have a strategy to end the structural economic crisis, which includes a budget deficit of 50 billion kroner in round figures and a trade deficit which is too big and still growing.

These matters are interdependent and an expression of the fact that we Swedes consume too much in proportion to our production capacity. We have had to fill the

void with imported goods. The public sector is too big, which means we do not have sufficient resources for investment and increased production.

Ambitious Goals

What we need to do now is to reduce the state spending rate to below zero. We must slow down the rate of municipal expansion and that work has already begun. Our goals are unprecedentedly ambitious and can only be met by courage and political power. I would like to see Social Democrats get behind measures of this kind.

We must also improve our productive capacity--not just to be able to export more; that is very difficult when economic conditions are deteriorating abroad. It is equally important for Swedish industries to be able to compete with foreign industries here at home.

That means stimulating small and medium-sized enterprises in particular and, if that goes well, we must do something about the immobility within the labor market. We must look beyond MBL-legislation and Aman's laws to create flexibility. We must eliminate the destructive elements in our tax system, elements that more and more encourage people to work on the side or not to work at all.

Totally Ridiculed

OG: Are these Gosta Bohman's policies or the government's?

GB: These are government policies, but I would like to say it is easier for the Conservative Party than it would be for center parties to stand for such policies. Year after year we have warned what would happen as a result of growing government spending and excess consumption. We did warn, but were totally ridiculed.

Now, of course, Social Democrats want to create friction between the governing parties. The center parties are sensitive to criticism of their moderate policies. It hurts considerably when they say my policies have been victorious.

But let me emphasize that our policies are government policies and even Thorbjorn Falldin guarantees their fulfillment. It does take time, but we shall do it.

OG: You can hardly deny that the center parties are now being pushed hard.

GB: No, but as I said earlier, we are not going to lose thanks to tighter measures because we have all along warned of what would happen. Center parties have a harder time explaining to their voters that policies must be changed. The People's Party, for example, has long been very optimistic about developing the public sector.

Block Against Conservatives?

OG: There are those who say that the center parties, out of pure self-preservation, must form some kind of block within the government against the Conservatives.

GB: I do not believe that at all. There are just as many differences between the center parties themselves as there are between us and either of them in the government.

OG: How does the purely technical cooperation within the government work? A couple of weeks ago I met the director of a big government department who said the entire administrative process had slowed down under the nonsocialist governments. No one knows who takes care of what. It is difficult to get the right answers. Decisions drag out indefinitely.

GB: Let us turn the question around. It is very possible that a director general could have called Gunnar Strang when he was in power to ask for money for a project and immediately have gotten the answer: "By all means!"

We do not use such methods today. Before any promise can be made today, it must have joint government approval. Times are not such that one can pursue a policy of promises. Everyone is required to show that something is absolutely necessary before the request is granted.

I personally pressure my director generals, pressure them till it hurts. It is obvious they do not like it very much; it is easier to let things flow freely.

Contempt For Politicians

OG: Based on a number of inquiries, the contempt for politicians is growing. Politicians' answers only sharpen the confrontation. Angry words in Parliament, angry words from other rostrums at a time when many see the need for national solidarity and broad political solutions across block borders.

GB: First of all, I do not believe that those who talk about contempt for politicians fully understand what they mean by that.

I meet a lot of people, but I have never met with any contempt. Never. I think the explanation of the so-called contempt for politicians is this:

The public sector has grown tremendously in the last few decades and has more relieved people of personal responsibility. Within families, businesses etc. it has become the rule to call Society when problems arise. When something goes wrong within an industry, it turns to Society--Asling must come and straighten out the problem.

But, in the end, Society cannot handle all the problems and when Society fails, we find growing criticism of it and those who are ultimately responsible, the politicians.

Hence the confrontation, angry words and squabbles. I do not believe people approve of such conduct in Parliament, but my guess is that such confrontation is a result of the kind of dissatisfaction I just described.

When something goes wrong in Garphyttan, Kalmar or in Landskrona, we get growing dissatisfaction with politicians and the voters then demand of their own politicians that they confront their political opponents.

Go After "That Palme"

I have noticed that our people demand we go after "that Palme." I can well imagine that those who voted for Palme come to him and say: "Wring Bohman's neck."

I believe there is a logical connection between politicians' growing sphere, dissatisfaction that politicians cannot solve all problems and the contempt for politicians. In other words, people can demand we fight each other while at the same time complain we are being noisy when we ought to stand together to solve problems.

The real qualifications for solving our problems in harmony is first of all that we agree what the problems are, secondly that we can largely agree on how they should be solved. Without this qualification, it is impossible to reach broad solutions.

Then you can discuss whether the disagreement is due to intellectual differences or the need for confrontation on behalf of a party that wishes to regain power. I personally believe the latter is an explanation. Social Democrats have not yet accepted the fact they lost power in 1976 and the disappointment became unprecedented when they lost again in 1979.

Chance to Win Next Election?

OG: Does the Falldin government have a chance to win the next election?

GB: It does. However, if we are not afraid, if we dare explain to the people it is we who are protecting the economy and pensioners while the Social Democrats are engaged in obstruction politics and if we can show signs of progress with respect to our reorganizational policy--our chances of winning the election are good.

For this reason I look forward to the 1982 election with some satisfaction--if I can only stay healthy. What a wonderful time we will have meeting the public and giving an account of all the things we have done!

OG: Seriously, have you decided to stay on as party leader or will you depart next year?

GB: I have made the decision--but I am not saying which.

8952

CSO: 3109

INDUSTRY COUNCIL URGES INCREASED COOPERATION WITH EC

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 8 Nov 80 p 27

[Article by Anders Nilsson]

[Text] We have to solve Sweden's economic crisis now and industry will have to put the country back on its feet again economically.

Using these ideas as a basis, the Industry Council yesterday submitted its plan to balance Sweden's economy. Their ideas were summarized in a 12-point program, which was sent to the five party leaders last Friday. The program is in part a summary of the council's earlier recommendation.

The foreign debt can be reduced through measures such as lowering marginal taxes, developing 25 percent more water power, expanding our cooperation with EC and by limiting the public sector as well as reducing crisis aid.

"If the government accepts the proposal in its entirety, I believe Sweden's balance-of-payment can be balanced in 4 to 5 years," said Nils Landqvist, Industry Council chairman.

"We must be positive and try not to solve the crisis by making cuts in the public sector alone. The important thing is to get industry back on its feet again so we can export more and also regain domestic market shares. Things must be turned around quickly. Sweden will not be able to borrow money abroad for any length of time."

Profitable Enterprises

"New job opportunities--at least 150,000 new jobs--must be created within industry between now and 1985. This must be done by profitable enterprises that do not expect to be subsidized by the taxpayer," wrote the Industry Council.

Industrial aid to crisis-stricken enterprises must be stopped. Competition has become distorted and international relations upset. Any aid that makes structural changes socially acceptable should be abolished, according to guidelines established by OECD.

Oil payments can be reduced by developing 25 percent more water power. Coal can also be used to replace oil.

Limited Assistance

The Industry Council supports the request to abolish double taxation of stock dividends. Capital and inheritance taxes can also be reduced to stimulate small and medium-sized enterprises. Other taxes that should be reduced include the tax on production factors. The energy tax can be included in the VAT. The should be abolished.

It is recommended we expand and intensify our cooperation with EC. However, the council does not urge full membership.

Environmental regulations should be enforced in accordance with the economy of the individual business. Foreign aid should play a greater role in promoting Swedish goods and services. Swedish policy would thus correspond to the normal practice among other nations that provide foreign aid, according to the Industry Council.

"A radical reduction in marginal taxes--50 percent with respect to most of them and up to 70 percent--should provide increased tax revenues long term," said Nils Landqvist.

Price controls should be abolished and foreign-owned enterprises should be treated the same as Swedish businesses, according to the Industry Council.

8952

CSO: 3109

KARAKAS WANTED AS ERBAKAN DEFENSE WITNESS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 12 Nov 80 pp 1,5

[Text] Ankara--ANKA--Ismail Alptekin, lawyer for NSP [National Salvation Party] Chairman General Necmettin Erbakan, has applied to the Ankara attorney general requesting that former assembly chairman Cahit Karakas be called as a defense witness regarding the letter sent from Germany by former Diyarbakir deputy Halit Kahraman, who is under arrest for smuggling heroin.

Kahraman, who is being held in a prison in Dieburg, sent a letter to Karakas a while ago, and, in statements regarding the heroin-smuggling incident, brought up the names of Erbakan and former Mardin deputy Fehim Adak.

The petition to the attorney general transmitted by Erbakan's attorney Alptekin asked that the letter sent by Kahraman from Germany be examined. Alptekin had this to say on the subject:

"We would like the original letter sent by Kahraman from Germany to be presented and examined. For this reason, we requested that, as is necessary in order to reveal the statements made in the letter and to clarify the incident, the attorney general hear former assembly chairman Karakas as a defense witness.

Erbakan's Travel Itinerary

Erbakan's attorney Alptekin stated that it has been determined that Erbakan was out of Ankara on the dates noted in statements that are vital to Kahraman's conviction and added that Erbakan's travel itinerary has been submitted to the attorney general. He gave this information:

"We have determined that Erbakan was not in Ankara on the dates given in the initial statements that were accepted as the basis for the trial of Kahraman on charges of heroin smuggling. For this reason, we submitted, with our petition, Erbakan's travel itinerary, which shows that he was outside Ankara on the date the incident took place."

11673

CSO: 4907

TWPP, NAP MEMBERS SOUGHT BY AUTHORITIES

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 13 Nov 80 pp 1,15

[Text] Ankara--As a result of investigations conducted by the Ankara Martial Law Commandant military prosecutor's office, warrants have been issued for the arrest of 42 TWPP [Turkish Worker-Peasant Party] officials, and the number of NAP [National Action Party] members being sought on various charges has risen to 89. In the meantime, it was learned that TWPP Chairman General Dogu Perincek, who is among those being sought, is in America.

In a statement made by the military prosecutor's office, it was announced that six pistols, five bombs, and various documents were confiscated during a search of NAP general headquarters. It was also reported that, in a search of TWPP general headquarters, posters of Mao and Stalin that were not printed in Turkey, activist guidebooks, seals belonging to various schools, and placards entitled, "We Will Demand an Accounting from Counter-guerrillas," were seized.

According to the statement made by the Ankara Martial Law Commandant military prosecutor's office, as a result of an investigation of the NAP and its affiliate organizations, a decision was made to issue warrants for the arrest of a total of 89 persons who are suspects in various incidents involving murder, robbery, bombing, and injury. A decision had previously been made to issue warrants for the arrest of 33 of these suspects. The statement also reported that a total of 91 persons belonging to the NAP and its affiliate organizations have been arrested to date for similar crimes.

The military prosecutor's office noted that its operations were initiated because of the documents that came into its possession and that the identities of the perpetrators, who had been unknown to this point, of a large number of murder, injury, bombing, and shooting incidents came to light through these operations. It announced that operations conducted at NAP general headquarters and at affiliate organizations turned up a total of 83 revolvers, 3 machine guns, 2,400 bullets, 32 sticks of dynamite, 3 bombs, 3.5 kilograms of TNT explosives, 100 primers, 24 gun barrels, 865 grams of gunpowder for a 105 mm cannon, 880 grams of explosive material

termed "Tertil," and 4.13 kilograms of TNT-D material used for the construction of revolvers.

In the statement, it was reported that the 91 suspects that have been arrested had committed the crimes of aiding in activities that led to armed rebellion, of resolving to engage in mass murder, of obtaining material resources and arms, and of taking part in massacres.

The statement made by the military prosecutor's office listed the crimes perpetrated by the persons who have been arrested and those whose arrests are sought. They are:

"The murder of Serpil Damaslan on 1 July 1979 in Kayas; of lycee director Rifat Sungur Tekin on 15 December 1979 in Kirikkale; of Zeki Meyanci on 21 March 1980 in the district of Abidinpasa; of Sedat Uslu on 4 April 1980 in Abidinpasa; of Ibrahim Zengin and Mustafa Ozturk on 15 June 1980 in Kayas; of Ferit Sazlik and Mehmet Baykara on 8 July 1980 in Abidinpasa; of Ibrahim Sahin and Sultan Kandas on 5 August 1980 in Abidinpasa; of Sedef Yildirim on 20 August 1980 in Turkozu; of Vural Arikaya on 20 August 1980 in Abidinpasa; and of Idealist Club supporter Sabri Yigit (by error in the darkness of the night) on 7 September 1980 in Kartaltepe.

"The wounding of Nadir Sazak, Bayram Topcu, Erdal Dogru, Hasan Sahin, Umit Dagtan, Mehmet Kaya, Binnaz Cagiran, Hayri Can, and Ali Keskici on various dates.

"Firing on two military teams; strafing with bullets the police station in Kirikkale; robbing a jeweler in Kirikkale; bombing the Barbaros Sports Club in Abidinpasa; bombing nine houses in Turkozu; bombing Maden-Is [Turkish Mine, Metal, Metal Works, and Machine Industry Workers Union], TOB-DER [Turkish Teachers' Unity and Solidarity Organization], and four clubrooms of the Socialist Youth Union in Kirikkale; ransacking 25 homes in the districts of Kayas, Kostence, Tepecik, and Topkaya; strafing with bullets three homes in Kirikkale and eight homes and public reading rooms in Kartaltepe; and taking part in seven different clashes."

In the statement made by the military prosecutor's office, it was announced that the persons who were arrested and those who have warrants out for their arrest are members of the NAP, UYD [expansion unknown], UGD [expansion unknown], and UGOD [expansion unknown]. It was also reported that Celik-Is [Steel Workers Union] Director General Riza Huftuoglu, who gave these persons material support, and Ahmet Yalal, director of accounting for the same union, have been arrested.

Those Sought

Those from the NAP and its affiliate organizations whose arrests are wanted by the military prosecutor's office are:

'Dogan Ataman, Mehmet Alinok, Coskun Akyildiz, Oner Arslan, Hamdi Ayaz, Hasim Akten, Lokman Abbasoglu, Abdullah Ayal, Erdogan Aktas, Numan Akkanat, Sahsever Bektas, Naci Bostanci, Sami Bal, Saffet Bestepe, Ahmet Bilgin, Veysi Baskan, Alparslan Bayir, Ibrahim Cakir, Basri Coskun, Fatma Colakci, Sitki Cortoglu, Seikar Cetin, Abdullah Capli, Perdag Celebi, Serafettin Dogan, Salim Dilek, Hakki Duran, Yilmaz Durak, Mustafa Deryal, Hacı Duran, Mehmet Gulu, Behcet Kemal Gursoy, Mehmet Goktolga, Ahmet Guzel, Sevki Goz, Nuri Gedik, Sanin Hasgul, Berker Inanoglu, Turan Komek, Necmettin Karakus, Oner Kumbag, Aydemir Karabatak, Burhan Kavuncu, Suleyman Kil, Nail Kocabag, Abdullah Kilic, Suleyman Kocel, Ahmet Karabacak, Sevki Koksai, Ozcan Kilic, Ismet Mirzaoglu, Selim Misirlioglu, Cengiz Ocal, Nermin Ozturk, Turken Onur, Ramiz Ongun, Ali Ozguven, Mustafa Ozturk, Omer Olmez, Fahrettin Piyade, Mehmet Sakarya, Haluk Sagkaya, Selahattin Sahinkaya, Necdet Sendil, Lutfu Sahsuvaroglu, Muzaffer Senduran, Mehmet Sandir, Hakki Safakses, Ahmet Sari, Bekir Soner, Ali Riza Saygin, Ertugrul Tras, Huseyin Turel, Ahmet Turgut, Mumtaz Turkolu, Ibrahim Turedi, Nurettin Taser, Hikmet Taylan, Yusuf Tasci, Nurettin Tasar, Ali Uzunirmak, Sencay Varli, Osman Yurt, Yasar Yildirim, Ahmet Yildiz, Muhsin Yazicioglu, Mehmet Yildiz, and Kadir Yanik."

The military prosecutor's office announcement reported that its operations proved the validity of the documents seized along with six guns and five bombs at NAP general headquarters on 12 September and that the investigation being conducted by the martial law administration military prosecutor and five assistant prosecutors is continuing.

TWPP

The Ankara Martial Law Administration Commandant military prosecutor's office initiated an investigation of the TWPP with the explanation that "it set up a secret society aimed at overthrowing the basic social order and establishing domination of one social class over other social classes" and issued warrants for the arrest of 42 TWPP officials, among these Chairman General Perincek. Of the 42, Bedri Gultekin has been arrested. The remaining 41 are being sought.

The statement made by the Ankara Martial Law Administration military prosecutor's office said:

"The search of TWPP general headquarters revealed that it is a counter-guerrilla organization. Placards entitled, 'We Will Demand an Accounting from Counter-guerrillas,' documents, posters of Mao and Stalin that were not printed in Turkey, activist handbooks, and seals from several schools were confiscated.

"The activist handbooks noted that socialism is the goal of the TWPP. The documents that were found during the search asserted that the TWPP will achieve a national democratic revolution that will obliterate imperialism, social imperialism, and feudalism in order to reach this goal. The TWPP

will serve as leader in the establishment of socialism, which will continue revolution under a proletariat government based on the alliance of workers and villagers. Furthermore, the documents stated, the land of large landholders and farming landlords will be seized without indemnification, and all revenues from farm landlords will be taken from them. In this way, evidence was obtained that TWPP administrators set up a secret society aimed at overthrowing the basic social order and establishing domination of one social class over other social classes. An investigation of this party was begun by the prosecutor, and warrants were issued for the arrest of 42 TWPP members."

Warrants

With the arrest of Gultekin, 41 TWPP administrators are being sought by the decision of the military prosecutor's office. They are:

"Perincek, Durmus Uyanik, Halim Spatar, Gun Zileli, Oral Calislar, Kemal Camkiran, Huseyin Karanlik, Hasan Yalcin, Yasar Karadag, Haydar Gungor, Hasan San, Huseyin Bulbul, Gurhan Erturk, Mehmet Cengiz, Ramazan Turan, Sahin Comez, Oktay Kutlu, Ilkay Demir, Riza Buke, Isik Soner, Ferit Ilsever, Lokman Orgun, Ahmet Ege, Nezih Artan, Mehmet Yucel, Asim Yazici, Mustafa Ovacik, Cezmi Kenan Arkis, Yusuf Sarioglu, Kamil Saydam, Erdogan Yemenici, Kabil Konyali, Inci Ataberk, Fuat Terzi, Israfil Tekin, Fikret Yalcinkayalar, Mustafa Karayonlu, Hasan Bayik, Ali Riza Sari, Fatma Bursali, and Ahmet Sencan."

It has been reported that the martial law administration military prosecutor and two assistant prosecutors are continuing the investigation of the TWPP members in conjunction with the investigation initiated by the military prosecutor's office under Article 141 of the Turkish Penal Code. In the meantime, it was learned that stamps seized at party headquarters belong to the primary school from the village of Sillice in Vakfikebir district.

11673
CSO: 4907

PASSPORT LAW CHANGES SUBMITTED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 16 Nov 80 pp 1,12

[Text of bill proposing amendments to the passport law]

[Text] Ankara--Changes in the passport law to regulate exits from the country for the purpose of protecting Turkey's integrity abroad and of thwarting efforts underway outside the country that aim to harm the Republic of Turkey have been made and submitted to the prime minister's office. One section of the bill drafted by undersecretaries from five ministries proposes "administrative measures" while the other proposes "legal regulations." Among the amendments of the passport law is one giving martial law commanders broad powers to regulate passports.

The draft proposal includes statutes to prohibit giving permission to leave the country to those who are charged with taking part in actions noted in the Turkish Penal Code as being crimes against state forces and against the moral character of the state.

If the changes become law, passports will not be issued to those who violate Articles 141, 142, 149, and 163 of the Turkish Penal Code in particular and who, therefore, are under investigation.

When martial law is declared, entries to and exits from the country will be allowed only upon receipt of permission from martial law administration commanders. Martial law administration officials will be able to prohibit from leaving the country those against whom evidence has been found concerning their participation in various incidents.

In addition, the Ministry of Interior is given new powers regulating the issuance of passports. It is proposed that governors not issue passports to persons against whom there is strong evidence that they have been involved in activities against the state.

It is being asserted that acceptance of the amendments sought by this draft bill will result in reversals of several European nations' decisions to require visas.

The text of the bill, which seeks to have "all passports issued in Ankara" and which was prepared by five ministry undersecretaries, reads as follows:

Administrative Measures

1. In cases where the courts have prescribed restrictions for various reasons regarding various individuals, it will be ensured by the Ministry of Justice that the local security officials are notified of this immediately.

2. Under Article 7 of Passport Law No 5682, persons attached to the military cannot leave the country. For this reason, it is necessary to inform local police organizations through a list of the names and descriptions of those who have not fulfilled their military obligation and to notify border stations of the situation so that they can impose the restrictions.

It will be ensured by the Ministry of National Defense that the Fundamental Office take the necessary measures toward this end.

3. It will be ensured by the Ministry of Interior that these communiques sent to police organizations be forwarded to border crossings immediately.

4. So that the names of persons on which restrictions must be placed because of delinquent taxes that exceed 25,000 liras will reach police officials in time, the necessary notice shall be sent to the provincial organization by the Ministry of Finance.

5. According to Article 22 of Law No 5682, in order to issue a passport to one who claims to have sufficient reason and means to live abroad, presentation of the following documents will be demanded:

A. A written document that is sent by a blood relative of, at the least, the second degree or a relative by marriage of the first degree living in the foreign country, that is approved by that country's local officials according to its regulations, and that is certified by the local Turkish consulate.

B. A certified invitation, contract, collective-bargaining agreement, or similar document that is sent by an official, semiofficial, or private organization of a foreign country and that is translated by a Turkish consulate.

C. A signed declaration giving the purpose of the visit, length of the visit, and the date he will return to Turkey after the purpose of the trip has been carried out.

6. If necessary, passports that are issued to persons covered in Article 5 will be valid only for the country or countries to which they will go and for the length of that visit only.

7. Extension or renewal of passports belonging to those whose situations abroad are in order will be carried out upon presentation of valid residence or working permits.

8. Those who wish to purchase foreign exchange to travel abroad will follow the general rules and regulations.

9. Until a new regulation is put into effect, absolutely no passport can be issued to anyone against whom an investigation or legal proceedings have been initiated by those who have established that the person's actions have harmed state security or constitutional order.

10. In order to prevent the counterfeiting of passports, the contents of passports will be changed along the lines of work done previously by the foreign affairs, finance, and interior ministries.

11. A coordination committee at the technician level within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinator's office will be established to follow up on implementation of measures to be taken and to propose new measures.

12. In order to assist work to issue all passports from Ankara and to evaluate all sorts of information and data, the transition to a computer system can be considered. For this purpose, the Ministry of Interior will look for available computers in Turkey, evaluate their capacities, and conduct the necessary work to ascertain whether or not it is necessary to rent them.

13. Workers' brokers will be closely supervised by both labor inspectors and security officials and will be subject to the treatment proposed by the labor law.

In order to prevent from leaving the country those buses that make trips without obtaining permits from the Ministry of Communications in order to smuggle workers abroad, communications and customs officials at exit points will closely examine the operation licenses of buses and will turn over these bus driver- to security officials. For this purpose, the Ministry

of Communications and Transportation and the Ministry of Customs and Monopolies will issue the necessary directives to exit points.

14. Under no circumstance can the space for occupation on a passport be left blank.

Legal Regulations

1. It is deemed necessary to make several changes in Passport Law No 5682 and Labor Law No 1475.

2. Articles 22 and 23 of the passport law will be amended as follows:

Article 22: A passport or travel document cannot be issued for a period of 5 years from the date of application to those under general-security surveillance; those who are prevented by the courts from going to foreign countries; those who have shown losses on a minimum of two of the previous 5-year income-tax declarations prior to making application for a passport; those who do not pay income taxes and who cannot prove that they have a reason and means to live abroad; those whose departure from the country would be objectionable, as established by the Ministry of Interior, from the standpoint of security; or those whom officials have been notified owe taxes.

A passport or travel document cannot be issued for a period of 5 years from the date of application to those who have participated in anarchic and terrorist activities; those who are suspected of or convicted of committing crimes with a purpose derived from a political or social viewpoint or with the goal of creating fear, concern, or panic among the people; those who are suspected of or convicted of crimes listed in the first chapter entitled, "Crimes Against the Moral Character of the State," of the second book entitled, "Crimes," of the Turkish Penal Code; or those who are suspected of or convicted of acting in violation of Law No 5816, which deals with crimes against Atatürk, of reform laws, of laws that prohibit white-slave trade, prostitution, and the smuggling of dangerous drugs, arms, and ammunition, and of Article 85 of Labor Law No 1475.

A passport or travel document cannot be issued for a period of 5 years from the date of application to those found guilty of a crime that calls for imprisonment at hard labor; to those found guilty of a shameful crime such as embezzlement, bribery, robbery, fraud, forgery, use of beliefs for evil ends, or promulgated bankruptcy; to those sentenced to more than 5-years' imprisonment for crimes other than imprudent offenses; or to those who have counterfeited or falsified passports or documents or who have made it a habit to lose these.

A passport cannot be issued to those convicted of a crime in a foreign country, depending upon the type of crime committed.

Article 23: The Council of Ministers can make a decision to issue passports valid for specific countries only because of political and economic considerations just as it can partially or totally prohibit Turkish citizens from going to foreign countries because of other extraordinary circumstances having to do with the threat of war, state security, or health conditions.

In cases of the threat of war, the existence of internal disorder or an epidemic in a foreign country, or other political or economic considerations, Republic of Turkey officials possessing the authority to issue passports in foreign countries can deliver passports to Turkish citizens through the instructions and with the consent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These passports are valid only for specific countries.

Turkish citizens in foreign countries who have been convicted by Turkish courts or who are being prosecuted for purposeful crimes committed in Turkey may be given valid passports or travel documents by Republic of Turkey officials possessing the authority to issue passports in foreign countries in accordance with instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or at the order or with the consent of the Ministry of Justice. These are valid under the condition that they are used only to return to Turkey, that they are used within a month of issue, and that they are used in order to leave the country in which the owner finds himself and particularly the countries he must travel through.

It will be beneficial to amend Articles 85 and 105 of Labor Law No 1475 and to add a paragraph to Article 92. These changes are listed below.

Article 85: Private individuals and corporations are prohibited from operating existing bureaus or opening private bureaus that seek to earn money and that serve exclusively as middlemen within the country or abroad for the purpose of finding jobs for workers or workers for jobs.

However, the IIBK [Labor and Employment Organization Directorate General] can give permission to middlemen to find, for a fee, jobs and workers in the agricultural field.

It is possible for societies composed of employers or employees in various branches of business and industry who come together amongst themselves, in various associations, or in order to serve the public or for societies that are not one of these, but that deal solely with philanthropic work to become involved with finding jobs and workers and to operate an organization established within their own framework in order to do so, provided that they receive the permission of the IIBK and that they are continually supervised by the IIBK. However, acceptance of any fee whatsoever for services performed by bureaus opened in this manner is prohibited.

Bureaus opened in violation of this article will be closed down at the command of the IIBK and by the order of the highest ranking civil service commander in the area.

Supplemental Paragraph to Article 92: IIBK inspectors have the authority to investigate, obtain information and documents deemed necessary, examine, and question, in matters concerning finding employment and workers in accordance with the statutes of this law, all businesses operated by the state, provinces, municipalities, private individuals, and corporations, and private and corporate middlemen and bureaus that find jobs and workers in accordance with the statutes of Article 85.

IIBK inspectors will notify their office and, when necessary, the regional labor directorate of the results of their investigations, research, and questioning. The IIBK or the regional labor directorate will immediately forward information that necessitates criminal prosecution to the attorney general.

Article 105: Private individuals or corporations that operate without obtaining permission as cited in the written conditions of Article 85, Paragraph 2 of this law or in violation of the statutes of Paragraph 1 of the same article will, in addition to punishment received appropriate to actions taken for general crimes, be subject to a fine of from 25,000 liras to 100,000 liras, and, furthermore, private individuals and directors of corporations and their employees who participate in the actions will be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 2 years. The bureaus involved will also be closed down.

Private individuals and corporations that seek to send workers abroad in violation of statutes within Article 85, Paragraph 1 of this law or who seek to employ smuggled workers will be subject to a fine of between 100,000 liras and 200,000 liras, and private individuals and directors of corporations and their employees who participate in these actions will be sentenced to imprisonment of 5 years at the least. The bureaus involved will also be closed down.

In cases of repeated violations, penalties will be doubled.

The right to close down offices is reserved by the IIBK.

11673

CSO: 4907

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION TO BE REVAMPED

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 15 Nov 80 pp 1,7

[Text] Ankara--THA--Minister of National Education Hasan Saglam has announced that his ministry is planning to institute, as a course in lycees, a general competency class, which has great importance on the university entrance examination, so that equal opportunity among candidates who take the university entrance and placement examination can be ensured.

In a statement to a THA correspondent, Minister of National Education Saglam noted that he has been receiving complaints from the public that the university examinations are not being given under equal conditions. He said:

"I receive a steady stream of criticism that the university examinations are not being given under equal conditions. The complaints come primarily from low-income families. It is said that education is not equal and that equal opportunity must be ensured. These complaints of our people have been considered. Working committees in our ministry are studying the insertion in lycees of a detailed program for a general competency course, which plays a large role in privately run preparatory courses.

Minister of National Education Saglam also reported that working committees are continuing their studies on determining application of Kemalist principles in national education.

Saglam pointed out that work is underway to redesign the religious courses given in primary and middle schools. He spoke of the preparation of a national education basic law, saying:

"I believe that, along with enactment of a national education basic law, other laws related to national education must be amended. These laws cannot be adapted. For this reason, one part of the program must be completely revamped."

Minister of National Education Saglam stated that the necessary agreements have been reached so that students from vocational-training lycees may be

employed in the public and private sectors and said that the drafting of rules and regulations has begun. He said, "Progress will be seen on this issue within the framework of the fourth 5-year plan. The employment of vocational-training lycee students in the public and private sectors will ensure satisfactory benefits."

11673

CSO: 4907

CHANGES OCCUR IN TOP-LEVEL PERSONNEL

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 16 Nov 80 pp 1,5

[Text] Ankara--THA--It has been learned that reports drafted at the request of Prime Minister Uluu on the situation of personnel in all ministries and their affiliate organizations have been studied, that the subject will be reviewed at a Council of Ministers' meeting to be held Wednesday, 19 November, and that a personnel decision that is being prepared will be put into its final form at that time.

The reports drawn up by all the ministries include information regarding the hiring date, education, rank in previous jobs, and present rank for each high-level civil servant and adviser employed in ministries and their affiliate organizations. The reports also contain information concerning the need for personnel in these organizations.

The reports give the total numbers of personnel in the ministries and their affiliate organizations as well as the situation of organizations that have an excess of personnel and present alternative views on the assignment of the excess personnel to other specific organizations and branches.

In the meantime, work to compile information has been completed by all the ministries, and reports giving the names of the members of the administrative councils and their chairmen of the KIT [Public Economic Enterprises] attached to them, these persons' assignment dates, prior jobs, and concurrent jobs, if any, have been submitted to the prime minister's office.

According to information that has been obtained, after all the information regarding high-ranking personnel within the KIT is received by the prime minister's office, the subjects of reducing the number of administrative council members in particular and of examining the appointment in the past to these positions for political purposes will be placed on the agenda. Once the Council of Ministers deals with the topic, changes in the KIT administrative councils will be regulated by a decision.

It was learned that, at the 19 November Council of Ministers' meeting, changes to be made among staff members at the level of undersecretary and

assistant to the undersecretary at various ministries will be discussed and that significant changes in assignment will take place in the days following this meeting.

According to information that was received, undersecretaries and their assistants will first be removed from office at the Ministry of Customs and Monopolies and the Ministry of Culture, and new appointments will be made. Following this, changes among high-ranking officials named prior to 12 September at all ministries except for the Ministry of Industry and Technology and the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources will be carried out in a specific order.

Included in the work to be conducted by the Council of Ministers within the next week is implementation of Council of State decisions.

According to information obtained, specific Council of State decisions reached prior to 12 September have begun to be applied at the Ministry of Customs and Monopolies and the Ministry of National Education in particular. It was reported that the topic of ensuring coordination of application among all ministries will be discussed by the Council of Ministers and that a joint method of application will be devised.

11673
CSO: 4907

IMF WANTS PRIVATE BANK CREDIT FOR TURKEY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 16 Nov 80 p 6

[Text] At an IMF administrative council meeting held last Friday in Washington, it was noted that Turkey's economic stabilization program is being implemented with success and that the IMF has reduced its share of assistance, but the fact that large commercial banks remain inactive was criticized. The council has decided to take steps so that these banks will provide credit to Turkey immediately.

A high-level official from a large American bank spoke on this subject, saying:

"It must not be forgotten that the banks are private firms and that they provide credit to other nations using a set of commercial criteria. We are astonished that the IMF is accusing commercial banks of not helping Turkey. The banks have expended a great deal of effort to date reorganizing the Turkish economy. And, recently, short-term credit of up to 180 days has been given Turkish banks."

Financial circles in Turkey report that large commercial banks' decisions as to whether or not to provide credit are not categorically based on political considerations, but point out that the condition these banks look for is political stability in the nations to which they give money. They note that, following the latest administrative change in Turkey, stability was ensured, and the maintenance of the stabilization program in the economic sphere arouses pleasure.

However, it is being reported that, despite this, banks are looking at the IMF's proclaimed "green light" as a "caution light" and are, in fact, coming to a halt in some areas because of several economic factors.

Banks Also Accuse IMF

Another banker characterized the IMF's accusation that commercial banks are not helping Turkey as "insincere" and said, "The IMF knows before everyone else and better than anyone else what banks will be able to do

and what they will not do. It is not possible for the IMF not to know the status, situation, and criteria of commercial banks. From this standpoint, criticism of commercial banks is inappropriate." The same official stated that it is necessary not to forget the large amounts of credit provided by the banks to Turkey to date and the postponement of agreed-upon indebtedness.

Financial circles in Turkey recall that the large commercial banks (the Bank of America, Chase Manhattan, Citibank, Morgan Guarantee, and the Chemical Bank being the American banks among these) have made less credit available to foreign countries this year already because of the economic crisis existing in the world and, in particular, to nations that do not produce petroleum. In fact, there has been a 36-percent decline during the first 10 months of 1980 in comparison with last year. Furthermore, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, Mexico, and the Philippines are the major countries that are able to obtain private bank credit in significant amounts this year. Banks consider these countries, whose foreign-trade volumes, in particular, are extremely high, "safe."

What Must Turkey Do?

In the meantime, financial circles in Turkey believe that, because of rising interest rates in recent times, it is unwise to borrow extensively from commercial banks. In fact, the interest rate on money obtained from these banks is currently 18.5 percent.

The political and economic conjuncture prevailing in the world has been gradually constricting banks' ability to provide credit and to make long-term loans in particular.

In this situation, the opportunity for countries such as Turkey to borrow money from large foreign banks is also reduced.

A Turkish economist, who is following these developments closely, stated, "What Turkey can do today is engage in production and export mobilization and use its own potential properly. To do so, it is necessary to take legal and practical measures immediately. In any case, to request continual indebtedness from foreign banks is not at all a sound course to take."

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SPO AUTHORITY HAS BEEN BROADENED

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 4 Dec 80 p 5

[Text] The powers of the State Planning Organization (SPO) have been broadened by a Council of Ministers' decision regarding the implementation and monitoring of the 1981 fiscal program. Limited by the decision are these activities of public enterprises that are conducted without the knowledge or approval of the SPO.

Through these expanded powers--described by authorities as aimed at "ensuring discipline in the public sector"--the SPO's position has been strengthened with respect to close monitoring and supervision of macro-developments in the economy, ensuring coordination in decision making, and in this regard overcoming discord that can arise among ministries.

Among the expanded powers granted the SPO, those of importance are ensuring and monitoring the implementation of 5-year investment programs prepared by public enterprises, approving changes in these programs, and deciding on increases for appropriations.

According to information obtained, the "Five Year Investment Programs," prepared by public enterprises for the purpose of achieving the goals set in the 1981 program and in the fourth plan, will be sent to the SPO by the ministries no later than 15 September 1981. In this connection, enterprises like TUMOSAN (Turkish Motor Industry and Trade Corporation), TAKSAN (Machinery Spare Parts Industry and Trade Corporation), TUMSAN (expansion unknown), TESTAS (Turkish Electronic Industry and Trade Corporation), and GERKONSAN (Gerede Steel Construction and Equipment Factories, Inc) will also submit their own operation and finance tables to the SPO by 1 September 1981 at the latest.

Implementation programs for projects that must be carried out by more than one enterprise will be prepared in coordination with the SPO.

Moreover the SPO will definitely weigh in before public enterprises take on new organizational structures. Economic, social, cultural and political draft laws as well as those concerned with measures will be sent to the SPO for its views before being sent to the Council of Ministers.

According to information gathered, the SPO has been given the authority to examine, in conjunction with the Finance Ministry, the State Economic Enterprises and their requests for participation in all public undertakings in which more than 50 percent of financing is public in origin. The SPO will also examine the proposed share of involvement. The results will be submitted for approval by the Council of Ministers.

In addition, main office functions for projects deemed important to program completion and coordination on the government level will be handled by the SPO, as will be project selection. The SPO can delegate coordination to its headquarters or that function can be assigned to one of the regional enterprises. These enterprises will be directly responsible to the SPO.

Among the powers given to the SPO to ensure discipline in the public sector is the continuous oversight of these enterprises through regular reports to be prepared by these bodies. To this end, enterprises that use foreign credit or other outside financial resources will inform the SPO by regular monthly reports as to their utilization of this credit. Moreover, public and private sector operations as well as the production rate for goods and services will be monitored and checked on by the SPO also through monthly reports. Enterprises like TUMOSAN, TAKSAN, TEMSAN, TESTAS and GERKONSAN fall within the scope of SPO oversight.

CSO: 4907

REALITIES OF ECONOMIC POLICY EXPLORED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 4 Dec 80 p 6

[Editorial by Teoman Erel]

[Text] There is great interest as to whether revisions will be made in the 24 January economic program and, if this occurs, whether there will be fundamental changes in key economic concerns.

However, there is unanimity among bureaucrats irrespective of their approval or disapproval of the policy Turgut Ozal represents: "It is still too early..." Especially while talks with the IMF delegation continue in Ankara...

The stalled aspects of the 24 January program and the unattainable goals have created growing apprehension which is again racing at the speed of inflation. Perhaps a revision will come some time later. But it is clear that a serious alteration or incisive discussion on the part of the National Security Council would not be beneficial at this point.

And this explains a meeting. Some time ago a briefing was given on economic matters to council members and concerned high ranking officers. Planning experts and economists provided information on economic developments during the time allotted them and defended the 24 January policy. In this connection the planners addressed exceptional developments in certain Asian countries like South Korea and Singapore with respect to foreign capital influx and export increases.

When this briefing started, a top-ranking general reminded the participants that the experts were not to be asked questions.

This explains the fact that at the end of the briefing Chief of State General Evren stated that discussion would be inappropriate and that meetings would be held later, if required.

Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal is still powerful and influential. He appointed Yildirim Alpturk, a trusted friend, as the de facto head of the State Planning Organization, even though an official "in-house circular" was not issued.

However, the sorts of results that 24 January-type program have yielded in various countries are being discussed in the press and bureaucracy. It is recalled that the Ozal-type, arrogant expert Netto in Brazil was forced to abandon the fiscal policy he had insisted upon.

Attention has been drawn to the failure of Prime Minister Thatcher, who implemented a similar policy in Britain. In an article published on this topic in the most recent "Aktualite" supplement of MILLIYET, Kasim Yargici noted that in the end doctrinaire and romantic attitudes will collide with the wall of reality. He wrote:

"The Margaret Thatcher government, which came to power asserting that it would right the country by observing a fiscal policy, could not be spared this fate."

Yargici reports that the government has made some adjustments in its economic policy in light of unsuccessful results but he qualifies his statement thus:

"But the general opinion is that these measures will be to no avail and that there will be a gloomier future."

It appears that these types of economic policies upset the middle class and cause extreme disruption in the political structure. It cannot be a coincidence that as the tough Thatcher economic policy presses on an individual considered a radical leftist has been elected leader of the British Labor Party.

It is an interesting indication that our Finance Minister Kaya Erdem during a press conference to announce the budget stated that a concerted effort would be made to protect the middle class.

How the middle class might be protected in light of the 24 January economy and in the face of the present inflation rate can be debated. But it is significant that the shock the middle class is experiencing has been identified by a member of the government and that concern is being shown.

As we stated at the outset, perhaps we have embarked on a discussion that might be regarded as "premature." But as the world economic conjuncture becomes dangerously narrow, and while even Greece is "giving emphasis to public investments so as to be able to endure Common Market competition," and as war clouds gather over our region, one must consider any type of change as possible.

A serious, alternative prescription to the 24 January policy has not been offered. Nevertheless, there are very few who do not believe in the necessity of being prepared for any eventuality.

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